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The food crisis has been at the forefront of the global con-sciousness for much of this year. Although food inflation 
is nothing new, the combination of rising commodities 
prices, increased fuel costs, greater consumer demand, and shifts 
from food to energy crops has made the cost of food an issue at 
every table. The issue brings with it a myriad of questions about 
not only the cause of rising prices but also how global food and 
agriculture impacts sustainability, climate change, and individ-
ual health and consumption decisions.
Our global agricultural system is about much more than the 
food we eat. On a large scale, it is also about how domestic and 
international agricultural policies impact our air, water, and soil. 
On a more local scale, it is also about working landscapes, urban 
sprawl, and rural livelihoods. And individually, it is about our 
health, nutrition, and lifestyle choices. Finally, it is about the 
access and equity necessary for everyone to realize the potential 
benefits of a thriving and efficient global food and agricultural 
system.
As we considered putting together an SDLP issue on food 
and agriculture, the wide range of potential topics was striking. 
We hope to provide a broad overview of some of these issues 
along with explanations of ongoing and potential future solu-
tions. Articles range from a synopsis of the recent global food 
crisis to the potential for and limitations of genetically modified 
crops in addressing the crisis. Our contributors touch on biofu-
els, organic agriculture, green labeling, tobacco farming, rural 
land use, and the 2008 Farm Bill in the United States. With this 
issue, we hope SDLP will help move the discourse beyond the 
common rhetoric of blame and defeat towards creative solutions 
for effective and efficient use of our global agricultural resources 
for today’s growing population and future generations. 
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an overview oF thiS iSSue:  
cloSely-linkeD nature oF Global FooD anD Finance
by Siwa Msangi* 
The tumultuous economic events of the past year have given us all a stark reminder of the closely-linked nature of the global food and financial economy, and the ability 
of market-level ripple effects to quickly spread from one corner 
of the globe to the other. In the case of the food crisis, the origin 
and underlying causes of these ripple effects are both diverse 
and complex in nature—as they include ‘drivers’ of change that 
are both socio-economic and environmental. While the role of 
crop-based biofuels in certain OECD countries might explain 
part of the rapid increase in prices for commodities like corn, the 
underlying causes of rapid increases in rice prices in East and 
Southeast Asia stem from a very different set of policies—some 
of which, in themselves, helped to magnify the original mar-
ket shocks, and worsen the effects. Among such policies were 
export bans and unilateral trade actions, which tend to allow 
less room for flexibility in the system just at the time when it is 
needed most, and distort the market signals that might help to 
bring about needed corrections and adjustments. 
Production-side shocks to food economies were driven by 
droughts, floods, or other extreme weather events that coincided 
with a much ‘tighter’ set of market conditions in many countries, 
where historically abundant stocks of grain reserves had slowly 
been run down over time, and demands had slowly been ramp-
ing upwards. The relatively low level of global grain stocks is 
largely due to either policy neglect or the desire to privatize the 
operation of the food system, so that a ‘just-in-time’ principle of 
inventory management could be exercised for the sake of effi-
ciency. Some of these changes were driven by the incentives of 
structural adjustment regimes, others were brought about by a 
more laissez-faire attitude towards how food economies should 
be managed and the persistent belief that there’s always plenty 
to be had from the market at low prices—which is clearly no 
longer always the case. 
One of the deficiencies in the world socio-political and eco-
nomic infrastructure that the food crisis has helped to bring to 
light is the widespread lack of compensating mechanisms that 
can provide social protection to those most in need of help. The 
‘low-hanging’ fruit of price controls turned out to be a favored 
policy instrument for many governments eager to suppress the 
inevitable discontent that high food prices cause among high-
ly-vocal, urban populations, and who lacked any other form of 
social protection programs. These price controls, while easy to 
implement, tend to dampen the very incentives and signals that 
food producers need to receive in order to boost their output, and 
help prices ease towards the lower levels that we’re now begin-
ning to see. When these highly-vocal populations begin to suffer 
* Dr. Siwa Msangi is a Research Fellow in the Environment and Production Tech-
nology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute (“IFPRI”). 
Dr. Msangi’s current research focuses on the major socio-economic and bio-
physical drivers affecting agricultural production and trade, and their impacts on 
nutrition, poverty and the environment. A Tanzanian national, he completed his 
undergraduate and doctoral studies at Stanford University and the University of 
California at Davis. 
the effects of high food prices, they also tend to be more cantan-
kerous and critical of other less-desirable aspects of government 
policy—which is why low food prices are often the opium that 
poorly-performing governments prefer to give to their constitu-
ent masses. 
The overall conclusion that we are forced to draw from 
these lessons of the recent past is that we live in a much tighter 
and more volatile world food market situation, where the fail-
ure of certain countries to maintain consistently high exports, 
for whatever reason, will result in a rapid escalation of prices 
and deterioration of socio-economic welfare for the world’s 
poorest and most vulnerable. There may not be the ‘fat’ in the 
system that we might have taken for granted in the past, that 
might help us to stave off the worst effects of food price vola-
tility for long enough to make the corrective measures needed 
to avoid high inflation. As we anticipate the growth of today’s 
nearly 6.2 billion people into a global population of over nine 
billion in 2050—many of whom will be more wealthy and 
sophisticated in their diets and lifestyles—and contemplate the 
implications for global food supply, and the constraining effects 
of land degradation and climate change, we are given reason to 
pause.  Malthusian doom is not upon us yet—but we must work 
to prevent his herald from appearing. Much work is yet to be 
done in strengthening agricultural production, distribution, and 
marketing systems in regions which have the worst-functioning 
infrastructure, and weak systems of agricultural extension and 
research. Multi-lateral effort needs to be applied, at a global 
level, to bolster the mechanisms of trade and commerce which 
can help smooth periods of turbulence and uncertainty. These 
efforts would allow for free movement of goods to where they’re 
most needed and valued, but the markets, by themselves, cannot 
save us entirely. Good systems of governance and well-targeted 
public interventions need to be made to fill in gaps, as they arise, 
and step into the widest breaches that might suddenly appear on 
the path of development. 
Such are the competing (and sometimes conflicting) demands 
of governance within these trying and turbulent times—to let the 
market-based incentives work when they’re most useful, and to 
protect those who are least served by the market at the same 
time.
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Biofuel production  
raises rather than reduces 
GHG emissions.
bioFuel, the environment, anD FooD Security: 
a Global problem exploreD throuGh a caSe StuDy oF inDoneSia
by Nicola Colbran & Asbjørn Eide*
InTroDucTIon
This paper examines the environmental and food security controversies over the production and use of biofuel for transportation. During the last decade, tremendous inter-
est has been paid to biomass refined into biofuel (mainly ethanol 
and biodiesel) and used to power transport vehicles. It is widely 
claimed that the use of biofuel can contribute to the solution of a 
range of problems, both environ-
mental and social in nature.
In the face of the growing 
threat of global warming caused 
by greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions, it has been argued that 
biofuel used for transport can 
partly or wholly replace gasoline 
and lead to a significant reduc-
tion of such emissions. Another 
often made claim is that biofuel can provide a renewable, and 
therefore sustainable, energy source with positive consequences 
for the environment. Some also claim that production of biofuel 
can increase the agricultural income for rural poor in developing 
countries.
If such achievements could indeed be made, there is a very 
strong ethical argument in favor of liquid biofuel production, but 
are these claims justified? Do they correspond with reality?
In recent years, grave concerns have emerged and during 
the last year have particularly grown in strength and signifi-
cance. There are well documented claims that there can be seri-
ous harmful environmental and social consequences of biofuel 
production and that these have been grossly underestimated. It 
also appears that the alleged benefits of biofuels have been exag-
gerated. The growing concerns are strikingly reflected in the title 
of a recent working paper for the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”): Is the cure worse 
than the disease?1
This debate has received increasing topicality due to the 
food crisis caused by a steep increase in prices without a cor-
responding increase in income for the food insecure. One cause 
of this crisis arises from the production of biofuel which com-
petes with food production for the use of land and water. In this 
article we examine the situation in one large country which has 
engaged massively in crops for biofuel production: Indonesia.
Liquid biofuel is primarily produced as ethanol or bio-
diesel. The feedstocks for ethanol are generally sugar cane and 
maize, and to a lesser extent wheat, sugar beet, and cassava. 
The feedstocks for biodiesel are oil-producing crops, such as 
 rapeseed, palm oil,2 and jatropha.3
Brazil pioneered the production of liquid biofuel well before 
World War II, using parts of its vast sugar cane plantations for the 
production of ethanol. The second major producer is the United 
States, starting its production of ethanol from maize in the 1980s. 
Around the turn of the millennium the European Union became 
heavily involved, mainly using 
rapeseed and to a lesser extent 
soybean and sunflower oil for 
biodiesel production. In 2006, 
Indonesia developed its own 
policy on the production and 
use of biofuel.
The United States and 
the European Union consume 
the whole of their own bio-
fuel production internally, but they are far from meeting their 
own targets of consumption through self-production. They will 
therefore be increasingly dependent on imports from developing 
countries if they are going to rely heavily on biofuel. The Euro-
pean and American demand for liquid biofuel has motivated 
substantial production in other countries, particularly in Indo-
nesia and Malaysia, which both engage in biodiesel production 
from palm oil. Indonesia has also focused on biofuel production 
from  jatropha plantations as part of a strategy to meet its own 
biofuel needs.
As of today, liquid biofuel has contributed only a tiny part 
of overall energy consumption. In 2007, it provided only 0.36% 
of the total energy consumption in the world. To achieve this 
very modest fraction of the total energy use, twenty-three per-
cent of U.S. coarse grain production was used to produce etha-
nol and about forty-seven percent of EU vegetable oil production 
was used to produce biodiesel.4 It is estimated that in 2008 the 
ethanol share of the gasoline fuel market in the United States 
will be about 4.5%, with a quarter of the coarse grain produc-
tion in the country devoted to biofuel. The U.S. National Acad-
emies of Sciences made a calculation, using 2005 as an example, 
showing that even if all the corn and soybeans produced in the 
United States in 2005 had been used for bioethanol production, 
* Nicola Colbran is the legal adviser at the Indonesia Programme, Norwegian 
Centre for Human Rights. Asbjørn Eide is Professor Emeritus, former Director, 
and now Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University 
of Oslo. 
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this would only replace twelve percent of the country’s gasoline 
demand and six percent of its diesel demand.5
If consumption of biofuel were scaled up enough to signifi-
cantly reduce the need for fossil fuel (gasoline), enormous land 
areas would be required with serious impacts on the environ-
ment and food security.
envIronmenTal anD socIal consequences oF 
bIoFuel proDucTIon
environmental harm
Monocultural production of feedstock for biofuel can cause 
a number of environmental harms. With the possible exception 
of sugarcane production for ethanol, there is increasing evidence 
that when the whole life-cycle of the production, distribution, and 
use of biofuel is taken into account, and when direct and indirect 
effects are counted, biofuel production actually increases GHG 
emissions and thereby intensifies rather than mitigates global 
warming.6
The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission is 
now largely endorsing the view that biofuel production raises 
rather than reduces GHG emissions. It has done so partly on the 
grounds that the GHG effects of the use of nitrogen fertilizers 
have been underestimated and partly because land use changes 
could release such quantities of GHG that it would negate the 
savings from EU agrofuels.7
Compounding these negative environmental effects of bio-
fuel production is the claim by critics that monoculture produc-
tion is harmful to biodiversity, which in turn has considerable 
consequences for the necessary dietary diversity required for 
adequate food. Furthermore, the production of biofuel causes 
both competition for water and the pollution of remaining water 
resources. Palm oil for biodiesel is heavily dependent on water. 
The jatropha bush is less dependent on water and can grow in 
marginal and dry areas, but its yield is low compared to what can 
be obtained when grown in more fertile land or with more access 
to water. It is likely that even with jatropha, the competition for 
water can be severe. Pesticides connected with biofuel produc-
tion are also reported to contaminate remaining water resources 
and give rise to health problems.
impact on FooD Security
The second issue with biofuels is the impact on food secu-
rity. In their paper prepared for the OECD, Doornbusch and 
Steenblik have argued that government policies around the 
world to replace oil with ethanol and other liquid biofuels could 
draw the world into a “food-versus-fuel” battle. They focused in 
particular on the impact on food prices. “Any diversion of land 
from food or feed production to production of energy biomass 
will influence food prices from the start, as both compete for the 
same inputs.”8 It is not only the conversion of traditional agricul-
tural land that may spark the “food-versus-fuel” battle. Follow-
ing conversion, areas like forests and marginal land previously 
used as common property resources, and which are traditional 
suppliers of food, fodder, fuelwood, building materials, and 
other locally important resources, are now no longer available to 
communities. The impact of such conversion on food security is 
outlined below in the case of Indonesia.
Putting it starkly, the “food-versus-fuel” game makes it pos-
sible for a car owner in a developed country to fill a 50 liter tank 
with biofuel produced from 200 kg of maize, enough to feed one 
person for one year.9 The purchasing power of the owner of the 
car is vastly higher than that of a food insecure person in a devel-
oping country; in an unregulated world market there is no doubt 
who would win this game.
Concentration, eviction, and transformation of the living 
conditions in rural areas exacerbate the impact of liquid bio-
fuel production on food security. Production of feedstock for 
biofuel is by its very nature best suited for large tracts of land, 
and it is a monoculture production, with all its negative impli-
cations. Large-scale monoculture production opens the land for 
foreign and outside investors on an unprecedented scale. Tra-
ditional, small-scale agriculture in developing countries is not 
attractive for investors, but biofuel is—as long as there is a guar-
anteed market. The implication of this is ominous: it may lead 
to a process of marginalization or eviction of smallholders to 
an unprecedented degree, transforming them either into badly 
paid workers or to the swelling number of urban poor. The long-
range consequences can be even more serious than the impact of 
the soaring food prices. The impact of marginalization of local 
communities on food security is examined more closely below 
in the case of Indonesia.
There are many other problems associated with the produc-
tion of biofuel that are outside the scope of this article. These 
include the particularly negative effect the process of land con-
centration, monoculture, and eviction or marginalization are 
likely to have on women’s role in agriculture. In many devel-
oping countries, women have the most important role both in 
production and preparation of food. A recent Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (“FAO”) study analyzes the risks that women 
will face if large-scale production of feedstock for biofuel goes 
ahead.10 The authors argue that liquid biofuels production might 
contribute to the socio-economic marginalization of women and 
female-headed households in several ways. For example, large-
scale plantations for such production require an intensive use of 
resources and inputs to which smallholder farmers, particularly 
female farmers, traditionally have limited access.11
Returning to the main topic of this article, the impact of bio-
fuel on the environment and food security, we have decided to 
use Indonesia as a case study to explore these issues in more 
depth.
The case sTuDy oF InDonesIa
Oil palm plantations, and to a lesser extent jatropha plan-
tations, are two of the main sources of bioenergy produced in 
Indonesia. Oil palm plantations were initially established by the 
Dutch colonial government between 1870 and 1930.12 Since 
then, the development of oil palm plantations has expanded rap-
idly, and Indonesia is now the largest producer of crude palm 
oil (“CPO”) in the world, producing almost half of the world’s 
palm oil.13
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In early 2008, Indonesia had 7.3 million hectares of oil palm 
plantations,14 with a further 18 million hectares of land cleared 
for expansion but not yet planted.15 Regional development plans 
have allotted an additional 20 million hectares (an area the size of 
England, the Netherlands, and Switzerland combined) for plan-
tation development mainly in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, 
and West Papua.16 One million hectares have been allocated 
for  jatropha plantation and production. By 2009, this area will 
increase to 10 million hectares.17
DrivinG the DemanD—DomeStic anD international
Domestic and international demand for biofuel is one incen-
tive for plantation expansion. At the international level, as dis-
cussed above, the EU and United States promote biofuel as an 
alternative energy source for transport and for use in power 
stations.18 In 2006, Malaysia and Indonesia announced their 
intention to supply twenty percent of the market in Europe and 
declared that they would set aside forty percent of their palm 
oil output for biodiesel.19 This commitment requires about 12 
million tons of CPO and plantation acreage of around 4 million 
hectares.20 China is also considering palm oil from Southeast 
Asia as a main source of alternative energy and has made large 
investments in oil palm development.21
At the domestic level, in 2006 the Indonesian government 
announced an ambitious policy targeting the development of 
renewable energy as a priority, especially the production of bio-
fuel, with the production of biofuel having two equally impor-
tant stated benefits: the alleviation of poverty and the creation of 
employment.22 To support its policy, the government has passed 
legislation for the production and promotion of biofuel;23 estab-
lished a National Team for Biofuel Development;24 provided 
financial incentives; and made efforts to simplify licensing pro-
cedures for biofuel plantation and production. Since the policy 
was announced in 2006, twenty-two companies have been set up 
to produce biofuels.25
While biofuel provides an incentive to develop and expand 
plantations, it is only one of a number of potential uses for palm 
oil. The oil is used in a variety of non-biofuel products,26 and 
demand for these products is sky-rocketing. Since the 1990s, 
economic growth in China and India alone has meant that one 
quarter of the world’s population depends on palm oil as its pre-
ferred vegetable oil.27 Demand for palm oil in the United States 
has also increased as food manufacturers try to reduce transfats 
associated with soy oil (U.S. palm oil imports have quadrupled 
in two years).28 Global demand is expected to double by 2020 
with four percent annual rate of increase per year.29 This means 
that irrespective of the level of demand for biofuel, any conse-
quences on the environment and food security of such crops are 
likely to continue.
The EU, China, and Indonesia have embraced biofuel as a 
clean, reliable alternative energy source. But are these claims 
justified? Do they correspond with what happens in reality? 
Does biofuel fulfil the claims of environmental benefits once fac-
tors like land use change, air pollution, the use of agrochemicals, 
water course diversion, and pollution are taken into account? 
Does it cause food insecurity as feared by many?30
The envIronmenTal eFFecTs oF bIoFuel 
proDucTIon
lanD uSe chanGe throuGh DeForeStation
Indonesia has 120.35 million hectares of forest, which is 
the largest forest area in Southeast Asia and the world’s third 
largest after the Amazon and Congo Basins.31 Its forests are 
home to around 10% of all species of flowering plants, 17% of 
all bird species, 12% of all mammal species, 16% of all reptile 
species, and 16% of all amphibian species.32 In large part owing 
to its rainforests, Indonesia is among the world’s ten most mega 
diverse countries. Importantly for food security, which is dis-
cussed later, its forests are also a source of food or the means to 
procure it for an estimated 60-90 million people.33
However, in 2008 Indonesia became “the country which 
pursues the world’s highest annual rate of deforestation” with 
1.8 million hectares of forest cleared each year between 2000 
and 2005.34 Today, oil palm plantations are a primary cause 
of deforestation, as Indonesia acknowledged itself in its Third 
Implementation Report on the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (“CBD”).35
Figure 1: The Extent of Deforestation in Kalimantan 1950-2005, 
and Projection Towards 202036
The destruction of primary and secondary forests on such 
a scale places enormous pressure on biodiversity and species 
such as the Sumatran tiger and orangutan found in the forests of 
 Kalimantan. In the last decade their habitat has declined while 
the plantation area in Sumatra and Kalimantan has increased rap-
idly.37 An oil palm plantation can only support up to twenty per-
cent of the mammals, reptiles, and birds that a primary rainforest 
supported prior to its conversion. To survive, wildlife (especially 
mammals) must share the same environment as humans. Planta-
tion workers and local communities encounter orangutans, tigers 
and other wildlife for some time after deforestation, leading to 
often serious and sometimes fatal consequences.38 According to 
Greenpeace, 1,600 orangutans were killed on oil palm planta-
tions during 2006.39
7 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
The loss of natural forests around the world each year con-
tributes more GHG emissions to the atmosphere than the global 
transport sector.40 Indonesia’s primary (old growth) forests are 
estimated to store around 230 tons of carbon per hectare,41 while 
secondary (re-growth) forests store around 176 tons of carbon.42 
By contrast, oil palm plantations only store around 91 tons of 
carbon per hectare, meaning there is a large deficit of carbon 
when primary and secondary forests are converted to oil palm 
plantations.43
Although the Indonesian Environment Minister has pub-
licly promised that “we are not going to sacrifice any trees for 
biofuels,”44 a substantial part of Indonesia’s planned oil palm 
expansion continues to be in forest areas. This is not surprising 
given Presidential Instruction No.1/2006 concerning the Sup-
ply and Utilisation of Biofuel as an Alternative Fuel directs the 
Ministry of Forestry to make “unproductive” forests available 
for conversion to plantations, and requires the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, provincial governors, regents, and mayors to encour-
age communities to turn land over to biofuel development. It 
is further complicated by conflicts of interest within the gov-
ernment. In Aceh, fourteen of the twenty-three district Heads of 
the Department of Forestry, who implement the mandate of the 
forestry department to protect forests from illegal loggers and 
plantation companies, are also the Heads of the Department of 
Plantations, whose priority it is to develop plantations.45
lanD uSe chanGe throuGh the DraininG  
oF peatlanDS
In addition to its vast forests, Indonesia has 22.5 mil-
lion hectares of peatlands,46 which is most of the 27.1 million 
 hectares of peatlands in the Southeast Asian region.47 Peatlands 
act as a natural carbon store, but release carbon when drying out 
or oxidizing. According to Wetlands International, about a quar-
ter of palm oil originates from drained peatlands48 and over fifty 
percent of new oil palm plantations are allocated on peatlands.49 
Conservative estimates indicate that each year around 660 mil-
lion tons of carbon is released from peatlands that are drying out 
and oxidizing.50 Over ninety percent of these emissions origi-
nate from Indonesia. Recently calculated GHG emissions place 
Indonesia as the world’s third largest emitter,51 although some 
oil palm companies and members of the government dispute the 
figures.52 Adding to this bleak picture is a study by Wetlands 
International which has shown that palm oil produced on tropi-
cal peatlands contributed more CO2 to the atmosphere than the 
use of fossil fuels.53 When peatlands in Indonesia are converted 
into oil palm plantations, studies estimate it takes 423 years to 
pay off the  carbon debt.54
In 2007, the Indonesian Agriculture Minister ordered pro-
vincial governors to stop awarding new permits to palm oil 
companies in peatlands, but according to Greenpeace, there 
have been no changes since the Minister’s order.55 Palm oil 
companies oppose any moratorium on forest and peatland con-
versions, arguing that it will negatively impact on the industry 
and on Indonesia’s economy, causing job losses and increased 
poverty.56
lanD uSe chanGe throuGh FireS
Forest fires to clear land for plantations are a regular source 
of haze in Southeast Asia, posing serious health problems, traffic 
disturbance, and substantial economic costs. Fires are a quick 
and cheap land clearing technique that save almost twenty per-
cent of the cost of establishing an oil palm plantation once the 
land has been clear felled.57
The worst forest fires in Indonesia to date were those in 
1997-98, which affected at least six percent of the country’s 
total landmass, causing smog to cover large parts of Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore for at least three months.58 
Indonesia’s Third Implementation report on the CBD states that 
large-scale land conversion was the largest cause of the 1997-98 
fires, which burned nearly 5 million hectares of forest and 
caused approximately $8 billion in economic losses in Indonesia 
alone.59 Of the larger 1997-98 fires, 46-80% occurred in planta-
tion concessions, around three-quarters of which were oil palm 
plantations. Although it is difficult to prove, most fires were 
likely lit by company staff or locals paid by the company. Arson 
as a result of conflicts between local communities and plantation 
companies was apparently another cause of the fires.60
water pollution, Soil eroSion, anD peSticiDeS  
anD FertilizerS
Biofuel plantation establishment and management also 
effects the environment in ways felt most acutely by the local 
communities whose land is converted into plantations.
The establishment of plantations diverts water from local 
communities, disturbs stream flows, and pollutes water resources. 
This also impacts water resources as a source of food for local 
communities. As oil palm is a monoculture crop, the land must 
be cleared of all vegetation. Roads and drainage canals are con-
structed using heavy machinery.61 This reduces the permeability 
of the land, causes a loss of soil faunal activity, and compacts 
the land, all of which increases top soil runoff and causes soil 
erosion. Sediment loads in rivers and streams increase signifi-
cantly. Flooding escalates in the rainy season, while there are 
water shortages in the dry season due to interrupted or reduced 
water flows.62
Oil palm plantations also cause the deterioration of water 
quality. The cultivation of oil palms requires pesticides and 
fertilizers for optimum production, which often leach into riv-
ers, contaminating the water.63 In the oil palm plantation sector, 
around twenty-five different pesticides are used, but monitor-
ing their usage is difficult as it is reportedly not controlled or 
documented.64 The most commonly used weed killer is paraquat 
dichloride, which is very toxic and accumulates in the soil with 
repeated applications.65 Its toxicity and accumulation in the soil 
negatively affect the ability to use the land as a source of food 
and income.
Water quality is worsened by the overflow or dumping 
of untreated palm oil mill effluent (“POME”) into waterways, 
which threatens community health and reduces aquatic diver-
sity. POME is a mixture of water, crushed shells, and fat residue. 
Most CPO mills have outdoor waste tanks to store and detoxify 
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POME by adding oxygen, but the tanks can overflow in heavy 
rain or during intensive production periods. Some companies 
also allow the effluent to flow directly into the rivers.66 A mill 
with a capacity of sixty tons of fresh fruit bunches (“FFB”) per 
hour can produce 1,200 cubic meters of liquid waste per day, 
equivalent to the sewage produced by a city of 75,000 people.67 
As FFB needs to be processed within twenty-four to forty-eight 
hours of harvest, one palm oil mill is usually built for about 
every 4,000-5,000 hectares of plantation.68 There are 7.3 million 
hectares of oil palm plantations in Indonesia.
Jatropha is also dependent on water. Although in principle 
it can grow in marginal and dry areas, the yield is low compared 
to what can be obtained when grown in more fertile land with 
access to increased water. In areas such as Sumba in East Nusa 
Tenggara, where extensive jatropha plantations are planned, 
there is no precedent for water management on the scale required 
for productive and profitable large-scale jatropha plantations.69
Contributing to potential environmental issues is that no 
 jatropha species have been properly domesticated and, as a 
result, the long-term impact of its large-scale use on soil quality 
and the environment is unknown.70 Jatropha has been banned in 
the Australian state of Western Australia, as it is claimed to be 
an invasive plant that is highly toxic to livestock.71
Without change in the way biofuel crops are planted and 
managed in Indonesia, there are no sufficient ethical justifica-
tions for biofuel use that override its harmful environmental 
implications. We are still far from the situation where all alterna-
tive energy sources are exhausted. There are other more efficient 
ways of using energy, and there are better ways to address the 
reduction of GHG emissions and urban pollution than by way of 
biofuel production.
The ImpacT oF bIoFuel proDucTIon on  
FooD securITy
On May 2, 2008, in his background note calling upon the 
UN Human Rights Council to convene a special session on the 
current world food crisis,72 the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food pointed to the demand for biofuels as one determining 
factor in the crisis. An increased production of crops for biofuel 
has contributed to higher prices as less food is produced in order 
to fill gas tanks. This has caused evictions and marginaliza-
tion, thereby undermining the livelihood of the most vulnerable 
groups. The result is that many individuals, either alone or in 
community with others, no longer enjoy physical and economic 
access to adequate food or the means for its procurement.73
tranSForminG traDitional aGricultural lanD  
into plantationS
In Indonesia, both traditional agricultural land and forests 
have been converted into plantations. This denies individuals the 
possibility of feeding themselves directly from productive land 
or other natural resources.74 In regards to traditional agricultural 
land, between 1993 and 2003 there was a decline in the num-
ber of staple crop farmers in Sumatra (3,140,000 to 3,080,000) 
but a steep increase in plantation smallholders (1,766,000 to 
2,831,000).75
Land conversion impacts productive agricultural land by 
increasing flooding and landslides. In Aceh Tamiang in eastern 
Aceh, oil palm plantations were identified as a main reason for 
flooding in recent years, as a result of which “at least 128,028 
hectares of farmland will become swampy when the rainy sea-
son arrives, and during the dry season will suffer drought.”76
the impact on FooD Security oF plantation-Style 
monocroppinG
Communities dependent on forests as a source of food are 
well-off in terms of food security, sovereignty over production, 
and management and stability in supply and income. Such com-
munities create secure livelihoods through a range of strate-
gies, including planting a variety of annual food crops as well 
as perennial cash crops. In addition, community economies are 
supported by ecosystem goods and services and common pool 
resources—a source of monetary and non-monetary income.77
Land made available for biofuel production through defor-
estation transforms areas that once supported forest-dependent 
communities into areas dominated by monocropping. Once 
monocropping is introduced, there is a loss of biodiversity, and 
a loss of ecosystem goods and services, as well as common pool 
resources. It also introduces a new crop requiring intensive man-
agement through permanent cultivation, which many local com-
munities are unfamiliar with.78 Traditional rotational farming is 
no longer possible because there is no natural forest left to fertil-
ize the poor rainforest soils, which are needed for the planting 
of crops.
As the transformation destroys indigenous peoples’ tradi-
tional food sources, it leads to food insecurity, and endangers the 
dietary diversity of local communities. Such a transformation 
of biologically diverse areas takes away the local community’s 
sovereignty over production and management, as well as stabil-
ity in supply and income. Dependence on a single crop commod-
ity may also increase the vulnerability of those working in the 
palm oil industry. For example, CPO prices on the international 
market fluctuate widely. In May 2007, CPO prices were $400 
per ton, but in May 2008 were $1,150 per ton.79 In August 2008, 
they had fallen back to below $800 per ton.80
Communities also find that their overall cost of living 
increases once monoculture has been introduced. This increase 
affects the ability of local communities to procure adequate 
food. They need more cash to survive as communities can no 
longer harvest food and products from the forest and do not have 
land to grow their own crops. To meet this need for cash, they 
can either become smallholders, laborers, or part of the swelling 
number of urban poor.
The effect on food security caused by oil palm plantations 
could be even more serious in regard to jatropha, which is to be 
planted in the eastern regions of Indonesia (West Nusa Tenggara, 
East Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Papua).81 Jatropha has been 
promoted as a good solution to the impact of biofuel produc-
tion on food security as it is a non-food crop that can be grown 
on “marginal lands” not normally suitable for foodcrops.82 The 
eastern regions of Indonesia are often considered marginal as 
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they are deemed to have limited food production ability and 
are prone to drought. In these regions there is an abundance of 
land not permanently cultivated, which is considered ideal for 
biofuel plantation development. However, if so-called marginal 
land is converted into biofuel plantations, the land can no longer 
be used as common property resources, which have traditionally 
supplied food, fodder, fuelwood, building materials, and other 
locally important resources.
The introduction of large-scale jatropha plantations will 
also increase the need for cash as workers and farmers have less 
time to feed themselves directly from productive land or other 
natural resources. Jatropha is quite labor intensive with calcula-
tions indicating one hectare of jatropha will require 108 work-
ing days per year (from land preparation to post-harvest), with 
each worker being annually paid Rp.1.7 million ($187).83 For 
farmers themselves, the price they receive for jatropha seeds is 
low, at less than one dollar per kilo, and in some cases less than 
six cents.84 This is a very small 
amount of money and there is 
little time remaining for work-
ers to either tend to their own 
land for food production or to 
carry out other income generat-
ing activities to procure food.
An important aspect of the 
right to food is the ability to 
procure adequate food without 
compromising the satisfaction of 
other basic needs.85 Like many 
countries, Indonesia is experi-
encing steep increases in food 
prices, particularly staple foods. The price of palm-oil-based 
cooking oil experienced the steepest rise; from Rp.9,000 per kilo 
in August 2007,86 to Rp.14,000 per kilo by March 2008.87 This 
price is prohibitively expensive for many Indonesians given that 
forty-two percent of Indonesians (nearly 100 million people) 
live on less than Rp.9,000 to 18,000 per day.88 One of the causes 
of this increase is that Indonesian palm oil producers are more 
interested in selling CPO to the international market, drawn by 
the possibility of higher prices.89 The shortage of cooking oil 
has meant many families are using recycled cooking oil, bought 
from vendors at a reduced price.
Indonesia is not immune to the recent world food crisis. 
Many Indonesians do not have regular access to, or means for 
the procurement of, sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and cultur-
ally acceptable food for an active, healthy life.90 In pursuing the 
plantation and production of biofuel, Indonesia needs to address 
the possible consequences that not managing biofuel sustain-
ably may have on food security. Failure to do so may seriously 
weaken the availability of food in quantity and quality sufficient 
to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals and the accessibility 
of such food.
The question then is whether Indonesia is likely to address 
the possible consequences of not managing biofuel sustain-
ably. One challenge is that Indonesia has simply not publicly 
acknowledged the social and environmental problems associ-
ated with unsustainable biofuel production. For example, in 
September 2008, the Indonesian Minister for Agricultre lobbied 
the EU over concerns that the EU was planning a policy that 
would limit imports of palm oil for biofuel from Indonesia. The 
Minister claimed “the EU was influenced by negative campaigns 
from non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”). We feel it’s 
not about environmental issues, it’s about trade.”91 He empha-
sised the Indonesian government’s belief that biofuel is a solu-
tion to poverty through employment creation by stating that the 
palm oil sector currently employs more than 5 million people. 
He added that “we should choose between human interests or 
those of the monkeys.”92 However, sustainable biofuel produc-
tion does not require such a choice.
At the international level, there is an increasing aware-
ness of the dangers inherent in unregulated palm oil and bio-
fuel production. Voluntary guidelines relating to certain crops 
used for biofuel production 
have been developed, such as as 
the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (“RSPO”) Principles 
and Criteria for Sustainable 
Palm Oil Production.93 These 
Principles were finalized in 
November 2007, although they 
will be reviewed again within 
five years. According to these 
Principles, “sustainable palm 
oil production is comprised of 
legal, economically viable, envi-
ronmentally appropriate and 
socially beneficial management and operations.”94 On the posi-
tive side, these Principles represent a potentially useful tool for 
civil society groups to evaluate companies’ social and environ-
mental practices and to hold them accountable. The grievance 
panel of the RSPO has already been used by communities in 
West Kalimantan as part of a suite of measures to challenge the 
environmentally and socially unsustainable practices of the Wil-
mar Group operating in the region.95 Wilmar International (and 
the International Finance Corporation) has since withdrawn its 
claims of sustainable palm oil production, and Wilmar claims to 
have set up procedures to ensure that the RSPO Principles will 
be adhered to.96
However, there are also challenges in relation to the Prin-
ciples. The Principles are voluntary and may only be truly 
enforced through market forces where there is higher consumer 
awareness about sustainability. There is also the question of who 
will ultimately bear the time and financial burden of proving 
that the palm oil produced is sustainable: will it be small plan-
tation holder producers, who in many cases produce oil palm 
fruit for the companies that control their lands and debts? An 
additional problem with the Principles was outlined by Unilever, 
the world’s largest consumer of palm oil, when it admitted to 
Greenpeace that it is not possible to trace the origin of palm oil 
once it is on the international market.97
In 2008 Indonesia became 
“the country which 
pursues the world’s 
highest annual rate of 
deforestation.”
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Finally, it is important to consider whether domestic legal 
systems that regulate biofuel production facilitate compliance 
with the Principles. If the legal systems do not, and in fact are 
contrary to the Principles, it will be impossible for companies 
that have already established plantations in compliance with 
domestic law to produce sustainable biofuel.
Irrespective of the efficacy of such Principles, the formula-
tion and implementation of national strategies for the produc-
tion of biofuel requires full compliance with principles of good 
governance: adequate and representative legislative capacity 
which can link the human rights principles to the concrete situa-
tions and needs of the country concerned, people’s participation, 
accountability, transparency, rule of law, and an independent 
judiciary, well versed with human rights.
conclusIon
In this article, we have presented the general environmental 
and food security issues relating to biofuel production and its 
use for transportation and have explored the real impact on the 
ground through a case study of biofuel plantation and production 
in Indonesia.
Two key lessons stand out from the environmental harm 
described above and from the soaring food prices, which are hav-
ing a devastating impact on vulnerable people. The first is that 
food availability is becoming an increasingly serious problem 
and has to be met by increased production. Future intensification 
of agricultural production or expansion to formerly uncultivated 
land should focus on food production, not on fuel production, 
and particularly not on liquid fuel production. The second lesson 
should be based on the awareness that prices will remain high 
for a long time, even though somewhat reduced from the present 
level. Taking into account that hundreds of millions of people in 
developing countries will not be able to buy their necessary food 
on the market at such high prices, alternatives must be found. 
This can take two directions, both of which must be pursued.
The first step is to ensure adequate land and protect the assets 
of small farmers and peasants so that they may produce the nec-
essary food for themselves, their families, and the local market 
with low input costs. The possibilities for small-scale and more 
organic farmers should be significantly expanded and given 
support, nationally and internationally. The second step, which 
supplements the first, is to establish a functioning safety net for 
those who cannot gain access to the necessary assets. Safety nets 
must be established through national and international coop-
eration. They should not be restricted to the minimum food or 
cash required to survive, but should facilitate empowerment of 
the recipient by helping them move from dependency to self-
 reliance, whether through agricultural activity or other means. 
The safety net should not be merely an emergency device but a 
tool for sustainable development.
recommenDation: the neeD For international 
GuiDelineS
To avoid the harmful environmental and human conse-
quences and maximize the possible benefits from biofuels, 
international guidelines must be urgently developed for biofuels 
production. The exact form of the guidelines is a matter to be 
explored through international negotiations. This is of increas-
ing urgency as a result of the food crisis. Existing guidelines on 
crops that can be used to produce biofuel and their associated 
strengths and weaknesses should serve as models. All guidelines 
should complement, not contradict, each other and should not 
impose an unnecessary burden on those who produce biofuel in 
a socially and environmentally satisfactory way.
In regard to the content of international guidelines for bio-
fuel production, the following concerns should be taken into 
account:
 • Avoid production of biofuel in ways which lead to increased 
greenhouse gas emissions, when direct and indirect impact 
is taken into account, or which divert water from existing 
users and prevents previously existing access to water for 
drinking and sanitation, which degrade the soil or pollute 
water or the local air conditions (e.g. by burning).
 • Avoid introducing non-native species which carry risks of 
invasion before appropriate safeguards are adopted—full 
application of precautionary principle is required.
 • Abstain from measures which evict previous users of the 
land without negotiation and acceptable alternatives for 
the previous users, whether they had recognized tenure 
or not. Abstain from production of biofuel in ways which 
undermine previously existing opportunities for women to 
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produce food or have access to woodfuel, unless other alter-
natives are made available prior to the initiation of the bio-
fuel project.
 • Establish legally binding certification schemes and a reli-
able monitoring system to ensure that the international cer-
tification is effective and enforced.
 • Give priority to projects based on small-scale farming, pos-
sibly through cooperative arrangements, with a combina-
tion of biofuel and food production for local consumption, 
and projects that ensure stable and healthy working condi-
tions, which ensure adequate dignity and independence of 
the worker.
 • Choose feedstock that has the potential, in its production, 
transport, distribution, and use, to reduce GHG emissions 
compared to the use of fossil fuel, and which avoids divert-
ing water from established and necessary uses, and avoids 
soil degradation or pollution.
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the real price oF atlantic Salmon
by Courtney Henson*
* Courtney Henson is a JD candidate, May 2010, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law.
The price of salmon has drastically decreased in the United States in the past decade, largely because of increased salmon aquaculture in countries like Chile. However, this 
price reduction was not achieved with sustainable methods. The 
real costs have been absorbed by the environment and workers 
in Chile’s salmon industry.
Salmon aquaculture has developed commercially in coun-
tries with natural salmon populations since the 1970s.1 Aquacul-
ture is the farming of fish under controlled conditions in natural 
water bodies or in closed systems. Fundación Chile, a nonprofit 
organization associated with the government whose goal is to 
foster Chilean business and industrial growth, introduced salmon 
aquaculture to Chile in the 1980s. The industry has boomed and 
Chile has become the world’s second largest salmon-produc-
ing country.2 Chilean salmon and trout exports have increased 
about 500% in the past decade.3 The expansion of commercial 
salmon aquaculture has resulted in the cost of salmon to con-
sumers being one-fourth the cost in the 1980s.4 Salmon has 
shifted from being an expensive delicacy to a common substi-
tute for meat and poultry.5 The drastic price reduction is a result 
of simple supply economics: aquaculture and improved technol-
ogy caused increased salmon production in more geographical 
areas, like Chile, which did not historically supply wild-caught 
salmon. Lower prices lead consumers to consume more salmon 
and has increased demand, particularly for value-added prod-
ucts like fillets, smoked salmon, and prepared meals.6 This shift 
has been particularly pronounced in the United States, the larg-
est importer of salmon.7 Chile supplies sixty-five percent of the 
salmon consumed in the United States.8
Salmon aquaculture in Chile has been credited as bringing 
development to several regions in Southern Chile. In Southern 
Chile’s Region X, with the majority of aquaculture sites, poverty 
has decreased by nearly half within a decade. 9 Extreme poverty 
in the same period dropped from thirteen to seven percent, and 
even further gains have been made since 2000.10 SalmonChile, 
an industry organization, estimates fifty-five thousand workers 
are directly or indirectly employed by the salmon industry.11 
In addition, Chile’s export-oriented economy has diversified 
its exports from copper and fruit; salmon is now Chile’s third 
largest export.12 Foreign direct investment has also increased, 
especially from Norway and Japan.13 Development of roads, 
banking services, and universities have also extended into the 
southern regions because of the salmon industry.14 
Cheaper prices in the supermarket and rapid development 
are not without costs, however. Impacts to the environment 
are more severe in Chile, because there is less regulation than 
in Norway, its primary competitor.15 There are several major 
environmental impacts from the salmon aquaculture indus-
try. The salmon themselves produce waste in addition to the 
antibiotics and other chemicals in their food. Escaped salmon 
present another environmental hazard. Salmon that escape their 
farm pens, which can amount to millions of salmon, are espe-
cially harmful in Chile because they are not a native species. 
They upset the ecological balance of the Pacific waters they are 
penned in because they are carnivorous and have few predators 
in their adopted habitat. 
Like Chilean environmental concerns, Chile’s labor prac-
tices in the salmon industry do not match their peers due to 
inadequate regulation. The industry’s close relationship with 
the government and the emphasis on exporting salmon has 
resulted in anti-union practices, substandard working conditions, 
and very low wages for workers.16 For example, Norwegian 
salmon industry workers make 378% more than their Chilean 
counterparts.17 
Economic development in southern Chile is highly depen-
dent on the salmon industry, which thus far has not demonstrated 
long-term sustainability. The industry faces an additional threat 
in the form of infectious salmon anemia (“ISA”), a disease that 
has plagued the salmon farming industry all over the world. ISA 
does not affect humans, but it is fatal to salmon and extremely 
contagious, especially to farmed salmon which are kept in close 
quarters. ISA finally spread to Chile in 2007, when much of the 
salmon stock in the country had to be destroyed. In the wake of 
the disease outbreak some importers, such as Safeway, refused 
to import Chilean salmon because the quality of the stock had 
declined.18 The effect of ISA has lead to the loss of jobs in 
Region X as companies—especially the giant in the industry, 
Marine Harvest—relocate or close.19
The ISA outbreak has dramatically exacerbated the nega-
tive impacts of poor environmental regulation and labor prac-
tices on the salmon aquaculture industry in Region X, where 
ninety percent of salmon production is located. Many of the 
companies in Chile have moved their operations further south to 
Regions XI and XII, or have closed, laying off over four thou-
sand workers in Region X.20 The disease outbreak has illustrated 
the unsustainability of the salmon farms’ practices. To prevent 
further outbreaks, companies have to improve their husbandry 
practices, and the government has to ensure greater regulation, 
such as protecting union efforts, mandating the space between 
aquaculture sites, and monitoring the chemicals administered to 
the fish. Regulatory agencies need to catch up to the growth of 
the salmon industry in Chile in order for the industry to become 
sustainable.21
Endnotes: The Real Price of Atlantic Salmon continued on page 67
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two Global criSeS brinG opportunity to  
international tobacco control
by Chris A. Bostic, M.S.F.S., J.D.*
InTroDucTIon
In many low-income countries, particularly those hardest hit by rising food prices, resources such as valuable land and human labor are diverted into the production of a cash crop 
that society would be better off without, tobacco leaf. Ironi-
cally, many of these farmers are rendered poorer than their food-
producing neighbors in the process, owing to the oligopolistic 
nature of the tobacco leaf processing industry, including preda-
tory credit and other practices.1 As the world takes greater action 
to combat the devastating health effects of tobacco consumption, 
nations that largely depend on tobacco leaf for export earnings 
are anxiously looking for alternatives.2 The nexus between this 
problem and the world food crisis is obvious. What is lacking is a 
coordinated, holistic approach. This paper will provide an over-
view of global tobacco leaf cultivation and efforts to promote 
a transition to other livelihoods for farmers, as well as suggest 
actions that may lead to greater cooperation toward solutions.
The health costs of tobacco consumption are well known, 
although few appreciate the magnitude. The World Health Orga-
nization (“WHO”) estimates that tobacco killed 100 million 
people over the course of the 20th century.3 It predicts that one 
billion will die this century.4 Unlike last century’s casualties, 
the majority of these deaths will be in lower income countries.5 
Addiction to tobacco causes more than just deaths. Tobacco-re-
lated diseases cost families and governments untold billions in 
health care costs, lost wages, and lost productivity.6 Poor fami-
lies that spend money on cigarettes must make up the difference 
somewhere else in the budget by reducing spending on food, 
housing, health care, or education.
In response to the coming catastrophe, the WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”) came into 
force in 2005.7 The treaty is focused on halting and reversing 
the alarming trends in tobacco consumption and its related death 
and disease.8 The FCTC includes several provisions focused on 
the developing world, including Article 17, which calls for coop-
eration in finding alternative livelihoods for persons involved 
in tobacco leaf cultivation.9 Article 17 has been a back-burner 
issue for the governing body of the treaty, but recently many 
have called for increased efforts to take advantage of opportuni-
ties in other vocations.10 The world food crisis has changed the 
equation for farmers and governments wishing to move away 
from tobacco cultivation.
The FcTc anD arTIcle 17
Negotiations for the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control began in 1999 under the leadership of then-WHO Direc-
tor Gro Brundtland.11 It was ground-breaking in two ways. First, 
it is the only treaty ever negotiated under the auspices of the 
World Health Organization.12 Second, it is the world’s first pub-
lic health treaty.13 In contrast to many environmental treaties, 
which have been seen as a threat to the profit margins of private 
industries, the goals of the FCTC and those of the multinational 
tobacco industry are diametrically opposed; complete success 
for the treaty necessarily means the bankruptcy of the tobacco 
industry. Public health advocates often point to the tobacco 
industry as the “vector” of diseases caused by tobacco consump-
tion, explicitly comparing them to mosquitoes or parasites.14
As a framework convention, the FCTC is meant as a starting 
point for further negotiations. Many of its articles are broad and 
few include definite obligations on parties. Still, six intergov-
ernmental negotiating body sessions, along with innumerable 
national and regional meetings, were required to hammer out the 
final language, which was unanimously adopted by the World 
Health Assembly in May 2003.15 To date, the FCTC includes 
168 national Parties, representing 83.5% of global population.16 
The only two mega countries—those with over 100 million 
persons—not Party to the FCTC are Indonesia and the United 
States.
The issue of tobacco cultivation is not a traditional concern 
of the public health community. Owing to the relatively small 
percentage tobacco leaf contributes to the total value of retail 
tobacco products, raising the price of leaf is not vital to efforts 
to curb tobacco consumption. There was, therefore, little reason 
from a public health perspective to include Article 17, which 
addresses farmers’ livelihoods rather than direct public health 
implications of tobacco use. Like all treaties, however, the FCTC 
is a political instrument. A number of WHO member states that 
depend to a great degree on export earnings from tobacco leaf 
were reluctant to support a treaty process that aimed, ultimately, 
to destroy this market by eliminating consumption. Article 17 
was the compromise that brought these countries on board by 
providing for alternative economic activities. It is short enough 
to quote in its entirety.
Article 17: Provision of support for economically via-
ble alternative activities
Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with 
competent international and regional intergovernmental 
* Chris A. Bostic is Legal Counsel to the Framework Convention Alliance, an 
umbrella organization of over 350 organizations from more than 100 countries 
working on the development, ratification, and implementation of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. He is also a Clinical Instructor at the University 
of Maryland School of Law, where his students focus on supporting the FCTC.  He 
is a 2002 graduate of the American University Washington College of Law.
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organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically 
viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and, as 
the case may be, individual sellers.17
The framers of the FCTC also gave a nod to environmental 
concerns, particularly as they relate to tobacco cultivation:
Article 18: Protection of the environment and the health 
of persons
In carrying out their obligations under this Convention, 
the Parties agree to have due regard to the protection of 
the environment and the health of persons in relation to 
the environment in respect of tobacco cultivation and 
manufacture within their respective territories.18
The first Conference of the Parties (“COP”) (the govern-
ing body of the FCTC) created an ad hoc study group (“Study 
Group”) to address Articles 17 and 18.19 The Study Group, 
made up of interested FCTC States, has met twice and reported 
back to the COP.20 While they are far from developing concrete 
solutions, the group has made a number of general recommenda-
tions, which will be further discussed below.
overvIew oF Global Tobacco leaF 
culTIvaTIon
As the absolute number of smokers in Europe and North 
America has leveled off and even fallen over the last four 
decades,21 the tobacco industry has increasingly looked to the 
developing world as a largely 
untapped market.22 As tobacco 
sales have exploded in developing 
countries, increased manufactur-
ing and commercial leaf cultiva-
tion have followed.23 In spite of 
public health efforts to combat 
consumption, the global demand 
for tobacco leaf is expected to 
continue to rise for decades.24 The 
United Nations Food and Agri-
culture Organization expects total 
production to reach 7.1 million metric tons in 2010, a twenty 
percent increase over 1998.25 Cultivation in developed countries 
continues a slow decline that began in the early 1980s; increased 
production is occurring entirely in developing countries, particu-
larly China.26
Tobacco can be grown in a variety of climates and soil 
types, and is grown in over 100 countries.27 For most nations, 
it is a minor crop, accounting for less than one percent of total 
exports.28 Two-thirds of the world total is grown in just four 
countries: China, Brazil, India, and the United States.29 South 
American leaf production is dominated by Brazil, the world’s 
number one exporter, which earned more than U.S. $1 billion in 
2003, the last year for which full figures are available.30 Brazil’s 
total production is dwarfed, however, by China, which produced 
more than 2.4 million metric tons in 2004, compared to Brazil’s 
928,000 metric tons.31
Africa has seen steady growth in tobacco cultivation since 
1970, increasing by an average of 3.7% from 1970-2000.32 
Malawi and Zimbabwe dominate continental production, pro-
ducing about half of Africa’s total.33 The two countries are major 
leaf exporters. Although most of the crop in China and India is 
destined for domestic consumption, Malawi and  Zimbabwe34 
earn sixteen percent and sixty-three percent, respectively, of their 
total export revenue from tobacco leaf. They are seventh and 
third, respectively, in the world in total export value.35 For obvi-
ous reasons, both countries were keenly interested in including 
language in the FCTC regarding the fate of tobacco farmers. 
Farmers in poor countries turn to tobacco for a variety of 
reasons. It has a relatively high yield per unit of land, and is 
therefore attractive in areas where individual farms are very 
small. The market for leaf is perceived as stable, anticipating 
high returns over the long term. Cured tobacco is far less perish-
able than food, a major reason why countries with poor infra-
structure and far from developed world markets tend to produce 
tobacco. Finally, support and loans (of both money and inputs) 
are often available from the tobacco industry, assistance that is 
not traditionally available for other crops.36
The benefits of tobacco cultivation are often illusory, how-
ever. In many instances, farmers who switch to tobacco cultiva-
tion find themselves poorer as a result,37 in monetary, health, 
educational as well as other terms, for several reasons. First, 
the initial investment is higher for tobacco than for many other 
crops. While economies of scale allow large-scale growers to 
make money, peasant farm-
ers are rarely able to realize 
enough profits to make the 
investment worthwhile.38
A second barrier to prof-
itability is the inherent power 
imbalance between tobacco 
farmers and transnational 
tobacco leaf buying com-
panies.39 A typical scenario 
plays out as follows: farmers 
enter into contracts with the 
companies whereby they receive up-front loans, seed, fertilizers, 
pesticides, advice, assistance, and a guaranteed buyer. Farm-
ers must promise to sell the entire crop to the company, at a 
price determined by the buyer. Sometimes payment for a partial 
crop will be withheld until the entire crop is delivered. Since 
the farmer has no control over the price paid for a crop, and no 
option to choose another buyer, in many cases the earnings do 
not equal what is owed under the contract. The farmer is able to 
put off the debt by signing a similar contract for the following 
year. Since these are legal contracts, and the farmer’s only col-
lateral is usually the farm itself, the leaf buyers can now use the 
domestic legal system to force the farmer to continue growing 
tobacco. This is known as “debt bondage.”40
The third drawback to tobacco cultivation is its relatively 
high reliance on labor. In order to make ends meet, farmers often 
require the full-time work of the entire family, including chil-
dren. Precluded from attaining an education, the children will be 
unable to break out of the cycle of poverty.41
Farmers who switch  
to tobacco cultivation find 
themselves poorer  
as a result.
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In addition to concerns about poverty cycles, tobacco cul-
tivation brings on a host of health concerns that are unrelated 
to smoking or other forms of consumption. Field workers often 
suffer an ailment known as green tobacco sickness, which occurs 
when nicotine is absorbed through workers’ skin during leaf 
handling. Symptoms include nausea and other gastro-intestinal 
maladies, weakness, headaches, dizziness, difficulty breathing, 
and increases in blood pressure and heart rates.42 Tobacco is also 
highly dependent on fertilizers and pesticides, including a num-
ber of organophosphate insecticides that have been shown to be 
highly toxic to humans.43
In addition to the human 
costs, there is an environmental 
cost to tobacco cultivation. First, 
runoff from heavy use of chemi-
cal fertilizers and pesticides pol-
lutes waterways and drinking 
water.44 Second, one of the rea-
sons fertilizers are so necessary 
is that the tobacco plant leaches 
nutrients from the soil at a rate 
higher than most other plants, 
reducing the fertility of the soil 
for years to come.45 Finally, 
tobacco cultivation is a major contributor to deforestation when 
wood is used as fuel to cure tobacco leaves. A researcher in 1999 
estimated that 200,000 hectares of forests are cut down per year 
as a result of tobacco farming, and that this accounts for nearly 
five percent of all deforestation in tobacco-growing developing 
countries.46 As tobacco cultivation has expanded in the first ten 
years of the new millennium, this figure has surely gone up.
Finally, one must consider the opportunity costs of grow-
ing tobacco instead of food crops. In addition to the millions 
of  hectares devoted to tobacco, an estimated eleven to twelve 
million farmers are largely dependent on the crop, with per-
haps an additional twenty million somewhat dependent.47 One 
researcher has estimated that if the land and resources devoted 
to tobacco were switched to food crops, an additional 10-20 mil-
lion people could be fed.48 This figure may seem pale in com-
parison to the world’s hungry, but one must consider that few 
farmers are profiting from tobacco and that leaf is the first step in 
a product stream that causes massive harm to society as a whole. 
Such obvious “win-win” trade-offs are rare.
The FcTc sTuDy Group
At its first meeting after the FCTC came into force, the 
Conference of the Parties established an ad hoc study group to 
address Parties’ issues arising under Articles 17 and 18. The 
study group has four objectives:
(1)  summarizing the uptake of existing economically via-
ble alternatives for tobacco workers, growers, and, as 
the case may be, individual sellers;
(2)  recommending to the Conference of the Parties mech-
anisms to assess the impact over time of the tobacco 
companies practices;
(3)  reporting on initiatives that are being taken at national 
level in accordance with Article 17; and 
(4)  recommending cost-effective diversification 
 initia tives.49
In addition, the COP mandated that the study group work 
closely with international organizations in related fields, such 
as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) and 
the World Bank.50 The study group is comprised of interested 
Parties. As an ad hoc group, membership is not fixed, and a 
greater number of Parties attended the second session than the 
first. Nongovernmental organi-
zations with relevant expertise 
have also been invited to both 
official meetings. 
The study group is not 
well-funded and has undertaken 
little original research, instead 
focusing on meta-analyses of 
other research in order to draw 
conclusions and make recom-
mendations. Issue areas exam-
ined include economics, labor, 
health, social and environmen-
tal impacts, alternative crops, 
non-crop alternative livelihoods, national policy frameworks, 
and tobacco industry corporate practices.51
The study group is tasked with reporting on its progress to 
each meeting of the Conference of the Parties, and produced 
a document in preparation for the third COP, held in Durban, 
South Africa in November 2008. In that document the group 
comes to a number of specific conclusions, recommendations, 
and observations:
48.  The pursuit of alternative livelihoods to tobacco 
growing must be addressed from a development 
perspective, as it involves health, social, environ-
mental and economic aspects beyond substitu-
tion of one economic activity for another. Despite 
advances in terms of national experiences, further 
work remains to be done.
49.  Standardized, regularly collected data are needed 
on employment, health and environmental and 
social issues, and independent studies should be 
conducted, especially in less developed countries, 
that provide credible evidence.
50.  Intersectoral approaches are needed to address alter-
native livelihoods, and public policies are required 
to ensure, for example, research and development, 
technical assistance and market access.
51.  At all levels, undue influence of the industry 
must be avoided in policy decisions by careful 
monitoring.
52.  The group agreed that a holistic framework is 
required that addresses all aspects of the liveli-
hood of tobacco growers. Such a framework was 
discussed at the meeting, and it was agreed that a 
Tobacco plant leaches 
nutrients from the  
soil at a rate higher  
than most other plants,  
reducing fertility.
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similar approach should be used to evaluate expe-
riences with alternative livelihoods and to provide 
a basis for implementing Articles 17 and 18 of the 
Framework Convention.
53.  To this end, the group identified the follow-
ing objectives, which the Conference of the Par-
ties might consider when expanding the group’s 
mandate: (1) adjust the suggested framework to 
address alternative livelihoods to tobacco growing; 
(2) standardize the terminology, instruments and 
variables in line with the standards and practices of 
the specialized international agencies; (3) identify 
mechanisms and areas of cooperation with inter-
national organizations with expertise in the matter; 
and (4) elaborate policy options and recommenda-
tions for implementation of Articles 17 and 18 of 
the Framework Convention.
54.  The group agreed that a successful shift from 
tobacco growing to economically sustainable alter-
natives requires public policies that give priority 
to profitability, technical and financial assistance, 
capacity-building and market and social support, 
especially during the transition from one economic 
activity to another, and that ensure the involvement 
of farmers in decision-making.
55.  An international database of information, research, 
experiences, best practices and regulations should 
be established, covering the status of tobacco 
growing, employment and the role of the tobacco 
industry. A baseline database should be established 
initially.
56.  While progress has been made in finding economi-
cally sustainable alternatives to tobacco grow-
ing, further studies are needed, particularly on the 
health, social and environmental impacts of tobacco 
growing in developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition. Further monitoring is 
needed, and information should be made available 
to farmers and to the public.
57.  States and international organizations should take 
a multisectoral approach in addressing the issue 
of alternative livelihoods, incorporating them into 
poverty reduction strategies and programmes. The 
World Food Programme and relevant development 
agencies should consider alternative livelihoods 
for tobacco crops as an opportunity. The involve-
ment of farmers in all stages of decision-making 
should be encouraged.
58.  Better understanding is needed of the role of the 
tobacco industry in tobacco production and its 
influence on the identification of sustainable alter-
natives. In accordance with Article 5.3 of the Con-
vention, governments should protect their policies 
for alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers 
from the vested interests of the tobacco industry, 
affiliates and front groups, as defined in the Frame-
work Convention.
59.  The group considered that the Convention Secre-
tariat should support Parties in raising and access-
ing funds for implementation of Articles 17 and 18 
of the Framework Convention.52
The global food crisis, and its nexus with the goals of FCTC 
Article 17, is specifically mentioned in the study group’s report, 
but only in passing.53 The group’s main contribution to a shift 
away from tobacco cultivation is in the gathering of evidence 
and data. It is simply not mandated or designed to react quickly 
to developments in international economics. By asking for spe-
cific expansions in its mandate—particularly in expanding coop-
eration with other international actors—the group is giving the 
COP the opportunity to accelerate the process. It remains to be 
seen whether the COP, which has so far seen Article 17 as a side 
issue, will rise to the challenge.
FunDInG sTreams anD pracTIcal  
obsTacles
The study group’s final recommendation, while simple, is 
arguably the most important. Many of the other recommenda-
tions for action will require funding, including further research, 
expanding infrastructure, technical assistance, monitoring, and 
market support. Over the life of the FCTC, Parties have been ret-
icent to assign a meaningful percentage of the budget to alterna-
tive livelihoods work. This reflects a common, and quite correct, 
attitude among tobacco control professionals that demand-based 
interventions are the priority. Even on the supply side, it is 
tobacco smuggling that receives the lion’s share of attention. 
There is also a perception among many that tobacco farm-
ers, as a part of the tobacco industry, are part of the problem and 
should be left out of any solution. FCTC Article 5.3 specifically 
calls for such a policy: “In setting and implementing their public 
health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act 
to protect these policies from commercial and other vested inter-
ests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”54 
The perception that farmers should be included as members 
of the tobacco industry contradicts the FCTC itself, however, 
which defines the tobacco industry as “tobacco manufacturers, 
wholesale distributors and importers of tobacco products.”55
Finally, the needs of tobacco farmers receive short shrift 
due to the compartmentalization of problems. The phenomenon 
is not limited to tobacco control or public health, but is univer-
sal and very natural. Tobacco control focuses on a problem that 
simply doesn’t include the plight of farmers. The focus of public 
health when it comes to tobacco was summarized very clearly in 
the chapeau of the FCTC:
The objective of this Convention and its protocols is 
to protect present and future generations from the dev-
astating health, social, environmental and economic 
consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to 
tobacco smoke by providing a framework for tobacco 
control measures to be implemented by the Parties at 
the national, regional and international levels in order 
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to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence 
of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke.56
Without a doubt, most public health professionals working 
in the tobacco control field, on a personal level, are also sym-
pathetic to the plight of tobacco farmers. They simply do not 
wish to see time and resources diverted from the core issues of 
tobacco control.
This discrimination against core WHO funding for Article 
17 issues is mirrored by private funding sources. In January of 
2007, billionaire and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
announced a major funding initiative to aid global tobacco con-
trol efforts.57 With additional financial support from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, this now amounts to hundreds of 
millions of dollars a year, a massive increase over the sparse 
funds allocated by WHO and donor countries in the past.58 Pub-
lic health professionals in low and middle income countries who 
wish to be considered for a grant under the initiative are directed 
to an explanatory web page, which includes the following infor-
mation: “What kind of projects will NOT be funded? The grants 
program is NOT designed to fund education programs (school-
based or otherwise) nor is it designed to fund agricultural or 
crop-substitution programs.”59
However, there are reasons to differentiate between farm-
ers and the rest of the tobacco industry. First, the FCTC explic-
itly carves farmers and farm workers out for special treatment.60 
The FCTC is a legally-binding instrument. When considering 
any one aspect, Parties must take into account all of its obliga-
tions. This does not necessarily mean that farmers must receive 
attention and funding equal to more mainstream tobacco control 
strategies, but it would be antithetical to the spirit of the main 
document to treat them as partners in one aspect but lump them 
in with tobacco manufacturers in another.
Second, farmers are in some respects natural allies of the 
tobacco control movement, since they are often victims of the 
tobacco industry, albeit in a different form than consumers and 
those exposed to secondhand smoke. Large tobacco farmer 
unions, which are controlled by international leaf buyer com-
panies, have attempted to influence the ad hoc study group’s 
work. However, a number of smaller unions and cooperatives 
have joined forces with public health groups to support the study 
group.
There are few in the public health community who would 
argue to shift existing tobacco control resources in order to pay 
for programs to aid farmers to move away from tobacco. It is 
therefore unlikely that either public or private entities will decide 
upon such a diversion. Clearly, if progress is to be made on this 
issue, either new money must be found, or an existing funding 
stream for a related issue must be diverted.
Strong evidence already exists that funding crop diversity, 
substitution, and alternative livelihoods would not be wasted.61 
In the United States, the state of Maryland has successfully 
reduced tobacco cultivation by eighty-six percent in a decade 
through a voluntary buyout program.62 Tobacco is a traditional 
crop in Maryland and, for most of its roughly four hundred year 
history, has been its leading commercial agricultural product. 
Funding for the buyout came via the Master Settlement Agree-
ment, a landmark legal settlement between most U.S. states and 
the tobacco industry, compensating governments for public 
health expenditures. The State’s plan included three steps:
1.  The tobacco buyout—Farmers voluntarily entered into a 
contract with the State to cease tobacco farming perma-
nently while continuing to use the land for agriculture 
for ten years. In exchange, farmers received compensa-
tion for ten years based on earlier tobacco yields.
2.  Infrastructure/agricultural development—The State 
funded development of alternative industries, such as 
vegetables, flowers, etc.
3.  Agricultural land preservation—The State offered fur-
ther incentives for farmers to place former tobacco lands 
in agricultural preservation.63
To be sure, not many developing countries will have the 
financial means to adopt the Maryland strategy wholesale. But 
other experiments are underway and showing signs of success. 
According to studies presented at the second meeting of the 
FCTC ad hoc study group on alternative livelihoods:
 •  In Mexico, a reconversion project run by the Government 
aims to seize the opportunity opened by current international 
food prices to promote cultivation of vegetables, fruits and 
grains.
 • In Kenya, bamboo was found to grow well under agro-
 climatic conditions similar to those for tobacco; this crop 
was selected on the basis of potential demand, its multiple 
uses, and the low investment and labor costs required.
 • In India, the net returns from cropping systems were found 
to be higher than from tobacco monoculture.
 • In Bangladesh, viable crop combinations were identified on 
the basis of food requirements, cash earnings, and improv-
ing soil health, as well as increasing livestock-keeping.
 • In Pakistan, the State is involved in research on economi-
cally viable alternative crop cycles, particularly in the case 
of hybrid spring maize and hybrid sunflowers.64
Brazil is also experimenting with a model promoting alter-
native livelihoods beyond crop substitution that focuses on five 
types of capital: natural, human, physical or infrastructure, finan-
cial, and social.65 Much research remains to be done, and there 
will be no one solution that fits every country, or even every 
region in a single country.
conclusIon
From one perspective, the need to promote a global transi-
tion away from tobacco leaf cultivation is not urgent. The WHO 
and the World Bank expect a dramatic increase in the number of 
smokers worldwide from approximately 1.1 billion today to 1.6 
billion in 2025.66 Demand for tobacco leaf will therefore actu-
ally go up, not down, for the foreseeable future, offering a poten-
tial livelihood for farmers for decades.
The purpose of Article 17, however, is to help farmers transi-
tion away from tobacco cultivation before the market forces them 
out. There is presently a unique opportunity to take advantage of 
increased global demand and prices for food. Several changes are 
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required to fully realize this opportunity. First, the compartmen-
talization of problems must be solved, meaning greater coop-
eration among disparate but interested parties. The ad hoc study 
group has been admirable in reaching out to other groups, such 
as FAO, the UN Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Tobacco 
Control, the International Labour Union, the World Bank, and 
others. What is needed is an umbrella group, comprised of 
experts from each group, focused on bringing various resources 
together to face the issue. Perhaps this could be a UN task force 
on alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers. Such a group 
could coordinate research and allocate funds for pilot projects.
Second, funding streams must be found. The most obvious 
place to start is with tobacco industry profits. In 2005, revenues 
for Altria alone were nearly $98 billion.67 Article 6 of the FCTC 
calls for Parties to implement excise taxes on tobacco products 
in order to raise the price and therefore reduce demand.68 A side 
benefit, of course, is greater government revenue. A relatively 
small earmark would provide large sums to help farmers through 
infrastructure development, crop experimentation, and debt 
relief, among others.
Another source is development funding, both public bilat-
eral and private. As we have seen, transitioning farmers away 
from tobacco cultivation cuts across a number of issues, includ-
ing food, environment, labor, and social justice. Presently, each 
funding mechanism seems to view the problem as outside its 
mandate. Private foundations should consider an overarch-
ing group, similar to the UN group called for above, to address 
how to best use existing funds to target tobacco farmers. Donor 
nations must reevaluate priorities.
As populations rise and environmental degradation reduces 
the amount of arable land on the planet, humanity can ill-afford 
to spend land and labor on growing a crop that causes a social 
ill. The need for new alternatives is obvious and the opportunity 
and funds exist. All that is needed is the will of the international 
community. The FCTC ad hoc study group on alternative liveli-
hoods has produced an excellent set of recommendations for the 
Conference of the Parties. However, the message needs to be 
heard beyond the mandate of a single treaty mechanism.
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SuStainable SoilS: reDucinG, mitiGatinG, anD aDaptinG to 
climate chanGe with orGanic aGriculture
by Meredith Niles*
InTroDucTIon
On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, its first case deal-ing with the issue of global warming.1 Yet, even before 
the ruling, the effects of climate change were already being felt 
and documented throughout the world. In late 2007, the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”) released its 
Fourth Assessment Report, 
which famously noted that 
warming of the global climate 
system is now “unequivocal.”2 
As policymakers throughout 
the world continue to feel the 
impacts of climate change and 
are compelled to action, over-
sight measures aimed at reduc-
ing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions and their impacts 
can no longer ignore the effect 
of industrial agriculture on cli-
mate change. Similarly, policymakers should recognize the role 
organic agriculture can play in stabilizing and lessening the 
impacts of climate change, and provide adequate funding for 
transition programs and initiatives utilizing organic production 
methods.
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, and several subse-
quent reports, including a recent synthesis and assessment report 
by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (“CCSP”), all 
conclude that climate change is already occurring and will likely 
accelerate in the future.3 New research suggests that our food 
system will be singularly affected by climate change. Agricul-
tural yields in the United States are set to notably decrease for 
crops ranging from corn to rice to sorghum.4 Longer growing 
seasons will increase crop water requirements,5 while rainfall 
events will become more sporadic and the intensity of rainfall 
events is expected to increase, resulting in more significant flood 
conditions.6 Weed growth is projected to blossom as weeds 
respond positively to higher carbon dioxide (“CO2”) levels, and 
glyphosate, the most frequently used herbicide in the United 
States, will lose its efficacy.7 Warmer temperatures will also 
likely increase the insect and pest populations throughout the 
United States, and a recent study has demonstrated that soybeans 
grown at elevated CO2 levels had more than fifty percent more 
insect damage than soybeans grown in normal conditions.8
Such significant damage to our food system would have 
widespread implications throughout the world. As the evidence 
of climate change continues to mount, oversight paradigms like 
regional cap-and-trade programs have focused mostly on the 
industrial and transportation sectors as targets of GHG emis-
sions mitigation. To date, the agricultural sector has been largely 
overlooked as both a source of 
GHG emissions and a potential 
tool for mitigation. Estimates of 
agricultural GHG emissions, as 
a percentage of total emissions, 
range from 13.5% to nearly 33% 
of all global emissions.9 Further-
more, the U.N. Food and Agri-
culture Organization (“FAO”) 
estimates that animal production 
alone accounts for eighteen per-
cent of global GHG emissions.10 
In comparison, transportation 
emissions account for a little 
over thirteen percent of total 
global GHG emissions.11 Clearly, there is a need for a shift in 
climate change policy to address the agricultural sector. 
As policymakers and individuals grapple with ways to 
reduce carbon footprints, it is essential that agriculture be rec-
ognized as a sector that needs to decrease its GHG emissions. 
Such reductions are essential, as they are in other sectors; how-
ever, agriculture has a unique role to play in climate change 
discussions because of its potential to mitigate GHG emissions 
through carbon sequestration, as well as lessen and prevent cli-
mate change impacts on agricultural, land, and water systems. 
This article will discuss recent and mounting evidence which 
suggests that organic agriculture, more than any other produc-
tion system, has the greatest potential for combating climate 
change by reducing overall GHG emissions, sequestering more 
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carbon, and promoting land management that lessens or elimi-
nates the potential climate change impacts on land and agricul-
tural systems.
Reducing GHG emissions in agriculture and adapting to 
climate change will depend on organic production systems for 
three reasons: 
1)  The overall emission reductions possible using organic 
production methods; 
2)  The increased ability of organic production systems to 
sequester carbon; and 
3)  The demonstrated ability of organic production to bet-
ter adapt to potential climate change related events, 
including drought, floods, pest increase, and loss of 
biodiversity. 
reDucInG emIssIons ThrouGh orGanIc 
proDucTIon meThoDs
Agriculture in the United States has changed significantly 
in the past several decades. Farming has shifted largely toward 
the adoption of industrial practices that rely heavily on synthetic 
chemical pesticides and fertilizers, equipment and machinery 
reliant on fossil fuels, and monoculture. Most large farms now 
grow only one crop, typically corn or soybeans. The indus-
trialization of our food system has had a heavy impact on the 
environment and played a major role in increasing global GHG 
emissions—especially with the rapid adoption of synthetic fer-
tilizers and pesticides.12
Each year, the U.S. food system uses nearly 40 billion 
pounds of synthetic fertilizers13 and more than one billion 
pounds of synthetic pesticides.14 The GHG emissions associated 
with the production, packaging, transport, and application of 
these chemicals contribute to climate change and air pollution. 
The production of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides contrib-
utes more than 480 million tons of GHG emissions to the atmo-
sphere each year.15 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) estimates that, once on our soils, synthetic fertilizers 
generate over 304 million pounds of GHG emissions.16 Frequent 
over-application of synthetic fertilizers results in “run-off” when 
fertilizers are carried off of fields during weather events and irri-
gation.17 Build-up of synthetic fertilizers has caused hypoxia, or 
“dead zones” lacking sufficient oxygen, in water bodies through-
out the world where animals, plants, and plankton are dying in 
vast quantities.18
Shifting to organic production systems will cause an imme-
diate drop in GHG emissions as organic production systems pro-
duce fewer GHG emissions than conventional industrial farming 
systems. FAO concluded that, “[w]ith lower energy inputs, 
organic systems contribute less to GHG emissions and have a 
greater potential to sequester carbon in biomass than conven-
tional systems.”19 Because organic production systems are pro-
hibited from using synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, they often 
rely on less intensive methods for fertilization including animal 
manure, cover crops, and integrated pest management strat-
egies.20 Research performed at the Rodale Institute, in conjunc-
tion with Cornell University, demonstrated that a conventional 
corn production system required significantly more energy per 
hectare than organic systems.21 The reduced reliance on fossil 
fuel energy in the organic system reduced energy inputs about 
thirty percent, mostly because the organic systems relied on 
animal and legume nitrogen nutrients rather than synthetic fer-
tilizers and pesticides.22 In addition, nitrate leaching from fertil-
izers is significantly higher for intensive conventional systems 
as compared to organic systems,23 and organic compost has the 
ability to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus leaching five fold 
when compared to synthetic fertilizers.24 Switching to organic 
production will thus reduce not only initial GHG emissions from 
the production of fertilizers, but will also prevent fertilizers from 
leaching into waterways and exacerbating emissions in hypoxic 
systems. 
Many of the synthetic fertilizers and pesticides used in the 
United States are for feed crops for animal production. It is 
estimated that about half of the grain and oilseeds grown in the 
United States are fed to livestock,25 and conventional grain-fed 
beef requires twice as many energy inputs as grass-fed beef.26 
Animals that are “grass-fed,” or produced using organic methods, 
produce significantly fewer GHG emissions than conventionally 
raised animals. Organic systems typically require fewer syn-
thetic inputs and less energy to operate than conventional indus-
trial facilities.27 In addition, because pastured systems require 
fewer feed crops than confined systems, significant reductions 
in nitrous oxide would result from a shift to grass-fed animal 
production.28 Overall, the global warming potential of organic 
animal production is about one third as much as intensive animal 
farming.29 USDA-certified, grass-fed animals “cannot be fed 
grain or grain byproducts and must have continuous access to 
pasture during the growing season.”30 While some animals (like 
chickens or pigs) do not eat grass and may rely on feed crops, if 
raised organically the animals are fed 100% organic feed grown 
without synthetic pesticides and fertilizers.31 Thus, organic meat 
and dairy products result in significantly fewer GHG emissions 
than conventional meat and dairy.32 
Animal production contributes nearly one fifth of all global 
GHG emissions,33 and in addition to the impact of synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides used on feed crops, manure manage-
ment, and enteric fermentation are also significant sources of 
GHG emissions.34 In 2007, EPA reported that livestock manure 
management is responsible for over 55 million metric tons of 
GHG emissions,35 mostly in the form of methane and nitrous 
oxide, which are approximately 21 times and 310 times more 
potent as GHGs than CO2, respectively.
36 Improper manure 
storage in large-scale, conventional animal production increase 
GHG emissions because waste is often pooled in large lagoons 
and holding ponds, rather than being directly incorporated into 
soils.37 During manure storage and decomposition, gaseous by-
products including hydrogen sulfide, CO2, ammonia, and meth-
ane are produced and released into the atmosphere.38 Research 
has documented that manure stores on conventional farms emit-
ted about twenty-five percent more methane gas than organic 
farms, demonstrating the significant impact that organic animal 
production can have in reducing GHG emissions.39
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carbon sequesTraTIon In  
orGanIc aGrIculTure
Addressing climate change issues involves not only reduc-
ing GHG emissions, but also incorporating mitigation tech-
niques that can sequester excessive GHG emissions. More than 
any other sector, agriculture is uniquely positioned to sequester 
vast amounts of carbon and thus reduce the impacts of climate 
change. Microbes and other soil organisms play a vital role in 
maintaining the health of agricultural soils as they decompose 
organic matter, cycle nutrients, and convert atmospheric nitro-
gen into organic forms.40 EPA estimates that composting one 
ton of organic materials results in a net storage of nearly 600 
pounds of CO2.
41 While all types 
of agriculture have the ability to 
sequester carbon, organic agricul-
ture can sequester significantly 
more carbon than conventional 
systems, and even conventional 
no-till systems,42 because organic 
agriculture prohibits synthetic fer-
tilizer and pesticide use, incorpo-
rates leguminous cover crops, and 
prioritizes increasing soil organic 
matter.43 Moreover, several stud-
ies have shown that organic soils 
can sequester more carbon than 
conventional soils and that synthetic fertilizer can have a nega-
tive impact on carbon sequestration.44 
In comparisons of field trials of organic and conventional 
farming plots, researchers found that while soil carbon lev-
els were initially the same, after more than two decades the 
organic systems had significantly higher soil carbon levels. The 
organic systems—one using legume cover crops and the other 
using manure—retained more carbon in the soil, “resulting 
in an annual soil carbon increase of 981 and 574 kg per hect-
are . . . , compared with only 293 kg per hectare in the con-
ventional system.”45 Similar long-term research at the United 
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) demonstrated that 
organic agriculture increased overall soil health more than con-
ventional no-till methods and resulted in increased yields over 
conventional production.46 In addition, carbon sequestration is 
not exclusive to crop systems and can also provide substantial 
opportunities for farmers in animal production.47
uTIlIzInG orGanIc aGrIculTure To aDapT To 
clImaTe chanGe ImpacTs
Climate change will impact many aspects of our lives, but 
the effects on agriculture may be the most noteworthy. CCSP 
noted:
Ecosystems and their service (land and water resources, 
agriculture, biodiversity) experience a wide range of 
stresses, including pests and pathogens, invasive spe-
cies, air pollution, extreme events and natural distur-
bances such as wildfires and flood. Climate change 
can cause or exacerbate direct stress through high 
temperatures, reduced water availability, and altered 
frequency of extreme events and severe storms.48
One of the greatest challenges of climate change will be find-
ing ways to adapt to its myriad potential impacts. Securing and 
maintaining a food system that can continue to produce, despite 
unexpected weather and climate events, is crucial for the future. 
Organic agriculture, which is more resilient to climate change 
impacts, will be a necessary component to this challenge.
Among the greatest threats of climate change will be the 
impact on biodiversity and the potential global loss of life. Bio-
diversity contributes to ecosystem functioning and maintenance; 
as biodiversity decreases it will be extremely difficult to retrieve 
and recover.49 Endangered and 
extinct species are already doc-
umented throughout the world, 
but climate change is caus-
ing more subtle losses in spe-
cies and diversity.50 Many of 
the species more prevalent in 
organic farming were known 
to have declining diversity and 
numbers as a result of previous 
agriculture intensification.51 
The biodiversity benefits asso-
ciated with organic farms likely 
derive from the management 
practices absent from or rarely utilized in most conventional 
systems.52 Specifically, organic farms have considerably more 
spiders,53 birds,54 butterflies,55 and other species,56 in both num-
ber and species count. Maintaining biodiversity on farms will be 
crucial to sustaining food production and ecosystem functions 
and organic production can certainly perform this task. 
Climate change also has the potential to threaten agricul-
ture through changing water and weather patterns increasing 
both drought and run-off.57 Soil organic matter and soil carbon 
content are important for water absorption and retention and can 
be greatly affected by changes in these elements.58 Increasing 
organic matter in soils leads to a direct increase in the ability of 
soils to retain water59 and will be an important tool for combat-
ing drought and potential flood conditions from increasing snow 
melt and runoff.60 Organic soils have higher levels of soil car-
bon and research has shown that in drought conditions, organic 
systems produced corn yields twenty-eight to thirty-four percent 
higher than conventional systems.61 As weather patterns and pre-
cipitation continue to change, organic agriculture will be better 
able to adapt and continue to produce in uncertain conditions. 
provIDInG The Framework For TransITIonInG  
To clImaTe resIlIenT aGrIculTure
Climate change is real, and its current and foreseeable future 
impacts can no longer be overlooked. As policymakers in the 
United States examine ways to reduce GHG emissions, mitigate 
climate change, and adapt for its effects, it is apparent that our 
food and agriculture system cannot be ignored. Conventional 
agriculture cannot continue on the same path because it causes a 
Organic agriculture, more 
than any other production 
system, has the greatest 
potential for combating 
climate change.
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significant portion of our global and domestic GHG emissions. 
Without a paradigm shift in farming, excessive and unnecessary 
GHG emissions will continue and our food system will become 
ever more susceptible to collapse as a result of climate change.
The policy and legal approaches to addressing climate 
change through agriculture must involve a transition to a more 
organic way of farming. In 2007, the U.S. government allo-
cated more than $3.7 billion in direct subsidies for corn, soy, 
and wheat.62 Less than one percent of corn, soy, and wheat are 
grown organically in the United States, meaning almost all of 
these subsidies were given for industrial or conventional pro-
duction.63 Moreover, as described by Environmental Working 
Group: 
Direct payment subsidies are provided without regard 
to the economic need of the recipients or the financial 
condition of the farm economy. Established in 1996, 
direct payments were originally meant to wean farmers 
off traditional subsidies that are triggered during peri-
ods of low prices for corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, rice 
and other crops.64 
Yet, prices for these commodities are currently at record 
highs, with the cost of corn per bushel rising nearly sixty percent 
between 2006 and 2007.65 
Such subsidies contribute to significant increases in annual 
GHG emissions and promote increased production and over-ap-
plication of synthetic fertilizers, loss of biodiversity, and simpli-
fication of the soil that leads to reduced soil health, which in turn 
reduces carbon sequestration capacity. Meaningful reductions in 
GHG emissions from agriculture will require broad-based and 
large-scale legislative initiatives that stop rewarding an agri-
culture system that is worsening the global climate change cri-
sis. Billions of dollars of subsidies for conventional production 
could be reallocated to organic transition programs and water 
and land conservation initiatives that will ensure that agriculture 
in the United States will continue to produce and function.
IncreasInG FunDInG For orGanIc cerTIFIcaTIon, 
conservaTIon anD conversIon
The 2008 Farm Bill allocated a total of $22 million for 
the national organic certification cost share program, which is 
designed to help decrease the amount of money farmers pay for 
organic certification.66 While this allocation did increase the 
annual cost-share eligibility from $500 to $750 per operation,67 
it pales in comparison to the vast subsidies received by larger 
conventional industrial farms. The National Organic Program 
received $39 million through 201268 and was authorized up to 
$10 million dollars for organic research.69 To foster the transi-
tion of farmers to organic production systems and reduce GHG 
emissions, future legislation must allocate significantly greater 
funds.
Unique opportunities also lie in providing carbon offsets to 
farmers who transition to organic agriculture. Given the increas-
ing evidence that organic agriculture is better suited to sequester 
carbon, offset programs established within cap-and-trade pro-
grams and public-based carbon offset initiatives should consider 
adding offset components for agriculture. Currently, only a few 
agriculture-based offset programs are in place within cap-and-
trade programs, including a methane digester offset program in 
the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.70 While con-
verting methane from manure can reduce emissions, research 
estimates that methane digesters could potentially only provide 
about 0.0002% of the energy currently consumed in the United 
States.71 Moreover, the compression of methane gas requires 
significant amounts of energy, which may offset any potential 
emissions reductions.72 Transportation of methane gas may also 
present difficulties, as most large scale farms will be able to pro-
duce more gas than they can use on farm; yet, given the eco-
nomic investment of digesters, only large farms are usually able 
to invest in this technology.73 Creating opportunities for farmers 
transitioning to organic production to receive carbon credits will 
create incentives for organic production and also help decrease 
the costs of transition. 
reDucInG FeeD crops anD TransITIonInG  
To pasTure-baseD orGanIc anImal proDucTIon
With roughly fifty percent of grains grown in the United 
States being fed to livestock, much of corn, soy, and wheat sub-
sidies are diverted to animal production.74 Livestock and animal 
production is an important source of income for billions of people 
throughout the world; yet, our current production methods are 
not sustainable. Transitioning livestock production to pasture-
based organic systems will utilize grasses unsuitable for human 
consumption and, through proper management, increase carbon 
sequestration.75 Reducing crop production for animal feed is 
one of the most efficient methods for mitigating GHG emissions 
from agriculture76 and ensuring sustainable food sources in the 
face of increasing fossil fuel prices. “[N]o other form of agricul-
ture is less dependent on external, finite resources, such as fos-
sil fuels, and/or external, potentially environmentally disruptive 
resources, such as fertilizers or pesticides, than grazing of native 
grasslands.”77 
aDvocaTInG For orGanIc conservaTIon 
measures
Transitioning to organic agriculture is not a process that can 
happen overnight and will certainly require significant invest-
ments of time and money. Yet, in the meantime, many organic 
practices can be incorporated into existing conventional farming 
methods that will help to reduce GHG emissions. For example, 
integrating perennial crops, riparian zones, cover crops, and 
grasslands, and increasing crop diversity on farms have a dem-
onstrated ability to not only reduce the climate change impacts 
of agriculture, but also increase yields and decrease costs associ-
ated with land management and fertilizer.78 
Traditionally, the USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program 
(“CRP”) has assisted farmers and ranchers to comply with fed-
eral, state, and tribal environmental laws, and encourages farmers, 
by providing annual rental payments under multi-year contracts, 
“to convert erodible cropland or other environmentally sensitive 
acreage to vegetative cover” including native grasses, trees, or 
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riparian buffers.79 The CRP has increased carbon sequestration 
and promoted the maintenance of important ecosystem func-
tions that help reduce environmental pollution. Since 1985, the 
program “has protected 170,000 miles of streams and restored 
2 million acres of wetlands and buffer zones.”80 Unfortunately, 
with recent steady increases in ethanol production, land-use has 
begun to change. Subsidies for ethanol production have caused 
land previously held in reserve under the CRP to be taken out of 
conservation for corn production.81 In 2006, USDA Chief Econ-
omist Dr. Keith Collins testified before the Senate Committee on 
Environment & Public Works about ethanol production, noting 
that the CRP, “which has 36 million acres set aside from crop 
production for environmental reasons, may provide a source of 
additional crop acreage. . . . [A] preliminary assessment con-
cluded that 4.3 to 7.2 million acres currently enrolled in the CRP 
could be used to grow corn or soybeans . . . .”82 
Policies that advocate for the removal of CRP land for 
ethanol production will not decrease GHG emissions.83 Instead, 
increased ethanol production is releasing carbon stores in grass-
lands and creating a “carbon debt.”84 If ethanol production 
increases to the congressionally suggested 15-36 billion gallons 
by 2022, nitrogen fluxes into the Gulf of Mexico could increase 
by as much as thirty-four percent.85 Such measures would have 
devastating effects on water quality, aquatic ecosystems, and 
GHG emissions. Policies encouraging ethanol production, spe-
cifically with land-use changes, should be strongly reconsidered 
in this context and re-evaluated for their overall effectiveness at 
reducing GHG emissions. Instead, CRP funding should continue 
and be strengthened to encourage organic conservation methods 
to be incorporated into farms throughout the country. 
conclusIons
Climate change is a critical environmental issue and has 
broad implications for sustainable development and the future 
of our economy, health, and food system. The ability to respond 
to the momentous task of regulating GHG emissions will have 
implications for the overall well-being of our entire country. 
Reducing and sequestering GHG emissions and adapting to 
climate change impacts demand comprehensive approaches 
that fully integrate agriculture, recognizing its contribution 
to climate change and unique ability to sequester GHG emis-
sions and reduce climate change impacts. Organic agriculture 
offers much hope for the future of environmental sustainabil-
ity and food production and should be recognized for the many 
contributions it can make. Providing and increasing funding for 
organic transition, certification, and conservation programs will 
allow the United States and other countries throughout the world 
to reduce and offset GHG emissions. At the same time, organic 
agriculture policy initiatives will ensure environmental protec-
tion in our waterways and promote biodiverse ecosystems in the 
face of looming global reductions in species. Ensuring the future 
of our environment and the vitality of our food systems in the 
shadow of climate change depends on organic production sys-
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uSDa orGanic:  
ecopornoGraphy or a label worth SearchinG For?
by Blake M. Mensing*
* Blake M. Mensing is a JD candidate, May 2010, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law and an MA candidate, May 2010 at American University 
School of International Service. 
“Ecopornography,”
1 more commonly known as 
greenwashing,2 is a term that applies to any entity 
that disseminates disinformation in order to promote 
an environmentally friendly public image without actually tak-
ing significant action to protect the environment.3 Greenwashing 
is pervasive and a nearly unavoidable component of consumers’ 
evaluations of potential purchases.4 Food producers and packag-
ers are often guilty of greenwashing their products to appeal to 
the environmentally conscious consumer by using such terms as 
“free range”5 or “all natural.”6 The United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) has set standards for the use of the word 
“organic” on food labels. These standards, while significantly 
more meaningful than those behind the “free range” label, are by 
no means the most stringent in the world.7 Is the USDA organic 
label indicative of an environmentally friendly product or is it 
greenwashing?
The 1990 Organic Foods Production Act8 provided for the 
formation of a National Organic Standards Board (“NOSB”) 
within the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service.9 The NOSB 
serves as an advisor to the Secretary of Agriculture in promul-
gating the final standards that the USDA National Organic 
Program oversees.10 The USDA organic labeling standards are 
broken down into four categories. The first category allows 
100% organic products to carry the USDA organic logo. 11 In 
the second category, the USDA organic logo may appear on the 
packaging if, excluding water and salt, the product is ninety-five 
percent organic by weight.12 Third, the front panel of a product 
made with seventy percent organic content may state that the 
product is “made with organic” and it may list a maximum of 
three organic ingredients.13 Last, if the product is made with less 
than seventy percent organic content, the back or side panel may 
list those ingredients that are organic.14 
Since October 21, 2002, it has been a federal offense punish-
able with a maximum civil penalty of $10,000 to place the word 
“organic” on any food product that has not been certified by a 
USDA accredited certifier or state certification program.15 Mak-
ing uncertified labeling a federal offense should tend to reduce 
the probability of greenwashing. However, it is important to note 
that although the organic certification process focuses on the 
materials and methods of production,16 some synthetic materials 
are nonetheless allowed in foods labeled “USDA organic.”17 For 
example, nitrates and nitrites are permitted in organic meats.18 
These chemicals give meat the bright red color that, to the aver-
age consumer, denotes “freshness.”19 Meat that does not have 
nitrates or nitrites added will naturally turn an unappetizing grey 
color before it decomposes or spoils.20 Consumers are eating 
chemically dyed meat carrying the USDA organic label. Despite 
the strict certification process behind the USDA organic label, 21 
a charge with significant gravamen may be leveled at the agency 
for allowing synthetics in foods labeled “organic.”22 
Synthetic additives permitted under an organic label are not 
the only area of weakness in the USDA labeling standard. The 
USDA may validly be charged with greenwashing for the stan-
dards behind the “free range” label, which on its face seems to 
indicate safe and humane treatment of animals raised for con-
sumption. However, under USDA standards, an animal that is 
“free range” must be given merely the opportunity to go out-
side for an undetermined period of time.23 There is no actual 
guarantee under the “free range” label standard that the animal 
exited its enclosure.24 A willingness on the part of the USDA to 
lend credence to “free range” labels raises suspicions about the 
organic label as well. 
If the USDA organic label is bordering on greenwash, then 
what standard is worth searching for? One possible answer is 
the Demeter Biodynamic certification, which imposes more 
stringent requirements than the USDA organic certification stan-
dard.25 Debio, Norway’s national organic certification body, 
includes the Demeter standard in its organic certifications.26 The 
Demeter standard has long enjoyed popularity in Europe, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand,27 and is currently used in wineries and 
vineyards in the United States.28 It focuses on treating a farm as 
a living organism, with frequently-composted soil as its heart.29 
Because the Demeter standard goes above and beyond what the 
USDA requires for its “organic” label, using the standard would 
help assuage the fears of American consumers facing a heavily-
greenwashed marketplace.30 The current USDA standard has 
been watered down to the point of greenwashing because syn-
thetics such as nitrites are permitted in “organic” food. For the 
organic label to be meaningful, the standards behind it must be 
closer to the Demeter standard and further from today’s “USDA 
Organic” standard. 
Endnotes:
1 See Joshua Karliner, A Brief History of Greenwash, Mar. 22, 2001, http://
www.corpwatch.org/article.pho?id=243 (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (describing 
the vast advertising budgets of high pollution corporations).
Endnotes: USDA Organic continued on page 70
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the GrowinG Supply oF ecolabeleD  
SeaFooD: an economic perSpective
by Nicolai V. Kuminoff, Darrell J. Bosch, Dan Kauffman, Jaren C. Pope, & Kurt Stephenson*
InTroDucTIon
Consumers respond to names and labels on food prod-ucts. In the seafood industry, this has led to the renam-ing of species that sound like they would taste bad. For 
example, “slimehead” (Hoplostethus atlanticus) was renamed as 
“orange roughy” in order to increase its marketability in restau-
rants and supermarkets.1 Unfortunately the marketing strategy 
worked too well. After first becoming widely available in the 
United States in the 1980s, this New Zealand and Australian 
fish became so popular that it was overfished and the popula-
tion crashed.2 Today, orange roughy is on the Monterey Bay 
Aquarium’s “Seafood Watch” list of fish to avoid.3 The Seafood 
Watch list is part of a growing effort by independent organiza-
tions and government agencies to inform consumers about the 
health of fisheries and the sustainability of their harvesting prac-
tices. The seafood industry has begun to use this information to 
develop ecolabels for fish caught from fisheries that are man-
aged sustainably.
Ecolabeling refers to placing a seal of approval on a product 
to recognize that it has been certified as meeting specific cri-
teria for the environmental impacts of its production process. 
The  largest independent certification program for fisheries is the 
Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”).4 Wild fisheries that sat-
isfy the Council’s criteria for sustainability may display its seal 
on their products.5 This ecolabel is intended to induce consumers 
to pay a premium for sustainable seafood or to consume MSC 
certified products rather than unlabeled seafood. If consumers 
are willing to pay a premium for ecolabeled seafood, they will 
provide an economic incentive for fisheries to shift toward more 
sustainable production practices. 
Seafood bearing the MSC label is currently sold in thirty-
nine countries and can be found in major supermarkets including 
Wal-Mart and Whole Foods.6 Since the number of fisheries cur-
rently seeking MSC certification is more than twice as large as 
the number currently certified, the supply of ecolabeled seafood 
will continue to grow in the near future.7 This article describes 
the growing market for ecolabeled seafood and provides an 
economic perspective on emerging legal and policy issues. We 
begin with an overview of the different ecolabeling schemes, 
with emphasis on the Marine Stewardship Council. We then 
summarize the state of knowledge on the demand for ecolabeled 
seafood and discuss three issues: conflicting labeling claims, 
the impact of ecolabeling on the demand for fish which are har-
vested sustainably but not sold under an ecolabel, and the effect 
of ecolabeling on the health of aquatic ecosystems. 
seaFooD ecolabelInG anD The cerTIFIcaTIon  
oF susTaInable FIsherIes
Perhaps the first non-governmental effort to bring fisheries 
management to the attention of consumers was the Earth Island’s 
Institute campaign for “dolphin safe” tuna. The campaign took 
off in 1988, when an Earth Island employee videotaped dolphins 
drowning in tuna nets.8 This campaign was instrumental in pass-
ing federal legislation and getting major U.S. tuna packers to 
change their harvest practices and put “dolphin safe” labels on 
their cans. 
In 1996 the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever, a multina-
tional corporation, jointly developed an independent organiza-
tion to certify sustainable fisheries—the Marine Stewardship 
Council.9 Subsequently, other independent certifying organiza-
tions have been formed, such as the Monterey Bay Aquarium’s 
Seafood Watch program.10 Meanwhile, industry groups such as 
the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute have developed their 
own sustainability criteria.11 International growth in seafood 
ecolabeling has also led the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations to issue broad guidelines for ecolabeling 
of marine products.12 Domestically, the U.S. National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration’s (“NOAA”) Fish Watch pro-
gram tracks whether specific fisheries meet the ten conservation 
and management standards defined by the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.13 For the interested 
seafood consumer, there is clearly a wealth of information about 
the sustainability of fisheries. 
Today, the Marine Stewardship Council is still the largest 
independent third-party certification program and its sustainabil-
ity seal is the most widely recognized seafood ecolabel.14 The 
label is intended to provide consumers with information about 
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the sustainability of the seafood they purchase in order to help 
them make informed decisions in the marketplace.15 
To receive MSC certification, a fishery must demonstrate 
that it complies with three broad principles for sustainable 
fishing:16 
MSC Principle 1: A fishery must be conducted in a 
manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion 
of the exploited populations and, for those populations 
that are depleted, the fishery must be conducted in a 
manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery.
MSC Principle 2: Fishing operations should allow for 
the maintenance of the structure, productivity, function 
and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and 
associated dependent and ecologically related species) 
on which the fishery depends.
MSC Principle 3: The fishery is subject to an effective 
management system that respects local, national and 
international laws and standards and incorporates insti-
tutional and operational frameworks that require use of 
the resource to be responsible and sustainable.17
These general principles underlie twenty-three specific cri-
teria that each fishery must satisfy in order to license the MSC 
ecolabel.18 For example, one of the criteria that must be satis-
fied under MSC Principle three is that mechanisms must be in 
place to limit or close the fishery when designated catch limits 
are reached.19 Likewise, fisheries must demonstrate that they do 
not use poisons or explosives.20 
A fishery seeking MSC certification can hire an independent 
certifier who has been accredited by MSC to determine whether 
their harvesting practices meet MSC standards.21 Certification 
lasts for five years and a fishery is also subject to annual audits.22 
After a fishery has received certification, manufacturers and pro-
cessors who want to use the MSC logo must pay an additional 
licensing fee to do so. 23 
Since 1997, the Marine Stewardship Council’s ecolabel has 
been licensed by nearly fifty different seafood brands and over 
200 specific products, which are sold in restaurants and national 
supermarket chains in the United States.24 This is not limited to 
small organic groceries and local health food stores. National retail 
chains have become interested in the MSC label. Whole Foods, 
the nation’s largest retailer of organic foods, started supporting 
the MSC label in 1999.25 In February 2006, Wal-Mart announced 
that it would purchase all of its wild-caught fresh and frozen sea-
food from MSC certified fisheries within three to five years.26
One limitation of the Marine Stewardship Council’s certi-
fication program is that its standards only apply to wild capture 
fisheries. MSC does not currently certify aquaculture and has no 
plans to do so in the future.27 Other independent organizations 
do monitor aquaculture. The Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Sea-
food Watch Program, begun in 1999, developed a “stoplight” 
system for reporting the sustainability of both wild caught and 
aquaculture fisheries. Its regional “pocket guides” use color cod-
ing to tell consumers whether a particular fish is a best choice 
(green), a good alternative (yellow), or a fish to avoid (red).28 
Compared to MSC, Seafood Watch is more comprehensive in its 
coverage. Fisheries do not pay to be evaluated. Seafood Watch 
conducts independent audits of major fisheries that serve dif-
ferent regions of the country.29 From an industry perspective, 
however, Seafood Watch’s pocket guides are more difficult to 
integrate into product labeling than the MSC label because the 
guides are updated biannually whereas MSC certification lasts 
for five years which facilitates longer term planning. 
Have the Marine Stewardship Council, Seafood Watch, and 
other ecolabeling programs been effective in promoting marine 
conservation and sustainable fishing practices? At the time of 
writing, thirty-five fisheries are certified by MSC and another 
seventy-eight are undergoing the assessment process for poten-
tial future certification.30 These fisheries, which are located 
around the world, have perceived the potential economic gains 
from ecolabeling to be sufficiently large to induce them to pay 
independent certifiers to verify that their fishing practices meet 
MSC standards. Whether their short run investment in certifica-
tion will translate into higher profits in the long run will depend 
on the extent to which ecolabels increase the demand for sus-
tainable seafood. 
The DemanD For ecolabeleD seaFooD
Market data on the sales of ecolabeled seafood are only 
beginning to become available. Without access to sales data, 
seafood economists have traditionally relied on statistical analy-
sis of consumer surveys to assess the potential demand for eco-
labeled products. In one of the first studies of the demand for 
ecolabeled seafood, economists at the University of Rhode Island 
conducted a mail survey of 1,640 potential seafood consumers in 
the lower forty-eight states during the fall of 1998. Participating 
households were asked to make a hypothetical choice between 
two regular seafood products (cod and shrimp) and ecolabeled 
versions of the same products that would cost up to five dollars 
more per pound.31 The survey results indicated that consumers 
would be willing to pay a premium for ecolabeled seafood, but 
that the size of the premium would differ across seafood prod-
ucts and consumer groups. Consumers with larger budgets and 
those who were members of environmental organizations were 
more likely to be willing to pay a premium for ecolabeled prod-
ucts.32 These results were reinforced by subsequent surveys of 
consumers in the United Kingdom.33 
While consumers say they are willing to pay more for ecola-
beled seafood, it is less clear whether the increasing availability 
of ecolabeled products will have a large impact on their purchas-
ing decisions. Recent evidence suggests that while consumers 
would be willing to pay more for ecolabeled versions of their 
favorite fish products, this “ecolabel effect” is too small to con-
vince average consumers to switch from their favorite fish (with-
out an ecolabel) to a less preferred fish (with an ecolabel).34
As more ecolabeled seafood products have entered the 
market, there have been some preliminary efforts to measure 
the effects on demand. For instance, preliminary evidence from 
supermarket scanner data suggests that the introduction of the 
dolphin-safe tuna label increased the market share of canned 
tuna by one percent between 1990 and 1995.35 However, this 
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analysis focused on sales of all canned tuna relative to lunch-
meat, red meat, and other seafood products and, therefore, 
did not isolate the shift of consumption away from unlabeled 
tuna and toward products bearing the dolphin-safe label. More 
recently, after the New Zealand hoki fishery received its MSC 
certification in 2001, the Unilever corporation increased its hoki 
purchases by an estimated $3 million.36 Hoki prices rose in the 
year after  certification although the portion of the rise attribut-
able to eco labeling is difficult to estimate precisely.37 
Overall, there is still very little evidence on the market 
demand for ecolabeled seafood. Survey results indicate that 
consumers would be willing to pay a premium for their favorite 
ecolabeled fish in restaurants and supermarkets, and case studies 
of specific fisheries indicate that ecolabels can increase returns 
to the industry.38 Yet the magnitude of the “ecolabel effect” on 
demand appears to be small. In order for consumers’ purchas-
ing decisions to influence the sustainability of fisheries, the 
price effect would have to pass through the marketing chain to 
provide a sufficiently large incentive for fishermen to change 
their harvesting practices.39 It is also important to remember 
that the existing evidence on market demand is almost entirely 
based on anecdotes and survey questions that ask consumers 
to speculate on their hypothetical future purchasing decisions. 
There is almost no market-based evidence on how consumers 
have actually reacted to the recent introduction of fresh and fro-
zen seafood products that have been certified by MSC or other 
organizations.
emerGInG Issues In seaFooD ecolabelInG
The impact of ecolabeling on the demand for seafood is 
one of many questions raised by the recent growth in the supply 
of “sustainable” seafood. Other interesting issues for industry 
experts, researchers, and policymakers to consider include label-
ing conflicts, the impact on the demand for seafood products 
that lack ecolabels but meet standards for sustainability, and the 
impact of ecolabeling on environmental quality. 
labelinG conFlictS
Labeling conflicts can occur when different ecolabeling 
schemes use the same terminology with different interpretations, 
or when they present conflicting information. For example, con-
sider two of Alaska’s fisheries: coho salmon and king crab. The 
Marine Stewardship Council, Seafood Watch, NOAA’s Fish 
Watch program, and the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute 
all seem to agree that the coho salmon fishery is sustainable. 
Coho salmon has MSC certification, Seafood Watch gives it the 
“green light,” NOAA’s Fish Watch program notes that Alaska’s 
stocks are healthy, and the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute 
(“ASMI”) advertises that coho salmon is one of many sustain-
able fisheries in the state of Alaska, which is “one of the most 
bountiful fishing regions on the planet, and has been recognized 
as a world model for sustainability.”40 
There is less agreement on Alaska king crab. While ASMI 
includes king crab among its list of sustainable fisheries, the 
crab fishery does not have MSC certification.41 NOAA and 
Seafood Watch both report that Alaska’s red king crab popula-
tion is healthy, but note that the pots used to catch crab can dis-
turb aquatic habitat and result in bycatch of females, juveniles, 
and non-targeted species.42 These concerns motivated Seafood 
Watch to give Alaska king crab its “yellow light.”43
The differences in the way NOAA, MSC, Seafood Watch, 
and ASMI characterize the sustainability of Alaska’s king crab 
fishery exemplify a broader issue in ecolabeling and green mar-
keting. Rapid growth in green marketing claims, conflicting 
reports, and vague language can leave consumers misinformed 
or confused. This is especially true when products are advertised 
using adjectives like “sustainable,” “renewable,” “eco-friendly,” 
and “green,” which are inherently vague or at least open to inter-
pretation. In response to the growth in environmental market-
ing, the Federal Trade Commission recently began reviewing its 
Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, more 
commonly known as the “Green Guides.” This process may 
affect seafood ecolabeling practices because one of the issues 
being reviewed is the allowable use of the word “sustainable” 
among other environmental buzzwords that are frequently used 
in product labeling and advertising.44
unlabeleD SuStainability: the caSe oF cheSapeake 
bay oySter aquaculture
A second issue is that the best known ecolabeling schemes 
do not necessarily identify the fisheries with the strongest poten-
tial for sustainability. Oyster aquaculture in the Chesapeake Bay 
provides an example. In the 1950s, the Chesapeake Bay was by far 
the nation’s largest oyster fishery. Since then, disease and habitat 
degradation have caused annual landings for the native Bay oys-
ter (Crassostrea virginica) to decrease from 30 million pounds 
to 0.3 million pounds, cutting U.S. oyster production in half.45
Small oyster harvests pose a concern for commercial growers 
and people who care about water quality in the Bay. The oyster 
fishery provides a source of income for growers and an eco-
nomic base for some Chesapeake Bay communities. In addition, 
oysters provide ecological services, particularly water filtration. 
By filtering phytoplankton (and seston in general) oysters help 
to improve water clarity.46 The nitrogen and phosphorus embod-
ied in the filtered material can be removed from ambient waters 
through natural biomass sequestration as well as through natu-
ral chemical transformation of oyster feces and pseudo feces.47 
These processes in turn aid the growth of submerged aquatic 
vegetation and help to protect essential habitat for other aquatic 
species.48 The Chesapeake Bay states have noted the importance 
of restoring oyster populations by signing the Chesapeake Bay 
2000 Agreement, which aims for a tenfold increase in native 
oysters in the Chesapeake Bay by 2010, among other goals.49
Commercial oyster aquaculture, which involves submersing 
oysters in cages or floats, provides water quality services without 
further depleting the wild oyster stock. This is a proven way to 
overcome the disease, predation, and habitat degradation prob-
lems that have plagued oyster restoration in the Chesapeake Bay 
region.50 If aquaculture is proven to be a financially viable means 
of producing oysters, it may relieve pressure on wild stocks. 
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2 Melissa M. Stevens, Seafood Watch: Seafood Report – Orange Roughy 
(2003), available at http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/cr/cr_seafoodwatch/
content/media/MBA_SeafoodWatch_OrangeRoughyReport.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2008).
Given the fishery’s extraordinary credentials for sustain-
ability, developing an ecolabel for aquacultural oysters would 
appear to have strong potential to promote conservation and 
reward growers for the water quality services they provide. 
Ironically, the MSC ecolabel is not available to the Chesapeake 
Bay’s aquaculture oyster fishery because it is a form of aquacul-
ture. NOAA’s Fish Watch program does not currently include 
aquaculture oysters among the species it tracks, and the Chesa-
peake Bay growers do not currently engage in green marketing.51 
While Seafood Watch gives aquaculture oysters a “green light” 
and recognizes their water quality services, the Seafood Watch 
pocket guides are only distributed in a limited number of restau-
rants and groceries.52 Thus, consumers may be largely unaware 
that unlabeled aquaculture oysters from the Chesapeake Bay 
meet Seafood Watch’s definition for sustainability and provide 
additional water quality services. 
the impact oF ecolabelinG on  
environmental quality
Ecolabeling is a decentralized tool for obtaining the goals 
of environmental policy. Will this tool lead to improved envi-
ronmental quality? Recent research in economic theory has 
suggested that the development of markets for “green” goods 
presents both advantages and disadvantages with respect to envi-
ronmental quality, and the net effect may be product specific.53 
The possibility that the introduction of green goods could have 
a detrimental effect on environmental quality is counterintuitive, 
but can be illustrated by an example. 
One of the key questions is whether the dimension of sus-
tainability that is highlighted by an ecolabel is a substitute or a 
complement for the seafood product itself. For example, aqua-
culture oysters remove some nitrogen and phosphorous from 
the Chesapeake Bay through their normal filtration of water and 
consumption of phytoplankton. Many consumers may enjoy eat-
ing oysters and may also want to improve water quality in the 
Chesapeake Bay. But these same consumers may be reluctant 
to eat “green” oysters that are labeled in a way that highlights 
the fact that they remove nutrients from the Bay. Is there a spe-
cial health risk associated with eating aquaculture oysters? Will 
they taste bad? Of course not. Wild oysters provide the same 
water filtration services as aquaculture oysters, and all saleable 
oysters must be harvested in waters that are approved for shell-
fish consumption. The point is that it may be difficult to convey 
this to consumers as part of an ecolabeling strategy that cen-
ters on water filtering services rather than simply one promoting 
sustainable harvests. If oyster lovers are turned off by the idea 
that aquaculture oysters are advertised as filter feeders (the “kid-
neys” of the Chesapeake Bay), they may seek out oysters from 
wild populations that are harvested in a less sustainable manner. 
A second issue is that the introduction of ecolabeled seafood 
products (and “green” goods in general) has the potential to drive 
out donations to environmental organizations. If consumers feel 
that they are making their contribution to the health of aquatic 
ecosystems by paying a premium for ecolabeled seafood, they 
may be reluctant to make charitable contributions to environ-
mental organizations such as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation.54 
In this case, whether the introduction of a market for ecolabeled 
seafood will ultimately improve the health of an aquatic ecosys-
tem will depend partly on whether environmental organizations 
are more or less effective in improving environmental quality 
than fisheries which meet the criteria for sustainability that are 
reflected by the presence of an ecolabel. 
conclusIon
The challenges in developing sustainable fisheries are well 
known. In the past, governments have sought to overcome these 
challenges through policies which limit fishing effort, catch 
rates, and harvests for wild fisheries. Ecolabeling offers a more 
decentralized approach to environmental policy by seeking to 
illuminate the connection between the choices we make in the 
marketplace and their environmental consequences. While the 
ecolabeling of seafood is still relatively new, a variety of gov-
ernment, industry, and independent third-party organizations 
have developed schemes during the past decade to measure the 
sustainability of fisheries. 
Evidence based on the number of fisheries that have 
obtained or are currently seeking ecolabeled status suggests that 
the market for ecolabeled seafood will continue to grow. The 
number of wild fisheries seeking MSC certification is more than 
double the number of fisheries currently certified. This growth 
raises a number of important questions. Is there a significant 
long-run demand for ecolabeled seafood, or are fisheries overly 
optimistic? How can conflicting ecolabeling claims be resolved? 
Will the introduction of ecolabels decrease the demand for sus-
tainable seafood that is not ecolabeled? Will ecolabeling actu-
ally improve the health of aquatic ecosystems? What are the 
best strategies for conveying ecolabel information to consum-
ers to maximize the market advantage of environmentally sound 
fisheries? These are important topics for economic research and 
legal analysis. 
Endnotes: The Growing Supply of Ecolabeled Seafood
Endnotes: The Growing Supply of Ecolabeled Seafood
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by Meti Zegeye*
* Meti Zegeye is a JD candidate, May 2010, at American University Washing-
ton College of Law.
The unprecedented magnitude of the current global food crisis took the world by surprise. Its hardest-hit victim, Sub-Saharan Africa (“SSA”), is in the midst of its worst 
food crisis in recent history.1 Immediate responses such as food-
aid and cash-handout programs, although necessary to address 
the urgent humanitarian dimensions of the food crisis, are not 
long-term solutions.2 Attaining a sustainable solution to SSA’s 
reoccurring food crises requires that African governments 
engage the international community in candid discourses tack-
ling the crisis’ main 
cause, namely the 
inherent structural fal-
lacies of these coun-
tries’ agricultural 
policies.3 The recent 
food riots and civil 
unrest that occurred in 
many of these coun-
tries should incentivize 
such policy discourse, 
as SSA’s fragile peace 
is closely linked with 
governments’ will-
ingness and ability to 
offer and sustain long-
term solutions to food 
security.4 
Most land in SSA 
countries is agrar-
ian, with varied agro-
ecological zones that are not conducive to uniform, large-scale 
farming techniques.5 SSA farmers predominantly engage in rain-
fed agriculture which makes them highly vulnerable to climate 
variations in an area which already suffers from low soil fertility 
and low rainfall.6 Frequent weed and pest infestations, as well as 
inadequate farming and water management techniques, further 
hinder farming productivity.7 Despite these shortcomings, agri-
culture remains the most important economic sector in most SSA 
countries.8 Agricultural output represents about forty percent of 
exports, thirty percent of GDP, and about thirty percent of for-
eign exchange earnings in the region.9 The sector also employs 
more than seventy percent the workforce.10 
Ironically, while other agrarian regions, such as parts of 
Asia, invested in green revolution, SSA adopted Bretton Woods 
championed developmental policies, which discounted and 
neglected agriculture’s role in these countries.11 Therefore, since 
independence, these countries have adopted various agricultural 
policies, which span from a focus on industrialization, to agro 
industries, integrated rural development, export crop-led agricul-
ture, and finally to smallholders’ staple food crops.12 These varied 
and often contradictory policies have hindered agriculture devel-
opment in most of SSA countries. For instance, the neo-liberal 
development paradigm of the 1980s promoted drastic reduction 
in international assistance for agriculture.13 While agriculture 
received eighteen 
percent of overseas 
development assis-
tance in 1980, its 
share dwindled to 
about four percent 
in 2007.14 Similarly, 
SSA governments 
felt compelled to 
reduce their agricul-
ture expenditure.15 
Although recently on 
the rise, these coun-
tries allocated less 
than four percent of 
their expenditures to 




from the sector has 
crippled farmers’ productivity. SSA farming is predominantly 
a household enterprise, and is mostly undertaken by poor small-
holder farmers.17 These farmers represent a very large portion 
of the world’s most marginalized people.18 Given their extreme 
marginalization, SSA farmers have historically depended on 
government services and subsidies for access to credit and farm-
ing techniques, such as fertilizers and irrigation.19 Without gov-
ernment intervention, these farmers could not afford the high 
transaction costs associated with agriculture and experienced 
extensive market failures.20 
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Consequently, over the last twenty years, crop production 
per capita has decreased by 0.2% per year, while food demand 
has continued to increase.21 Confronted with such stringent real-
ities, these farmers have expanded the arable farming land, at the 
expense of forests, soil fertility, and water.22 Their efforts have 
been unsuccessful as is evidenced by the prevalence of drought 
and famine throughout the continent. In SSA, agricultural pro-
ductivity growth, as opposed to expansion in arable farming 
land, is the means to achieve food security.23 Furthermore, agri-
culture must become the engine of growth in these countries, 
especially given the fact that three quarters of the poor in SSA 
depend on agriculture for their livelihood.24 
African governments must use this opportunity to revamp 
their agricultural policies. SSA countries should continue to 
increase their budgetary allocation for agricultural development 
to about fifteen to twenty percent of their revenues. They should 
also develop new agricultural policies, which take into account 
their particular agro-ecological characteristics.25 These policies 
should create the kind of incentives and market opportunities 
necessary to reduce the marginality of smallholder farmers.26 
Particularly, the new policies must improve soil and water man-
agement, and must invest in drought resisting crops.27 Finally, 
African countries should invest in research and development and 
come up with home grown viable farming.
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urGent neeD anD emerGinG SolutionS
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InTroDucTIon
The global food crisis has affected hundreds of millions of people worldwide, causing a surge of sociopolitical unrest in many countries as families struggle to find ways 
to survive soaring food and fuel prices.1 In the United States, 
many families find it harder to feed their children on a daily basis 
and more families are turning to local food banks.2 In develop-
ing countries, the World Bank estimates that at least 100 million 
could fall back into poverty, swallowed by what Josette Sheeran, 
the director of the World Food Program (“WFP”), dubbed the 
“silent tsunami” of soaring food prices.3
At the UN General Assembly meeting on September 23, 
2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon “told the UN’s 192 
member states that in a single year, staple foods that feed half of 
the world more than doubled in price,”4 highlighting the severity 
of the global food crisis. A report by the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) produced in conjunction 
with a summit on the food crisis in Rome last June stated that the 
prices of all major commodities have reached their highest lev-
els in nearly fifty years (prices in real terms were at a thirty-year 
high).5 The FAO price index rose, on average, eight percent in 
2006 in comparison to 2005, but then twenty-four percent from 
2006 to 2007.6 
Governments and multilateral bodies have met to discuss 
possible solutions, for both the short and long-term. They have 
debated issues such as the possible effects of climate change on 
food production and the problems caused by increasing biofuel 
production.7 Governments and international organizations must 
play the lead role in designing policy in this area and encour-
age multilateral solutions to this problem. Short-term monetary 
donations are needed for emergencies, but multilateral institu-
tions will have to work together to achieve a sustainable solu-
tion that develops economies and promotes wise environmental 
stewardship around the world. Already, organizations such as 
FAO, WFP, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”), and the UN Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”) have begun 
a multifaceted approach to addressing this problem, targeting 
“high risk” countries first. Of course, these efforts are just the 
first steps of an effort that could go on for years. 
This paper will survey briefly some of the causes of the 
global food crisis, identified by economists and policy experts, 
and will discuss multilateral responses to date. 
* Terence P. Stewart, managing partner, Law Office of Stewart and Stewart, 
 Stephen J. Norton, senior communications advisor, Stewart and Stewart, Jumana 
G. Madanat, December 2007 graduate, American University Washington College 
of Law, Hanna E. Stewart, 2008 graduate, New York University.
Figure 1
Source: FAO, worlD FooD Situation: FooD priceS inDiceS (2008), available at 
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/.
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FacTors oF a “perFecT sTorm”
Numerous factors have contributed to increasing food costs 
from 2005-2008 and created the “perfect storm” that led to the 
global food crisis.8 This “perfect storm” has been catastrophic to 
millions of people and has threatened the world’s political sta-
bility.9 Perhaps more disturbing, the confluence of factors from 
climate change to increased production of biofuels to changing 
consumer demand could mean a fundamental change is occurring 
in the dynamics of food production, distribution, and consump-
tion. The FAO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) warned in a May 2008 study that 
the changes occurring could take ten years to address and to 
reestablish market equilibrium needed to make food affordable 
to millions of people.10 Some of the factors that led to the crisis 
are discussed below.
weather-relateD FactorS
Weather, either in single catastrophic events or subtle shifts 
possibly related to climate change, has impacted food production 
causing structural changes to the agricultural system.11 Accord-
ing to the FAO, cereal production among major exporting coun-
tries has been declining since 2005,12 and much of this decline 
can be attributed to droughts and other weather disasters in grain 
producing countries. For example, Burma’s cyclone destroyed 
its supply of rice,13 a commodity with prices that have risen by 
as much as 130% or more since 2007.14 As climate change is 
altering or threatening to disrupt growing patterns around the 
world in the coming decades, experts warn prices could con-
tinue to go up. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, in a 2007 report, warned that melting glaciers 
in the Himalayas could have serious ramifications for farmers in 
China and India during the dry season in those countries.15 On 
the other hand, climate change could allow for the cultivation 
of crops in areas now inhospitable for agriculture.16 The chal-
lenge is how quickly the world’s growing population can adapt 
to these changes in areas for cultivation.
increaSinG Fuel anD Fertilizer coStS
The increasing price at the gas pump that has affected mil-
lions of drivers has also affected the farming industry and con-
tributed to the increase in food prices. According to the FAO, 
these higher fuel prices have been coupled with increasing fertil-
izer costs and have driven up the cost of producing and trans-
porting major agricultural products all over the world.17 Some 
farmers and ranchers who pay these high fuel and fertilizer costs 
are forced to pass on the increased costs to consumers.18 Fur-
thermore, this year’s record oil prices are driving up food prices 
by increasing costs of production and transportation which also 
increases the prices consumers pay.19 
bioFuelS
Many policy experts believe that another factor contributing 
to higher food prices is the production of biofuels. The worldwide 
approaches to energy security and food security have been in 
conflict. The increasing production of alternatives to fossil fuels 
has depleted supplies in commodities such as corn and sugar, 
leading to unsustainable prices. Moreover, government support 
for the biofuels industry in the form of consumption mandates, 
tax credits, import barriers, investment subsidies, and other poli-
cies can be substantial in some cases. This support accelerates 
the shift in usage for some commodities from food and feed to 
fuel, thereby driving up prices for food. Ethanol production tri-
pled from 2000-2007, with the United States and  Brazil account-
ing for a major part of this increase in production.20 Europe has 
also been a significant contributor to increase in ethanol produc-
tion as the European Commission has set a goal of having at 
least 5% of all road transport fuels come from renewable sources 
by 2015, with at least 1% of that share derived from second-
generation biofuels, electricity, or hydrogen.21 
Figure 2: Increasing Prices of Fertilizer 2006-2008
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheets) September 2008.
(Potassium chloride (muriate of potash), standard grade, spot, f.o.b. Vancouver 
TSP (triple superphosphate), up to September 2006 bulk, spot, f.o.b. US Gulf; 
from October 2006 onwards Tunisian, granular, f.o.b.).
Figure 3: Ethanol production 1975–2007 (billion liters)
Source: Global Subsidies Initiative 2007, Joachim von Braun, International 
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increaSinG DemanD
Increased economic development and international trade 
have led to the growth of the middle class worldwide, which 
in turn has increased demand for costly meat and dairy prod-
ucts by people who have changed their diets to match their 
incomes. While the FAO report22 cautions against overestimat-
ing the role changing diets are 
playing on food price spikes, 
Joachim von Braun, the Direc-
tor General of the International 
Food Policy Research Institute 
(“IFPRI”), estimates that chang-
ing demand could account for 
half of the recent price hikes.23 
China exemplifies this phe-
nomenon as its per capita meat 
consumption grew by 140% 
between 1990 and 2006.24 This 
increased demand also puts a 
strain on grain supplies because 
it takes seven pounds of grain to 
produce one pound of meat, fur-
ther burdening the commodities 
already experiencing production 
decreases due to weather-related 
disasters and other factors.25
traDe policy
Trade policy is also a key factor to consider as it can deter-
mine access to food. Proponents of trade argue that it is more 
urgent than ever to complete the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) Doha Development Agenda.26 They argue that mar-
ket forces would better ensure the right level of production and 
distribution. However, even before the food crisis emerged, free 
market advocates argued that subsidies distort trade, reward 
farmers in developed countries, and punish those in developing 
countries. The food crisis has intensified calls for cutting sub-
sidies. But, before subsidies are sharply reduced or eliminated, 
it is important to keep in mind that this could cause the cost of 
production to rise, and many importing countries would not be 
able to afford the food they need. Imports of subsidized products 
are often their chief source of food. 
As the food crisis unfolded, some twenty-six countries began 
to prohibit the export of certain products in order to ensure that 
their own populations were able to eat.27 This drove up prices 
even more and prompted calls for the export controls to be lifted. 
Some countries, such as Ukraine, did lift their bans. 
Of course, it is important to keep in mind that under global 
trading rules established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) after World War II, nations retain the right to 
restrict exports in certain situations. Specifically, GATT Article 
XI:2(a) permits “[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions temporar-
ily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs 
or other products essential to the exporting” country. When such 
rights are used simultaneously by many countries, as was done 
earlier this year, the implications for the trading system and for 
net food-importing countries are significant. 
Decline in aGricultural reSearch
The steep and prolonged reduction in agricultural research 
in developing countries and major agricultural research institu-
tions has also been cited as a contributing factor to the food cri-
sis. Nicholas Minot of the IFPRI 
explained at a June 5, 2008 
briefing before the U.S. House 
Hunger Caucus that national 
agricultural research institutes 
in developing countries have 
experienced declining budgets 
since around 1990, and inter-
national agricultural research 
centers have suffered budget 
cuts as well.28 This decline has 
hindered the ability of coun-
tries to respond quickly to 
short-term and long-term solu-
tions to the food crisis. With-
out current research, countries 
have been unable to respond to 
new pests, climate change, and 
other impacts on agriculture in a 
timely fashion. 
Financial marketS
According to the FAO report, investments of non-com-
mercial interests, such as financial funds, in futures trading on 
commodity markets have also played a role in determining the 
decisions of farmers, traders, and processors of agricultural com-
modities.29 Essentially, the activities of major futures investors 
appear to have a causal relationship with spot or cash markets.30 
As this trend increases, it may mean large institutional investors 
could control futures of wheat and other commodities causing 
new spikes in demand, and therefore even higher prices. 
crIsIs mITIGaTIon
As noted earlier, the scope and likely duration of the food 
crisis has commanded the attention of elected officials, multi-
lateral institutions, non-governmental organizations, and pri-
vate sector companies around the world. In the months after 
the media began to focus on the crisis in the spring of 2008, 
there have been high-level meetings, an increase in monetary 
donations to relief operations, and steps by over thirty countries 
ranging from easing import restrictions to distributing seeds in 
an effort to mitigate the short- and medium-term effects of the 
crisis and to design long-term strategies for preventing a recur-
rence of this catastrophe.
In April 2008, the Chief Executives Board of the United 
Nations pulled together its major departments as well as repre-
sentatives from other multilateral institutions to create a High-
Level Task Force (“HLTF”), and began work on a framework 
for action to mitigate and eventually solve the food crisis. United 
Higher fuel prices have 
been coupled with 
increasing fertilizer 
costs and have driven 
up the cost of producing 
and transporting major 
agricultural products all 
over the world.
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Nations participants included the FAO, the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), and the UN Develop-
ment Program (“UNDP”). Other multilateral organizations rep-
resented in the task force included the WTO, the World Bank, 
and the IMF.31
At the FAO annual summit in Rome in June 2008, world 
leaders and experts from a wide array of fields considered pos-
sible reasons for the price spikes and how to address the ensuing 
hunger and political instability. Among the medium- and long-
term solutions embraced by participants were policies to help 
restore the viability of subsistence farming in cases where the 
market-based trading system cannot deliver food to where it is 
needed. The summit’s formal declaration also called for more 
concerted action to respond to challenges presented by climate 
change, and a focus on maintaining biodiversity through wise 
stewardship of fisheries and forests. Participants also called for 
increased investment in science and technology for food produc-
tion, as well as reductions in trade barriers and market-distorting 
policies.32
On the issue of biofuels, the Rome declaration acknowl-
edged the competing international goals and urged in-depth 
studies on ways to ensure that 
production and use of biofuels 
is sustainable. These recommen-
dations tracked closely with a 
ten-point proposal World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick put 
forward on the eve of the Rome 
summit. Specifically, he called 
for lifting of export bans and cut-
ting tariffs on ethanol imported 
into U.S. and European Union 
markets to encourage the out-
put of more efficient sugarcane 
biofuels, which do not compete 
directly with food production and expand opportunities for 
poorer countries.33
Meanwhile, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy also urged 
a successful conclusion to the WTO Doha Round and stressed 
the importance of improving the trade capacity of developing 
countries. He noted that of twenty-two countries listed as most 
vulnerable to food insecurity, many were also among the least 
integrated economies in terms of their assimilation into global 
agriculture markets. These countries lack the adequate roads, 
ports, and administrative infrastructure needed to import and 
export goods; countries often import food from a country on 
another continent instead of a country next door.34
Later on in the summer, the members of the G8 major eco-
nomic powers met in their annual meeting and spent a signifi-
cant portion of time discussing the dire effects of the global food 
crisis worldwide. They emerged with pledges for cash assistance 
and commitments to work to find long-term solutions to the 
crisis.35 
Sustained attention at the highest levels of government 
and international organizations will be needed as the food 
crisis continues, and there have been encouraging steps in recent 
months to suggest that international leaders are taking the matter 
seriously. 
For example, the World Bank has moved forward on its $1.2 
billion rapid financing program—the Global Food Resource Pro-
gram (“GFRP”). As of October, the GFRP had dispersed $193 
million in twenty at-risk countries. One project worth $7 million 
was awaiting approval and an additional $651 million had been 
earmarked for projects in eleven countries. The money is to be 
used for feeding the most vulnerable groups (such as children 
and pregnant women), obtaining food imports, and purchasing 
seeds for the upcoming planting season.36
In July 2008, the FAO approved a series of projects in 
forty-eight countries with a total value of $21 million to help 
farmers and needy people in those countries. The chief goal of 
these efforts is to ensure the success of the next planting season. 
Over the longer term, the expectation is to demonstrate how bet-
ter access to seeds and fertilizers can increase food production 
where it is needed most.37
In addition to these actions by multinational institutions, 
in May 2008 three dozen countries, in every part of the world, 
unilaterally adopted policies 
to try to feed their populations 
for the short-term and develop 
approaches for food security 
needs for the future. For exam-
ple, Guyana began distribut-
ing seeds for free while Ghana 
eliminated all export duties on 
rice, wheat, yellow corn, and 
vegetable oil.38 India removed 
an export ban on non-basmati 
rice and other products for ship-
ment to Bhutan, while China 
made diesel fuel more readily 
available for farm vehicles during the cereal harvest season.39 
In addition, Ukraine lifted export quotas on grains and cancelled 
restrictions on grain imports it had put in place when the crisis 
first manifested itself.40 These examples show that individual 
countries are beginning to shift their policies in response to the 
global food crisis. Governments realized that restricting or ban-
ning exports of key food staples to ensure domestic supplies and 
reduced prices would only bring short-term relief. However, 
these practices would eventually cause long-term harm by cre-
ating disincentives for domestic production and constraining 
global supply, which would raise costs to consumers around the 
world. These changes in agricultural and trade policies mani-
fested by numerous countries this year show that individual 
governments are not solely relying on the work of multilateral 
institutions to temporarily solve the food crisis—they are also 
taking the initiative to protect their future food security.
The focus by governments and international organizations 
has also served to underscore the need for creative and diligent 
work by the private sector, whether corporations or charitable 
organizations. There are complex political, economic, and social 
Countries lack the 
adequate roads, ports, 
and administrative 
infrastructure needed to 
import and export goods.
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relationships at stake for policy makers to consider. At a devel-
opment conference in September 2008, Zoellick renewed calls 
to lift export bans and restrictions on humanitarian food aid as 
these “harm the most vulnerable.” He acknowledged that it is 
not always easy for countries that are concerned about having 
enough to feed their population and suggested possible solutions 
including, “sharing the management of physical reserves, creat-
ing regional information systems for early detection of supply 
shocks, and establishing networks of virtual grain reserves.”41
The food crisis has also created new challenges and oppor-
tunities for the public and private sector to address broader goals 
for sustainable development.  For example, the UN HLTF issued 
a paper urging public/private actions that would engage and 
aide smallholder farmers in rural areas of developing nations.  It 
promotes ensuring farmers’ access to seeds and fertilizers, 
opportunities to reduce post harvest losses, and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure.42
The meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 
2008 provided a forum for showcasing some of the private sec-
tor initiatives and highlighting the need for even more action. 
For example, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Howard 
G. Buffett Foundation, and the government of Belgium unveiled 
a $76 million initiative called Purchase for Progress (“P4P”), 
which is designed to help hundreds of thousands of small farmers 
access reliable markets so that they can sell their surplus crops 
at competitive prices. P4P will bolster fragile local economies, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America.43
The General Assembly also saw the convening of chief 
executives representing leading corporations from all continents 
for the first UN Private Sector Forum on Food Sustainability and 
the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”). At the open-
ing meeting UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told business 
leaders, “We need to bring knowledge, resources and innovation 
together in a way that links sustainability with opportunities for 
growth.”44
To be sure, there are many private sector initiatives directed 
toward the eradication of hunger. For example, during the Gen-
eral Assembly meeting, the WFP welcomed a private sector 
commitment under the auspices of the Clinton Global Initiative 
(“CGI”) to support improved food and nutrition for millions of 
schoolchildren in the world’s least developed countries. The lead-
ing corporate supporter of this initiative, YUM! Brands, offered 
an $80 million cash pledge to WFP and other hunger-related 
organizations.45 Earlier in the year, Kemin Industries announced 
it will help the WFP improve the quality and nutritional impact 
of the food it distributes to the hungry poor throughout the world 
by providing its technical expertise in the field of food quality 
maintenance and quality assurance systems.46 This example 
shows how a company can connect its unique capabilities to spe-
cific needs—it is an example that should be duplicated. 
conclusIon
The causes of the food crisis are numerous, complicated, 
and interconnected, so designing mechanisms for addressing the 
current emergency and preventing a future catastrophe will take 
time, resources, and political will. 
While the price of some commodities has come down 
slightly, the factors that have contributed to this crisis remain. 
According to the FAO, by 2030 world agricultural production 
will have to increase by fifty percent to feed an additional 1.6 
billion people and world food production will need to double 
to feed 9 billion people by 2050. Concerted public and private 
investment is crucial for boosting agricultural production and 
spurring sustainable development.47
Nations and multilateral institutions have begun to sort out 
how issues from trade to biofuels to investment in agricultural 
research can be part of a long-term solution. Of course, it is a 
daunting challenge to create solutions that suit political, eco-
nomic, social, and environmental considerations all at once. 
Creative philanthropy by the private sector will also be 
integral to sustainable and environmentally sound development. 
Businesses, large and small, with a wide variety of tools, know 
how, and financial resources might be in the best position to 
tackle discrete challenges in isolated corners of the world.
For individuals and companies, there are many ways to con-
tribute to the alleviation of hunger and starvation in the short 
run and prevent future catastrophes. This will require people to 
remain aware of the issue. Every day a myriad of tragedies,  crises, 
and important “normal” events compete for our attention—the 
plight of disabled veterans and homeless people, global financial 
panics, elections, wars, and weather-related calamities, such as 
tsunamis. Many of these issues explode onto the front page. But 
others, like the silent tsunami of the food crisis, wreak havoc 
every day in places where people are voiceless and powerless. 
In a world ever more interconnected, we must remain vigilant 
in our attention to the silent tsunami because it affects all of us. 
Nothing is so fundamental to human existence as a sustainable 
supply of affordable food.
Endnotes: The Global Food Crisis
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1 See U.N. World Food Programme, WFP Crisis Page: High Food Prices, 
http://wfp.org/english/ ?ModuleID=137&Key=2853 [hereinafter WFP Crisis 
Page] (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (explaining that high food prices have put 
up to 130 million people deeper into poverty and have caused social unrest in 
countries around the world).
2 Kent Garber, The Food Crisis Hits the U.S., u.S. newS & worlD report, 
May 1, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/01/ 
the-food-cost-crisis-hits-the-us.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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InTroDucTIon:  
posITIonInG bIoFuel proDucTIon In The laTTer 
halF oF The TwenTIeTh cenTury
There is little doubt that the world is in the midst of a food and fuel crisis. Among developed nations, the United States finds itself in the particularly precarious position 
of maintaining both a strong domestic economy and a positive 
reputation abroad. Domestically, 39.8% of total energy consump-
tion comes from petroleum,1 22.8% from coal,2 23.6% from nat-
ural gas,3 8.4% from nuclear power,4 and 6.8% from renewable 
energy (including conventional 
hydroelectric power, wood, 
alcohol, geothermal, solar, and 
wind).5 The frightening reality is 
that 98.4%6 of the world’s oil is 
largely located in nations char-
acterized by political instability 
and/or tense relations with the 
United States, such as Venezu-
ela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 
Nigeria.7 Some have character-
ized this geopolitical situation 
as allowing the above mentioned 
nations’ political leaders to ensconce themselves from demo-
cratic reforms and “insulate themselves from international and 
domestic pressures.”8 Many also allege that the United States’ 
interest in oil has led to unnecessary engagement in foreign con-
flict. The current energy crisis has come with equally trouble-
some record-increases in the cost of agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. Rising food and fuel prices are driving record enroll-
ment in food nutrition assistance programs in the United States9 
and threatening to return some 100 million individuals to pov-
erty abroad.10 This situation has left Americans searching for a 
means of securing energy independence and restoring afford-
ability to the global and national food supply. 
In this context, the rapid expansion of renewable biofuels 
has been simultaneously viewed as a culprit and solution. Bio-
fuel production has been consistently indicted as a major con-
tributor to increasing food prices in multiple dimensions. This 
includes the direct competition of food crops being diverted for 
production of biofuels, as well as the more indirect competition 
for land and resources to grow fuel versus food crops.11 Alterna-
tively, some stress that biofuels are not to blame for rising global 
food prices, adding that biofuels have had a greater impact in 
keeping transportation costs as low as they are.12 As a substitute 
for gasoline, it is argued that biofuels have played a critical role 
in adding stability to energy prices and assuring that they do not 
climb higher than their recent record levels.13
Before delving extensively into the role of biofuels in the 
modern food and fuel crisis, it is important to remember that 
the modern experience of “agflation”14 and energy dependence 
is not unlike other points in U.S. history. As Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke recently recalled, in the mid-seventies 
“oil price shocks” were also accompanied by “rapidly rising 
prices of agricultural products.”15 Then, just as now, the United 
States turned to domestic avenues for diversifying the energy 
economy. For example, in 1978, 
Congress passed its first version 
of the ethanol blenders’ credit 
as an incentive to begin blend-
ing their gasoline with home 
grown ethanol.16 Powerful 
corn advocates were among the 
first to push for a corn ethanol 
industry, and this initial support 
secured their dominance in the 
U.S. biofuel industry.17 Inter-
estingly enough, exactly thirty 
years later, another convergence 
of food and fuel crises along with the dominance of the corn eth-
anol industry and its controversial environmental impacts, has 
placed the United States at a critical juncture in regards to future 
importance and sustainability of biofuels policy.
With the leg up in the seventies, corn ethanol was best situ-
ated to take advantage of a number of recent market and politi-
cal trends. The widespread state bans on the gasoline additive 
MBTE created a significant opportunity for ethanol to be com-
bined with gasoline in order to obtain a desired consistency and 
quality at the pump.18 More recently, record high and rapidly 
increasing oil prices have made corn-based ethanol competi-
tive with gasoline.19 In recognition of the rapidly increasing 
importance of biofuels, an energy title was added to the Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act20 (the previous farm bill) for 
the first time in 2002. The passage and implementation of the 
first Renewable Fuels Standard (“RFS”) in 200521 provided the 
first mandated level of ethanol production as an opportunity for 
Expansion of renewable 
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the United States to “grow its way” out of a dependence upon 
foreign oil.22 Between 2005 and November of 2007, produc-
tion nearly doubled from four billion gallons to 7.6 billion gal-
lons.23 Moreover, it is estimated that another 4.9 billion gallons 
of production capacity is under construction.24 This increase has 
not occurred without significant secondary impacts in agricul-
ture and the greater environment. Increased ethanol production 
has substantially raised livestock 
feed prices,25 eroding profit 
margins for poultry, swine, and 
cattle producers. Also, expanded 
production has brought increased 
inquiry into ethanol’s actual abil-
ity to deliver on its promise as a 
climate mitigating strategy. Cur-
rent research is focusing on the 
secondary costs associated with 
biofuel expansion.26 These costs 
include carbon deficits created 
by drawing new lands into pro-
duction for biofuels in develop-
ing nations, the impacts of drawing down major aquifers for the 
planting of corn,27 and, most importantly as of late, the cost of 
diverting land from the production of food crops to the produc-
tion of fuel.28 
With production for 2008 expected to well out-pace the 
mandate of the 2005 Renewable Fuels Standard29 and grow-
ing concern over corn ethanol’s impact on environmental and 
food policy, the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act 
(“EISA”) both revised and expanded the standard in light of 
the modern food and fuel controversy.30 Beginning in 2009, the 
EISA will require increasing portions of the renewable fuels 
mandate to be derived from “advanced biofuels,” or biofuels 
derived from sources other than corn.31 While the EISA outlines 
a skeletal framework for the future of domestic biofuel produc-
tion, the recently passed 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy 
Act (“2008 Farm Bill”)32 requires fleshing out the policy incen-
tives to facilitate such a transition. 
Through the lens of the most recent farm bill, this paper 
investigates the content and implications of a dramatically altered 
renewable fuel policy in the context of the modern food and fuel 
crisis. After establishing this basic understanding, we argue that 
the renewable biofuels industry is at an important juncture as 
the transition is made from corn ethanol towards advanced bio-
fuels. We offer a preliminary assessment of the sustainability 
of biofuels as a component of the U.S. energy policy transition 
from “monosource” petroleum dependence to a “multisource” 
production scheme. 
2008 Farm bIll enerGy provIsIons
The 2008 Farm Bill occupies the unique position of gen-
erating active policies for energy production incentives and 
reactionary policies which must account for higher food costs 
and negative environmental impacts associated with biofuel 
production. It also carries the responsibility for creating the pro-
grams that will make the goals set by the EISA attainable over 
the five-year horizon.
The 2008 Farm Bill marks a major transition in renewable 
biofuels policy by moving away from the dominant corn-based 
industry.33 The Farm Bill’s programs are directed towards the 
development of “advanced biofuels.” The “advanced bio uels” 
terminology was adapted by 
the Congress in the 2007 EISA, 
but loosely aligns with what 
the scientific community has 
termed “second generation” 
biofuels.34 The primary empha-
sis is placed on cellulosic etha-
nol, which is derived from 
cellulose, hemi celluloses, or 
lignin,35 and includes fuels that 
are produced primarily from a 
variety of crops, crop residues, 
forest sources, waste streams, 
and other cellulosic sources.36 
However, the term “advanced biofuels,” as utilized by the Con-
gress in the 2007 EISA37 and in the 2008 Farm Bill, covers a 
much broader range of technologies than solely cellulosic eth-
anol. These include commercially scaled technologies such as 
biodiesel and sugar ethanol. In reality, the modified definition of 
advanced biofuels can include any non-corn source.38 Programs 
with specific reference to “advanced biofuels” terminology 
include the authorization and appropriation of mandatory funds 
for a loan guarantee program and an energy payments program.39 
General programs incorporating advanced biofuels promotion 
establish a controversial sugar-to-ethanol program and reautho-
rize federal programs to give preference to bio-based products.
The 2008 Farm Bill’s Energy Title addresses the concept of 
“advanced biofuels.” In § 9003, a $320 million loan guarantee 
program offers up to a ninety percent guarantee on loans up to 
$250 million for the construction of advanced biofuel infrastruc-
ture and demonstration scale projects.40 The other major program 
addressing advanced biofuels, outlined in § 9005,41 builds off 
of the Commodity Credit Corporation bio-energy program, cre-
ated by executive order of President Clinton in 1999.42 The pro-
gram previously provided incentives and payments for bio fuels 
producers.43 Although the bioenergy program was extremely 
popular, no funding was appropriated in fiscal year 2007.44 Now 
the second largest provision of the title in terms of mandatory 
money at $300 million, the Farm Bill has revived the program 
with a focus on moving away from corn-based ethanol.45 The 
program “directs the USDA to make payments to support and 
ensure an expanding production of advanced biofuels.”46 In 
addition to these funding incentives, § 9002 commissions a bio-
fuel infrastructure study that directs the Secretary of Agriculture 
to look into infrastructure needs associated with the expanding 
production and use of advanced biofuels.47 The Department of 
Energy and the Transportation and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency will also assist in the study.48 
The United States stands 
at a critical juncture  
in the implementation  
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More targeted programs that begin to address the needs of 
cellulosic ethanol are also present in the energy provisions of Tax 
Title XV, § 15321. However, none of the programs likely to see 
the level of funding promised in the general advanced bio fuels 
provisions.49 The first targeted program is the Biomass Crops 
Assistance Program (“BCAP”).50 According to the Statement of 
the Managers, the “primary focus of the BCAP will be promot-
ing the cultivation of perennial and annual bioenergy crops that 
show exceptional promise for producing highly energy-efficient 
bioenergy or biofuels, that preserve natural resources, and that 
are not primarily grown for food or animal feed.”51 This pro-
gram is granted no mandatory funding under the Energy Title, 
but the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) scores the pro-
gram to cost some $70 million.52 
Cellulosic ethanol production is also being supported 
through additional funding for research and development initia-
tives.53 Tax Title XV creates a $1.01 per gallon tax credit for 
producers of cellulosic ethanol.54 
The CBO scores the program 
at a cost of $403 million over 
the ten-year budget window,55 
which is likely the single largest 
flow of funds to the commercial-
ization of cellulosic ethanol.56
Working from the opposite 
side of active advanced bio-
fuels programming is the effort 
to reduce the incentive for corn 
ethanol production. Section 
15331 of the Trade and Tax 
Title reduces the Volumetric 
Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (“VEETC”) for ethanol blended into 
gasoline from fifty-one cents per gallon to forty-five cents per 
gallon starting in 2009.57 More popularly known as the ethanol 
blenders’ credit,58 the tax credit is an incentive for blenders to 
purchase ethanol and has been a powerful tool for expanding the 
ethanol market since it was established in the 1978 Energy Tax 
Act.59 The 2008 Farm Bill reduces the ethanol blenders’ credit 
in reference to projections that ethanol production will soon out-
pace the 2005 RFS mandate.60 
The sugar loan program appears in the Commodities Title 
and confronts increased competition from trade liberalization.61 
The U.S. sugar loan policy consistently maintained sugar prices at 
levels two to four times higher than world markets through man-
aged trade.62 These circumstances, which allowed the USDA to 
operate the sugar policy at “no cost,” are quickly eroding.63 An 
increasing number of free trade agreements coming online and, 
most significantly, the phase-out of tariff quotas in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement,64 will make it harder for the 
USDA to recoup all losses from sugar forfeitures. In light of the 
celebrated success of the Brazilian sugar ethanol program, the 
USDA began considering the possibilities of  sugar-to-ethanol 
production. In 2006, the USDA released an economic analysis 
concluding that with high oil prices, it would be cost effective 
for the United States to produce sugar ethanol.65 With the added 
push of the U.S. market opening up to sugar inputs from Mexico, 
the sugar-to-ethanol program was added to both the House and 
Senate versions of the Farm Bill.66 The final product is the estab-
lishment of the Farmer Feedstock Flexibility Program.67 Build-
ing on the Commodities Title three quarters of a cent per pound 
raise of the loan rate for sugar, this Title IX program requires the 
USDA to buy up surplus sugar for sale to ethanol producers.68 
Additional sugar-related programs include the extension of the 
sugar ethanol tariff until 2011.69 
evaluaTInG The FuTure oF bIoFuels
We argue that the successful transition of U.S. biofuel pro-
duction from corn to a broader-based system will require the con-
vergence of a number of factors. First, the modern debate over 
the causes of the food and fuel crisis has significantly damaged 
the public perception of biofuels. While ethanol is most often 
recognized as a one element of a “perfect storm” of a number of 
factors influencing prices of food 
and fuel, it has been consistently 
indicted as a primary contribu-
tor in analyses from politically 
powerful organizations,70 with 
estimates ranging between ten 
and thirty percent regarding its 
role in driving record prices.71 
The role of biofuels in driv-
ing agricultural prices needs to 
be clearly addressed through 
reforms that reduce the competi-
tion between uses of food crops 
and production lands. 
Second, the corn ethanol industry has the advantage of 
already having advanced along a substantial commercial learn-
ing curve.72 Thus, policies must also address means to “level 
the playing field” by increasing the competitiveness of advanced 
biofuels along the production chain and reducing supports that 
encourage the dominance of corn in the industry. Recogniz-
ing that the United States stands at a critical juncture in the 
implementation and acceptance of biofuels policy, this section 
assesses the progress of the 2008 Farm Bill towards meeting 
these goals.73
While the “advanced biofuels” terminology of the farm 
bill allows for a transition away from the corn based system, 
it fails to hold United States policy accountable to a food and 
fuel hypothesis. This is because sugar ethanol, biodiesel, and 
cellulosic ethanol present different obstacles to sustainability.74 
In particular, sugar and biodiesel face a similar problem as corn 
in requiring the diversion of a food crop to fuel production.75 
Furthermore, a scarcity of land resources available to be brought 
into production limits the potential of either biodiesel or sugar 
ethanol to expand to occupy a dominant position in the market 
relative to corn.76
By contrast, cellulosic ethanol avoids many of the pitfalls 
associated with commercially available technologies. It can be 
produced from almost any plant source, including plant waste 
Cellulosic ethanol 
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and dedicated energy crops that may not be as competitive for 
land and resources with food crops. By assessing the current 
level of existing activities, some studies estimate that the United 
States has the capacity to produce enough raw materials for 
cellulosic ethanol production to offset sixty percent of domes-
tic oil consumption.77 Cellulosic ethanol further promises to be 
more energy efficient in life cycle costing measures, and is more 
regionally diverse in its applicability when compared to corn 
ethanol.78 However, because the technology has not been com-
mercialized, there is no way to truly know what its actual poten-
tial is. Farmers do not want to grow dedicated energy crops that 
have never been grown on a commercial scale,79 investors do 
not want to invest in cellulosic ethanol production plants until a 
crop is in the ground, and banks do not want to offer reasonable 
loan rates until the technology is proven.80 Clearly the obstacles 
to cellulosic production are very distinct from the sugar or biod-
iesel industries. However, with cellulosic ethanol placed under 
the same umbrella as the previously mentioned problems with 
commercially available technologies, it is very possible that the 
infant industry’s particular needs will be neglected as policy 
makers grasp for a short-term solution.
Despite its far less commercialized position, cellulosic etha-
nol is not given near the prioritization, in terms of overall funding 
or triangulation, as programs dedicated to other advanced bio-
fuels. While the Bill earmarks substantial funding for research, 
the most actively praised program by farmers81—the BCAP pro-
gram—receives no mandatory money.82 Yet this is the program 
most likely to begin solving the problem of “who goes first”83 in 
terms of growing cellulosic ethanol production on a commercial 
scale. Cellulosic ethanol, clearly distinct from corn-based etha-
nol, sugar ethanol, and advanced biofuels, needs to be discussed 
as an alternative to those fuels. The current inclusion of cellu-
losic ethanol with advanced biofuels has great potential to be 
misleading in the context of the food and fuel debate. 
In terms of leveling the commercial playing field, the 2008 
Farm Bill does offer incentives to expand the commercializa-
tion of advanced biofuels. Existing ethanol plants or new plants 
looking to produce sugar ethanol can apply for a loan guarantee 
through the loan guarantee program. Those plants can expect a 
steady stream of supply as trade in sugar opens and the USDA 
has to both accept and sell more sugar forfeitures to ethanol pro-
cessors.84 Moreover, while small producers can take advantage 
of producer credits, distributors can take advantage of the now 
reduced, but still significant, ethanol blenders’ credit.85 All the 
while, the domestic production system is protected from direct 
competition against the more efficiently produced sugarcane 
ethanol from Brazil.86
Regardless of these advancements, recent research sug-
gests that the 2008 Farm Bill’s ethanol blenders’ credit reduc-
tion will not decrease the competitiveness of corn ethanol in the 
biofuels market. While the six cent reduction in the tax credit 
is certainly significant as the greatest reduction in the blenders’ 
credit in nearly twenty years,87 recent studies conclude that the 
reduction will have very little impact in the short run. Research 
from Iowa State University suggests that even the entire repeal 
of the blenders’ credit would not result in a major transition 
away from corn ethanol as ethanol plants will continue to oper-
ate in the short-run as long as production covers their variable 
cost.88 If the price of gasoline remains high, there will be suf-
ficient demand for corn ethanol even with higher costs of inputs 
and reductions in credit.89 
expanDInG The horIzon:  
susTaInabIlITy ImpacTs oF bIoFuels In The 
conservaTIon, nuTrITIon, anD TraDe TITles  
anD FooD aID provIsIon
There is more to the sustainability of advanced biofuels 
than can be demonstrated through the specific energy provisions 
alone. Placed in the broader context of the 2008 Farm Bill, bio-
fuels policy conflicts with the principles of environmental stew-
ardship through land pressures in the Conservation Title,90 and 
with social equity through disproportionate distribution of the 
burden of higher food costs compensated for in the Nutrition and 
Trade Titles and Food Aid Provision.91 Despite the fact that the 
energy and tax portions (discussed above) are the primary actors 
in shaping the active policies regarding the future of domestic 
biofuels, the funding priority overwhelmingly targets programs 
that must react to the secondary effects created by continued and 
increased ethanol production.92 Specifically, the Conservation 
Title takes a new direction based on increasing land availability, 
land values, and the drive to bring more acres under production 
due to greater aggregate demand for food and fuel production.93 
The Nutrition and Food Aid provisions work even further down 
the line, ultimately accounting for the increased end cost of food 
that has been linked to ethanol.94 Figure 1 provides a rough pic-
ture of the distribution of funding in the 2008 Farm Bill based on 
the scores offered by the Congressional Budget Office.95 
Figure 1: Farm Bill Spending 2008-2012
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Reserve Program,97 the funding for the Conservation Title now 
feeds into a number of programs which promote environmental 
sustainability for both “retired” and working lands.98 
Concern in the 2008 Farm Bill focused on the original 
Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”). CRP is a land retire-
ment program that offers farmers a paid option to enter into a 
ten year contract to reduce environmental and income risk by 
removing highly erodible and marginal lands from production 
while encouraging environmental stewardship; CRP is popular 
with farmers, environmentalists, and the hunting communi-
ty.99 Despite its popularity, vast increases in crop prices have 
offered farmers a powerful incentive to not reenroll their lands 
in the program and to return many of these marginal lands to 
production.100 These concerns elicited several proposals from 
academia, and even the Secretary of Agriculture, with the objec-
tive of making more effective use of the land.101 In response to 
these proposals, the CRP will gradually reduce its enrollable 
acreage from the current 36 million acre cap to a 32 million acre 
cap in 2010.102 Because of reduction in CRP acreage, funding 
increases in the Farm Bill will now go to programs focused on 
the regeneration and environmental sustainability of working 
lands.103 This includes substantial increases for the Environmen-
tal Quality Incentives Program (“EQUIP”)104 and the Conser-
vation Security Program (“CSP”).105 Managers announced in 
a May press conference that a funding agreement focusing on 
EQUIP and CSP would assure the sustainability of agriculture 
in light of increased land demand from biofuel producers and 
increases in crop production.106 
nutrition, traDe, anD FooD aiD
Whatever the exact role of ethanol in the food and fuel cri-
sis, its effects bear primarily on the poor—both in the United 
States and abroad. The poor spend the greatest proportion of 
their income on food and transportation.107 The U.S. scenario, 
where the average American still spends less than ten percent108 
of his income on food, is a rosy one in the global context where 
the poor spend approximately seventy-five percent of their 
incomes on food.109 The administration of the food stamp pro-
gram, renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
in the 2008 Farm Bill, and the delivery of international food aid 
are the government’s primary mechanisms for ensuring that hard 
economic times and high commodity prices do not translate to 
hunger at home and abroad. 
In 1996, steep cuts made to the food stamp program meant 
a drastic decline in the purchasing power of food stamps.110 The 
2008 Farm Bill sought to correct this by linking the asset deduc-
tion of the eligibility formula to inflation. Moreover, the mini-
mum benefit had not been indexed in over thirty years, meaning 
that food stamp participants could only purchase one third of 
the amount purchased in 1979.111 The 2008 Farm Bill raises 
the minimum benefit by almost one-third and then indexes the 
minimum benefit to future inflation in hopes of preventing this 
problem in the future.112 In terms of more macro interventions, 
the Nutrition Title doubles assistance to food banks for a total of 
$1.256 billion.113 
Indeed, to some extent the funding dedicated to nutrition 
and food aid objectives in the Farm Bill can be seen as a trans-
fer payment for the relative inefficiency of the U.S. government 
to ensure an affordable food supply. Although seventy percent 
of the Farm Bill spending ($10.3 billion) goes towards nutrition 
programs,114 rising agricultural prices have eroded the strides 
made by the Farm Bill. Reflecting these concerns, the House 
Agriculture Committee held hearings this summer to review the 
extent of “hunger in America” and international development 
assistance in agriculture.115
conclusIon
Given the dualistic position of biofuels as both a potential 
mechanism for reducing energy dependence and a source of food 
and environmental stress, it is vitally important that the policy 
and scientific community “get it right” in order for bio fuels to 
remain an important aspect of the domestic energy portfolio. In 
the recent example of the rise and decline of public favor for 
King Corn,116 “history tells us that public opinion will latch onto 
the first standard issued, and if the number is inaccurate, the 
public may . . . withdraw their support [from] renewable biofuels 
because of concerns about environmental impact.”117 
In terms of offering a sustainable solution, cellulosic etha-
nol may present the greatest biomass opportunity for a mutually 
agreeable solution to the reduction of dependence on petroleum 
in our current energy crisis. The Senate Committee report rec-
ognizes this premise stating, “for bioenergy, the most important 
need is to support and accelerate the development and commer-
cialization of technologies for producing biofuels and biobased 
products from cellulosic biomass feedstocks.”118 Yet, despite lip 
service to the importance of cellulosic ethanol, the 2008 Farm 
Bill obfuscates its definition through inclusion in the general 
category of advanced biofuels. It also fails to provide adequate 
incentives along the production chain for either commercialized 
cellulosic production to come to fruition or for adequate removal 
of support for corn ethanol production to promote the opening of 
an opportunity in the market.
This failure to deliver a systematic approach to bring a more 
sustainable biofuels production becomes all the more devas-
tating when viewed in light of the downstream effects on the 
environment and the poor, most threatened by the rising cost of 
food. Such impacts come at great economic and moral expense. 
In the Nutrition and Trade Titles and the Food Aid Provision, 
rising food costs create a double bind in which more people are 
made food insecure while it costs substantially more to provide 
a safety net. As showcased in the section on Conservation, land 
pressures have forced the issue of increased conservation spend-
ing as more marginal lands are brought into production. Yet the 
moral implications of our failed biofuels policy are truly the 
most profound, illustrating that we have yet to find an engine 
to our modern way of life that does not thrive at the expense of 
our natural environment, food affordability, food availability, or 
common humanity.
Endnotes: Adding Biofuel to the Fire
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The most recent collapse of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) negotiations occurred in July 2008 because countries were unable to reach an agreement on how to 
protect farmers in developing countries from the negative effects 
of greater trade liberalization.1 Although an attempt was made 
to restart talks in September 2008, little progress was made, and 
if talks are to continue, it will not likely be until 2009.2 The cur-
rent round of negotiations, titled the Doha Development Agenda 
(“DDA”), began in 2001 and included an emphasis on the needs 
of developing countries.3 However, subsequent negotiations 
have raised many questions about the commitment of developed 
countries to the DDA goals and highlighted the increasingly 
central role of agriculture in the WTO.
The Uruguay Round of negotiations, which continued from 
1986 until 1994, created both the WTO and the Agreement on 
Agriculture (“AoA”). Prior to the Uruguay Round, it was com-
monly believed that the international trade regime did not include 
agriculture. This can be traced to a 1955 waiver on agricultural 
import restrictions granted to the United States, which resulted 
in global disregard of trade rules.4 
The AoA firmly returned agriculture to the WTO trade 
regime with specific binding commitments regarding market 
access, domestic support, and export competition.5 Yet it does 
not take into consideration non-market aspects of agriculture 
and food markets, such as the relatively inelastic supply and 
demand in agriculture, the lack of political and economic power 
of farmers, and the fact that corporations rather than countries or 
farmers are the actors who engage in agricultural trade.6
The agricultural trade rules of the WTO have required lib-
eralization of developed country access to developing countries’ 
markets, but developed countries have not reciprocated by open-
ing their markets to agricultural products from developing coun-
tries. Tariffs levied by developed countries on products from 
developing countries increase the final product price, making it 
more difficult for developing countries to sell their agricultural 
products.7 Nor have developed countries sufficiently decreased 
their trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, which provide addi-
tional income to agricultural producers and allow them to sell 
their products for a lower price.8 As a result of these types of 
policies, developing country farmers are forced to compete 
with subsidized, larger foreign producers who may cause local 
producers to go out of business, increasing urban emigration, 
vulnerability of food-importing nations to swings in global com-
modity markets, and food insecurity.9
Commodity prices, which were quite low until relatively 
recently, coupled with the AoA’s unfair trade rules, have sig-
nificantly affected the ninety-six percent of the world’s farmers 
who live in developing countries and approximately 2.5 billion 
people who are dependent on agriculture as their main source of 
income.10 
Farmers in developing countries are negatively impacted 
when prices for their crops decline, which can result from trade 
liberalization.11 Conversely, consumers in developing countries 
generally benefit from lower food prices, because a large per-
centage of their income is spent on food.12 However, in many 
developing countries, households are both producers and con-
sumers of agricultural products and lower prices simultaneously 
lead to negative and positive effects.13 In subsistence farming 
households, the benefits of reduced food prices for consumption 
may not outweigh the losses of decreased profits from sale of 
their crops.14
Increased food prices have the greatest negative effects on 
people who spend a substantial portion of their incomes on food. 
When prices in staple food crops go up these people are forced 
to reduce either their food consumption or their purchases of 
other essentials. The recent food crisis has increased the num-
ber of people living in poverty by an estimated 100 million and 
led to widespread food riots.15 The number of people suffering 
from malnutrition increased by 119 million in 2007 and 2008, 
bringing the worldwide total to nearly one billion.16 Although 
increased food prices should lead to increased incomes for 
farmers in developing countries, for the most part this has not 
occurred because of increases in input prices, limited access to 
markets, and the fact that the minority of household producers 
are net sellers.17 
At the July 2008 WTO negotiations, parties reached an 
impasse because developing countries refused to move forward 
with an agreement that would deepen the inequities exacerbated 
by agricultural trade. Developing countries want to protect their 
farmers and their populations from poverty and hunger. The 
agricultural sector within developing countries is important for 
ensuring food security and for employment. In India, for exam-
ple, two-thirds of the population is supported by agriculture.18 
At the July negotiations, Susan C. Schwab, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, stated that the developing countries wanted an 
agreement that would take the global trading system back thirty 
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years.19 While this may be true in some respects, it ignores the 
fact that developing countries are not now industrialized to the 
degree that the United States was thirty years ago. Developed 
countries, like the United States, have demonstrated a contin-
ued unwillingness to recognize the role that protection played in 
their own economic development and to extend similar protec-
tions to developing countries. 
Developing countries’ concerns regarding unfair rules of 
trade in agriculture must be incorporated into any future WTO 
negotiations in order to contribute to rather than detract from 
progress on long-term development goals. Developed countries 
should reduce the subsidies given to domestic agricultural pro-
ducers, as well as the tariffs on agricultural imports from devel-
oping countries. It is also essential that countries recognize that 
trade may lead to food insecurity in developing countries and 
take measures to support both subsistence farmers and consum-
ers there.20 
Since the Doha Round began, developed countries have pro-
posed some reductions in their subsidies and to allow some of 
the poorest developing countries to maintain tariffs on a limited 
number of products.21 However, the developing country propos-
als do not go far enough to fulfill the objectives outlined by the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, such as taking into account the 
development needs of non-industrialized nations, including food 
security and rural development.22 Developing countries should 
continue to work together to build agreements and power blocks 
to ensure that any future trade agreement embodies the original 
intent of the Doha Development Agenda.
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The sharp rise in the price of basic foodstuffs in the last year has impacted consumers around the globe, but the ill effects are disproportionately felt in developing coun-
tries. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) 
reports seventy-five million more people living below the hun-
ger line in 2007, raising the number of undernourished to 923 
million worldwide; these numbers are likely to increase even 
more sharply in 2008.1 Food prices for staples such as flour, 
corn, and rice have risen fifty-two percent on average from 2007 
to 2008.2 In developing countries, where families may spend as 
much as fifty to seventy percent of their daily budget on food, 
these price increases translate into poorer nutrition and loss of 
purchase power; in other words, these families must make dev-
astating trade-offs: paying for food instead of essential utilities, 
education, or basic health care.3 Food prices have triggered pro-
tests in thirty-six countries, twelve of them violent.4
Economists and food policy experts cite a variety of factors 
that have most likely contributed to the price rise of commodi-
ties. Demand-side fundamentals include the increased demand 
for commodities due to new investment in biofuels, which now 
for example use one third of U.S. corn production,5 and the 
changing diet of the world’s growing middle class, requiring 
more land- and water-intensive production of meat, dairy, fruits, 
and vegetables.6 Supply-side fundamentals include weather and 
natural disasters affecting crop yields, such as Cyclone Nargis in 
Burma, droughts in Java, stem rust disease affecting wheat crops 
in East Africa;7 food and water shortages effecting agricultural 
production; and generally lagging agricultural productivity 
that fails to keep up with worldwide population and economic 
growth.8 
Many experts agree, however, that the fundamentals alone 
to do not explain the dramatic rise in commodity prices. Out-
side of the fundamentals, there are old culprits: inefficient trade 
policies, such as tariffs, subsidies, and export restrictions, some 
of which have been raised or reinstated as countries attempt to 
protect their domestic food supplies. And there is a relatively 
new culprit: the direct and indirect impacts of speculative invest-
ment in commodity futures. Within this market, as the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute (“IFPRI”) reports, “rising 
expectations, speculation, hoarding, and hysteria are among the 
additional factors that have played a role in the increasing level 
and volatility of food prices.”9 
Investment in the commodity futures market has increased 
from roughly $13 billion in 2003 to $250 billion this year.10 
Much of the increase has come through the introduction of 
new investors, index funds, and other noncommercial traders 
who seek profits through speculation, using largely unregu-
lated over-the-counter swaps.11 Commodity futures were origi-
nally designed to protect farmers and commercial investors, 
for example grain elevators, with some physical interest in the 
underlying commodity market.12 Until the 1990s, the distinction 
between these commercial hedgers and non-commercial specu-
lators was clear—and both were regulated. In the United States, 
the Commodity Futures Trade Commission (“CFTC”) regulates 
the activities of the commercial hedgers, for example, by impos-
ing position limits and capital stock requirements.13 Beginning 
in 1991, recognizing that non-commercial swaps dealers were 
playing an important role in providing liquidity in the market, 
the CFTC granted them exemptions from these limits. With 
deregulatory legislation of the late 1990s, additional regulatory 
loopholes were deliberately left for commodity swaps, which 
allowed for more speculation by commercial hedgers and the 
entrance of more noncommercial speculators into the market.14
Speculation in commodities futures involves both benefit 
(liquidity) and risk (price destabilization). There is little doubt 
that speculation is tied to rising food prices, whether as a cause, 
a symptom, or both.15 The causal effects are both direct, as a 
flood of investment further drives up already rising prices, and 
indirect, since the price of oil, a non-food commodity, invariably 
affects the prices of other commodities through transportation 
and fertilizer inputs.16 
By spring 2008, international organizations, think tanks, 
and politicians began to call for regulatory reform in the com-
modity futures market. The IFPRI called for “a resilience pack-
age” of policy measures, the first of which was to “calm markets 
with the use of market-oriented regulation of speculations” in 
May.17 On July 10, 2008, Senators Joe Lieberman, Susan Col-
lins, and Maria Cantwell introduced in the Senate the Commod-
ity Speculation Reform Act (“S. 3248”).18 The bill was referred 
to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 
where it has languished ever since.19
Meanwhile, political pressure and charges that the Com-
mission was neglecting its regulatory duties spurred a response 
from the CFTC. In September 2008 it published the preliminary 
results of a broad survey of all U.S. swap dealers and index 
funds. In the introduction to the preliminary report the CFTC 
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wrote, “this type of a compelled survey relating to off-exchange 
activity is unprecedented, but the growth and evolution in futures 
market participation and growing public concern regarding off-
exchange activity supported the need for this extraordinary 
regulatory inquiry.”20 The recommendations mostly called for 
further investigation. For example, a review was recommended 
as to whether “swap dealers would maintain their exemptions 
in exchange for them to report when their clients reach certain 
position levels and provide ‘certification’ that none of their spec-
ulative clients exceed position limits.”21 One of the four CFTC 
commissioners, Bart Chilton, said the recommendations did not 
go far enough. As he colorfully put it, “We need a sheriff in the 
saddle, to make sure these markets are honest.”22
Regulation is also being addressed internationally. On 
October 1, 2008 the CFTC announced that it will co-chair the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions’ newly-
created Task Force on Commodity Markets (“TFCM”), along-
side the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority, with 
the participation of both developed and developing member 
countries. The TFCM is charged with “examining the current 
supervisory approaches for overseeing commodity markets 
worldwide” given the “profound changes” these markets have 
recently undergone.23
If not for the latest wave of the financial crisis, including 
the near failure of American International Group, the prospect 
of legislative change in the United States on these issues may 
have died with S. 3248. Instead, in mid-October various com-
mittees of the both the House and the Senate have held hearings 
on credit- derivatives and credit-default swaps. As these commit-
tees debate whether the CFTC, the Security Exchange Commis-
sion, or private sector clearinghouses are better suited to regulate 
credit swaps,24 the hope is that whatever the legislative outcome 
may be, it does not allow the gaping loopholes in commodity 
futures regulation to persist.
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InTroDucTIon
California farmland is disappearing.
1 As farmers age2 
and their heirs move to other lines of work, the agricul-
tural land traditionally making up small- and medium-
sized farms is being consolidated by large-scale agribusiness 
or, increasingly, moving out of production.3 Although smaller 
farmers have never been respon-
sible for a majority of Califor-
nia’s agricultural production, 
they do offer important social, 
economic, and environmental 
benefits to their local commu-
nities. They also contribute to 
local and national food security 
by improving crop diversity 
and lessening dependence on 
imports.
The shift away from produc-
tive agricultural use is largely 
related to the sprawling devel-
opment that consumes valuable 
farmland: about fifty thousand acres of farmland in California 
are paved over annually.4 Land values in California have sky-
rocketed in recent years and as cities sprawl farther beyond tra-
ditional suburbs, formerly rural agricultural land has increased 
dramatically in value. As a result, small farm owners find it more 
profitable to subdivide, develop, or simply sell their land than 
keep it in production—even on land producing some of Califor-
nia’s most profitable crops. Farmland along the expanding urban 
fringe is often purchased by wealthy suburbanites who crave 
open space and country estates but not necessarily agriculture.5 
One relatively recent and innovative solution to preserving 
productive agricultural land is the Agricultural Conservation 
Easement (“ACE”). Generally, an easement is a legal tool that 
gives one person or entity an interest or right in another person’s 
property. Frequently easements give the third party the right 
to restrict the owner’s use of his or her property in a specific 
way. Conservation easements encourage land conservation by 
restricting development. Often the party with the interest in the 
land is a municipal government or land protection organization 
known as a land trust.6 California state law7 provides for conser-
vation easements and federal tax law provides for substantial tax 
benefits to donors of conservation easements.8 
Agricultural conservation easements, in particular, have 
emerged as a popular tool in protecting not only “open space,” 
but also top-quality soils in productive farming areas or working 
landscapes.  This is a significant step, however many ACE pro-
grams do not go far enough when they merely set aside valuable 
land.  Protecting open spaces preserves the inherent value of 
nature and ecosystems but stops short of boosting rural econo-
mies, maintaining domestic food production as a societal asset, 
and protecting our food independence and security.  ACEs can 
be used to achieve the dual 
goals of protecting open space 
and ensuring that productive 
land is actually farmed. 9
This paper discusses the 
challenges of maintaining the 
benefits of ACEs in California 
where land value has increased 
so drastically that even the 
encumbered property is worth 
more than the potential agricul-
tural productivity of the land. It 
then explores three tools used 
by other states’ easement pro-
grams that, if adopted by Cali-
fornia land trusts, could improve the tools available to preserve 
California’s working agricultural landscapes.
aces In calIFornIa: The challenGe oF lanD 
value & keepInG lanD In proDucTIon
“It’s Not Farmland Without Farmers,” cautions a bumper 
sticker put out by American Farmland Trust. Even so, would-be 
farmers are dissuaded by competitive global markets, industry 
consolidation, and rising land prices. Open space and farmland 
conservationists, ‘Locavores’ promoting regional food econo-
mies, rural sociologists, Farm Bill reform groups, and agricul-
tural industry representatives are all concerned that young and 
incoming farmers are becoming scarce. While the consolida-
tion of big agriculture diminishes the need for new farmers, 
those small- and medium-scale farmers intrepid enough to enter 
the business need a leg up. These smaller farms often provide 
Smaller farms often 
provide ecological, social, 
and even economic 
benefits to the public that 
industrial agriculture  
does not provide.
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ecological, social, and even economic benefits to the public 
that industrial agriculture does not provide.10 Lack of access to 
affordable farmland is a real barrier to new-entry farmers that 
must be addressed to keep farms farmed.
Due to unprecedented residential development pressures, 
especially the proliferation over the past twenty-five years of 
“rural sprawl,” agricultural land prices throughout much of 
California have climbed well out of reach of new farmers.11 
Increased demand for rural ranchettes, for example, is having a 
grave impact on land prices. For example, recently land values 
in the San Joaquin Valley increased from ten thousand dollars 
per acre for agricultural land to upwards of two hundred thou-
sand dollars per acre when that land was re-zoned and sold for 
development. The result is that ranchettes are “pricing bona fide 
commercial farmers out of the market for the most productive 
agricultural land.”12 
Small farms, defined for our purposes as those agricultural 
parcels at or near their zoned minimum parcel size (or usually 
ten to eighty acres), present a particularly difficult conservation 
challenge. The value of a parcel 
of land as a home site consis-
tently overshadows its agricul-
tural production value. Though 
these farms may play a valuable 
part in an area’s agricultural 
economy, ecological resilience, 
and rural culture, conservation 
easements may not successfully 
preserve them as working land-
scapes. Non-farmers who buy 
these properties but do not need 
agricultural income may let production lapse. Moreover, non-
farm buyers are often willing to out-bid farmers on such prop-
erties, establishing an “after-value” which outstrips agricultural 
income potential. 
For example, consider a forty acre farm property with a 
modest house within an hour and half driving distance of the 
San Francisco Bay area valued at one million dollars. A standard 
agricultural conservation easement, prohibiting further subdivi-
sions, residential buildings, and location of farm buildings, is 
appraised at $300,000, bringing the easement-encumbered prop-
erty value down to $700,000. Based on local crop production 
data and a thorough farm business plan, an organic farmer calcu-
lates that she could only afford to buy the farm for five hundred 
thousand dollars.
 
Figure 1: Easement “Gap”
As you can see, standard agricultural conservation ease-
ments often do not yield enough easement value to bring prop-
erties into a price range affordable by farmers. The difference 
between easement-encumbered estate home value and agricul-
tural use value results in the “gap” shown in this example.
This lack of affordable access and the increased likelihood 
that parcels owned by non-farmers will fall out of production are 
creating a stir in the farmland 
conservation community. Of 
twenty-five easement programs 
surveyed nationally in 2005, 
only five reported that average 
prices of easement-protected 
parcels were still affordable 
for buyers seeking to continue 
farming on those parcels. Thir-
teen said land resale prices in 
their areas had clearly become 
unaffordable to farmers; and 
only nine said a majority of their protected parcels are purchased 
by farmers. Only one of these easement programs is in Califor-
nia; the Marin Agricultural Land Trust reported that easement-
protected rangeland is only marginally affordable for ranchers 
there.13 
A more recent series of interviews with thirteen easement 
programs in California revealed that fewer than forty percent of 
properties under an agricultural easement were under production 
by their owners.14 Since most of these properties are still in their 
first generation of ownership under the easements, there is con-
cern that the number of owner-operators of preserved farmland 
will diminish further after these parcels are sold.15 Some land 
trusts are also beginning to see small farms as an important part 





Fair market, unencumbered (“before”) 
value: $1 million
Fair market, easement-encumbered 
(“after”) value: $700,000
Agricultural + residential use value to 
a farmer: $500,000
Ranchettes are  
“pricing bona fide 
commercial farmers out  
of the market.”
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farms are especially vulnerable to the “easement gap” problem, 
these land trusts ask how to make rural housing more affordable 
and avoid further farmland conversion to non-farmer ownership 
as they strive to protect working landscapes.17
creaTIve easemenT alTernaTIves:  
encouraGInG lanD-ownershIp by Farmers
A number of land trusts and farmland conservation pro-
grams in the Northeast have adopted farmland conservation 
tools to directly address the related goals of ensuring continued 
farming and land-affordability for farmers. Similar to the earli-
est conservation easements, these tools have lacked precedent 
and sometimes been controversial. However, in two decades of 
use, a great deal has been learned.
Bringing down the market values of smaller farms in Cali-
fornia to affordable prices for farming families requires these 
types of legal tools that are not currently part of standard con-
servation easement transactions in the state. As discussed below, 
these may include increased residential building restrictions, 
requirements that limit an owner’s right to sell his or her farm, or 
affirmative mandates of agricultural use. 
excluSion oF reSiDenceS anD other inFraStructure 
Some easement programs exclude residences and other 
infrastructure in order to eliminate the disproportionate value 
they add to whole farms. As authorized by its state law, the 
Massa chusetts Agricultural Preservation Restriction (“APR”) 
does this as a matter of course, carving out homesites and even 
agricultural buildings from APR-protected parcels.18 Similarly, 
Vermont law permits the carve-out of residential and farm build-
ings and the majority of Vermont Land Trust (“VLT”) conserva-
tion easements do so.19 This tool results in bare land easement 
valuation remaining unaffected by increasing residential values. 
It also eliminates difficult appraisal issues, instead allowing the 
land to be transferred for its agricultural value alone. Meanwhile, 
it effectively creates small residential parcels surrounded by 
agriculture, which can be sold separately from the farmland. In 
both states, while the majority of these building areas or “farm-
steads” have been purchased by the owners of adjacent farmland, 
there is an emerging concern that their exclusion from agricul-
tural easements will encourage consolidation of smaller farms 
into fewer, larger farms while the residential parcels become 
expensive, thus reducing opportunities for entering farmers to 
live where they farm.20 Some land trusts adhere to the principle 
that farmsteads are integral as housing for farmer-owners and as 
infrastructure for continued farming operations, and would not 
choose to separate them.
Practically speaking, the exclusion of several-acre farm-
steads from greater acreages of “bare land” would not be pos-
sible in California. This is because local zoning ordinances for 
minimum parcel sizes, as enabled by state law,21 require that 
farmland not be carved up into parcels below that minimum—
often 40, 80, or even 160 acres in agriculturally-zoned areas. 
However, the California Farmland Conservation Program and 
the federal Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program do fund 
conservation easements which include design controls com-
monly limiting building location (or “envelope”), and allow-
able size (usually to a range of 1,500 to 4,000 square feet). 
Sometimes the right to secondary or additional dwellings and 
certain nonagricultural infrastructure—equestrian arenas, for 
example—is eliminated as well.22 However, farm employee 
housing is allowed under California State Code23 and should not 
be extinguished by agricultural easements. By restricting “rural 
estate” or “trophy home” use, easements can weed out some of 
the non-farmers bidding on farm properties. More research is 
needed to determine whether such restrictions actually dissuade 
a substantial number of non-farmer buyers and how they impact 
property values. 
aFFirmative obliGation to Farm
Standard agricultural easements give up or restrict devel-
opment rights; few require that the land be actively farmed. A 
requirement to farm, usually in the form of an “affirmative cov-
enant,” defines agricultural use and establishes remedies, then 
consequences, for failure to comply. The Massachusetts Agri-
cultural Preservation Restriction, administered by the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, may be the only easement program to 
currently include the agricultural use requirement, in the form of 
an affirmative covenant, in all of its easements.24 
Affirmative covenants are additional restrictions on the land 
and obligations on the landowner that reach beyond a standard 
conservation easement. A covenant requiring the landowner to 
farm the property makes it considerably less appealing to any 
buyer other than a farmer. Limiting the pool of potential buyers 
only to farmers further reduces the value of the encumbered land 
while correspondingly increasing the cost of the easement.25 
Again, more data is needed to determine the real impact of affir-
mative language on market value.
While the Massachusetts Code specifically authorizes this 
affirmative farming requirement,26 the legal viability of such 
language in California is uncertain. The California Code27 does 
not explicitly provide for affirmative easement language; instead 
it defines easements, in the negative, as limitations. It does, how-
ever state the goal of the “preservation of land in its natural, sce-
nic, agricultural, historical, forested, or open-space condition.”28 
It is not clear whether affirmative language is enforceable in 
California courts. Because of this concern and in order to reduce 
the risk that affirmative wording results in termination of the 
conservation easement, strong “backup” language should be 
incorporated, stating that in case the affirmative clause is ever 
found unenforceable, the remainder of the easement is to remain 
in effect.29
There is some precedent for affirmative covenants in Cali-
fornia ACEs. In some cases, such as in easements held by the 
Brentwood Agricultural Land Trust and at least one easement 
of the Marin Agricultural Land Trust (“MALT”), the land trust 
requires submission and approval of an agricultural management 
plan.30 If the owner fails to comply with that plan, the land trust 
may require the landowner to lease the land out for farming. 
Tougher enforcement mechanisms reserve the right of the land 
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trust to collect “damages” or exercise an option to purchase the 
farm.31 
On Live Power Farm in Covelo, California, for example, 
the Equity Trust, a nonprofit organization based in Massachu-
setts, holds the first known affirmative easement in the state, 
and one of the very first in the nation.32 Equity Trust distributed 
a sample easement document with affirmative language along 
with a related commentary33 for the benefit of land conserva-
tion groups interested in doing similar work. MALT and the 
Monterey County Agricultural and Historic Land Conservancy 
both hold easements with affirmative use language, as does the 
Land Trust for Santa Barbara County on an urban farm called 
Fairview Gardens. The Tri-Valley Conservancy’s South Liv-
ermore Valley easements require agricultural production, but 
for only eight years. Sample affirmative agricultural use lan-
guage, legally reviewed for use in California but not yet exer-
cised, can be found in a California FarmLink model affirmative 
easement.34 
option to purchaSe at aGricultural value
In response to the concern that protected farms are purchased 
by non-farmers at prices higher than farmers can afford, legisla-
tion in two states established innovative farmland conservation 
programs that now authorize Options to Purchase at Agricultural 
Value (“OPAV”) in their agricultural conservation easements.35 
An OPAV allows the easement holder to step in any time a farm 
property threatens to sell for estate value and, as such, provides 
a substantial deterrent to non-farm buyers.36
OPAVs were adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts in 1992 and by the VLT in 2003.37 Whereas the Massachu-
setts program requires an OPAV, the Vermont program offers 
landowners a choice to relinquish the OPAV to the VLT.38 Most 
do so for the additional easement value it provides, as well as 
assurance that the land will continue to be transferred to other 
farmers. Equity Trust includes an OPAV in its model agricul-
tural easement as well. Based on its use in Massachusetts and 
Vermont, an OPAV can be a strong deterrent to non-farmer 
buyer and an essential component to preserving farmland.
An OPAV can be exercised at time of sale or assigned to 
another farmer. In over fifteen years, an option has not yet been 
exercised in Massachusetts, and was exercised only once by the 
VLT when a clearly non-farm buyer made a purchase offer on an 
easement-encumbered farm. To save paperwork and government 
involvement and thereby appeal to a broader group of farm own-
ers, Vermont waives OPAV when a farm is transferred within a 
family or to a qualifying farmer as defined by the IRS.39 
Vermont appraiser Justus DeVries estimates that there is 
roughly a twenty to thirty percent increase in standard easement 
value with an OPAV, for a total easement value of up to sixty 
to seventy percent of a property’s fair market value.40 In con-
trast to the Massachusetts APR, the VLT has begun using ease-
ments with OPAVs for whole farms, including farm buildings 
and residences. This approach is supported by Equity Trust and 
is gaining popularity in Vermont, as it protects affordable hous-
ing as an integral part of these agricultural areas. Homes and 
home sites, however, confound so-called “agricultural value” 
and present significant appraisal challenges. Specific appraisal 
methodology must be prescribed to arrive at a mutually accept-
able property valuation.
In the VLT and Massachusetts APR models, the OPAV 
is triggered by a proposal or attempt to sell the property. The 
Equity Trust document includes an additional “triggering 
event”—the failure to maintain “qualified owner status.” 41 It 
becomes, in effect, an enforcement mechanism for the affirma-
tive agricultural language also included in that easement. Each 
model addresses the setting of the option/purchase price differ-
ently. If the owner has already entered into a purchase and sale 
agreement with a third party, the OPAV holder may match that 
amount. The Equity Trust model and the Massachusetts stan-
dard OPAV present two valuation methods for determining the 
purchase price. The first approach is a standard appraisal of “As-
Restricted Value” (Equity Trust) or “Fair Market Agricultural 
Value” (Massachusetts APR) value as determined by compa-
rable sales and other standard appraisal methods.42 “Agricultural 
value” is an adequate description in Massachusetts projects, as 
Photo by Bob Nichols, USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service Photo courtesy of Kendra Johnson
49 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
residences and buildings are not included in these easements. 
The second approach offered by these similar documents is to 
assess the land and improvements according to the previous 
“governing appraisal” and augment with an inflation rate index. 
These methods are problematic when home sites are included 
because home values have, until recently, increased faster than 
the inflation rate. The VLT model OPAV for “Operating Farms” 
uses a similar approach to assess agricultural value, but adds the 
value of farm structures and improvements, as well as any resi-
dence and appurtenant structures/improvements according to the 
replacement cost approach to valuation.43 
OPAV restricts resale values to a “farm supportable price.” 
While an OPAV increases the original easement cost expended 
by the land trust, it also gives the organization a measure of 
control over future land transactions and deters non-farm buy-
ers. Furthermore, it creates an opportunity for land trusts to 
help farmers purchase these farms each time land is transferred. 
Drawbacks are that an OPAV may limit the ability of new buy-
ers to obtain financing, and land trusts may not have cash or 
financing available to properly exercise the option.
An OPAV has not yet been used in California. In the 
absence of authorization by statute, such an option may not be 
enforceable by California easement programs: challenges to the 
“triggering” of an OPAV, for example, and to appraisal meth-
odologies such as the VLT method described above, might be 
expected. Before deciding to use this concept, the legal issues 
should be explored and addressed. 
conclusIon: poTenTIal For calIFornIa?
California’s farmland protection policymakers, land trusts, 
and supporters have a tough row to hoe in coming years. If farm-
land conservation efforts do not begin to include access and 
affordability strategies, farmers will not experience the benefits 
of farmland protection and California’s agriculture will not be 
protected. The list of tools described in this article is not exhaus-
tive; there are many other ways to support the use and owner-
ship of farmland by farmers. Non-easement tools for example, 
such as land trust ownership with lifetime leases to farmers, col-
laboration with affordable housing programs or community land 
trusts, purchase of farming rights by farmers needing land secu-
rity but not all the residential value, and other forms of creative 
or cooperative ownership, deserve further attention.
California land trusts who wish to further the use in ACEs 
of building and parcel restrictions, or be state leaders in the 
adoption of affirmative use requirements or OPAVs, will face 
a number of financial and legal barriers. At least at first, these 
new legal tools will require higher per-acre easement acquisition 
costs as well as greater staff resources dedicated to transactions, 
monitoring, and stewardship than they do currently. Improved 
support and funding for these innovative projects will therefore 
be key to their applicability and success in California. The tools 
yet untested in California courts (again, affirmative covenants 
and OPAVs) may also subject land trusts to increased legal 
scrutiny and the risk of expensive court battles. If, on the other 
hand, land trust leaders can begin to set precedent for the use of 
easement tools benefiting smaller farmers, amendments to State 
Civil Code, and other relevant statutes may more easily follow. 
If California’s fertile agricultural lands are threatened by 
urban and rural ranchette development, its farmers are also 
threatened by intense competition for control over farmland. If 
the State’s land trusts and policymakers decide to protect not 
only farmland but the myriad social, economic, and environ-
mental public benefits offered by our small farmers, they will 
find that their eastern counterparts have already set important 
examples. Agricultural landscapes are, by definition, working 
landscapes and will be best conserved if the livelihoods which 
define them are supported as well.
Thanks to Debbie North and the Yolo Land Trust for asking 
the right questions and making possible the report upon which 
much of this article is based. Thanks to Conservation Partners 
for thoughtful review and comments. Thanks to California Farm-
Link for working on behalf of beginning farmers, and first bring-
ing this question to my attention. Finally, thanks to the many 
other land trusts, both California and Northeastern, whose staff 
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three keyS For rehabilitatinG anD  
StabilizinG haiti
by Chris Logan*
* Chris Logan is a JD candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington 
College of Law.
Haiti faces many challenges due to the current global food crisis that are exacerbated by the nation’s lack of an effective government and the devastation wrought 
by four hurricanes in one month. In order to rebuild the county’s 
infrastructure, combat hunger, and promote good governance, 
Haiti must rehabilitate basic infrastructure, expand existing 
microfinance institutions (“MFI”), and reestablish functioning 
government institutions. This article will discuss three essential 
objectives for short- and long-term recovery and advancement 
in Haiti.
Today’s global food crisis is affecting hundreds of mil-
lions of poor people around the world who live with hunger and 
instability on a daily basis. The reasons for the crisis are many. 
Global agriculture commodity prices have reached their high-
est level in thirty years1 and worldwide decreased supply and 
increased demand create a situation where the world’s poor must 
use more of their incomes to purchase food.2 
Haiti is a prime example of an impoverished, fragile coun-
try that struggled under the weight of the food crisis even before 
natural disaster struck. Seventy-six percent of Haitians live on 
less than two dollars per day and fifty-five percent on less than 
one dollar per day.3 Daily food insecurity affects forty percent of 
Haitian homes.4 In April 2008, the government was ousted fol-
lowing food insecurity riots.5 A functioning government has yet 
to be reestablished while Haitians are burdened by rebuilding 
after four hurricanes ravaged the country leaving coastal cities 
under water and people stranded on their roofs. The hurricanes 
wiped away food reserves, flattening crops and farmland, kill-
ing livestock, and creating a desperate situation in a country 
beholden to foreign aid and relief.6 
To improve Haiti’s immediate welfare funding and 
resources are necessary to rehabilitate the country’s weak infra-
structure so food aid and emergency relief can reach those in 
need. As of September 26, 2008, the United Nations (“UN”) 
reported that road travel remained disrupted due to collapsed 
bridges, damaged dykes, flooded roads, and landslides.7 The 
UN Development Programme is leading an interagency effort to 
strengthen Haiti’s dyke system and several NGOs are willing to 
implement cash-for-work programs to assist with infrastructure 
repair.8 The United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (“USAID”) has 7,000 metric tons (“MT”) of food aid in 
Port au Prince and 10,000 MT in regional warehouses ready for 
distribution to affected areas, but washed out roads and bridges 
hinder its distribution.9 
Basic infrastructure rehabilitation will ease immediate suf-
fering in Haiti, but is not enough to mitigate long-term food 
resources inadequacies. One option is increased access to micro-
finance, which contributes to poverty reduction, especially at the 
local level where it bolsters the economy.10 MFIs, such as Haiti’s 
Fonkoze, provide a safety net and help establish the economic 
foundation for a democratic government.11 Throughout the food 
crisis, MFIs have worked with borrowers to provide flexible loan 
policies tailored to each client.12 MFIs empower ordinary people 
to secure food, housing, and medical care by providing small 
business loans, increasing agricultural investment, and coordi-
nating trainings on literacy, women’s health, and environmental 
protection.13 Expanding Haitian MFIs through increased fund-
ing will allow more people to receive loans, feed their families, 
and climb out of poverty.
To begin climbing out of poverty and creating long term 
stability, Haiti’s government with international organizations 
and the private sector must respond to the needs of its people. 
However, its institutions are weak or inactive, so the govern-
ment cannot “hear or represent citizens’ interests, render jus-
tice, achieve consensus, or effectively provide public goods and 
services.”14 One promising program is Kombit Ak Tèt Ansanm 
[Working Together in Haiti] which facilitates the creation of 
immediate, durable jobs through infrastructure development 
and maintenance.15 A Haitian government will succeed when its 
people have enough food and are empowered to control their 
own economic situation.
Coordinated infrastructure rehabilitation and increased 
investment in Haitian MFI’s are necessary components for 
improving Haiti’s immediate welfare. Long-term stabilization 
will come when the Haitian population is free from hunger and 
worry, and when a government is in place that responds to needs 
of the people. 
Endnotes:
1 Sophia murphy, inSt. For aGric. anD traDe pol’y, the Global FooD 
price criSiS (2008), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.
cfm?RefID=104147 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
2 Id. (outlining current decreased supply from factors such as halved world 
food stocks, drought affecting exporters of major staple crops,  diminishing 
water supplies, climate change affecting rainfall and temperatures, and 
 production costs alongside increased demand from factors such as an increasing 
world population, changing diets, and exponential growth in biofuel use). 
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the caSe For Green FooD labelS
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 Agribusiness. 
InTroDucTIon
Presidential debates, headlines, and magazine covers dem-onstrate a dramatic rise in environmental consciousness, especially associated with global climate change, carbon 
emissions, oil independence, and human health. While global 
warming, the need to cap carbon emissions, and oil indepen-
dence dominate the public arena, the food industry must also be 
scrutinized for its energy and carbon emissions. In the United 
States, food production consumes nineteen percent of our energy 
and contributes thirty-seven percent of our carbon emissions.1
In the absence of a systematic strategy by the U.S. govern-
ment, many consumers are searching for ways to make a posi-
tive environmental impact while, at the same time, improving 
their personal and family’s food consumption and lifestyle. 
This trend, termed “green consumerism,” leads people to pur-
chase products with limited or positive environmental impacts, 
especially foods that have been produced in an environmentally 
sensitive manner. Green consumerism has led to a very lucra-
tive industry,2 which is indicative of the appeal of green creden-
tials to consumers. Companies embracing green consumerism 
advertise their products’ benefits through eco-labels which are 
“label[s] placed on a product to inform consumers that the prod-
uct is less environmentally harmful than similar products.”3 
The green food industry is currently devoid of any mean-
ingful system of making or verifying these claims, which creates 
several problems. Many claims may be intentionally or acciden-
tally misleading as to their actual environmental benefits.4 With-
out any standards set to define what certain environmental terms 
mean, the use of this terminology can either render a consumer 
clueless or simply confused over the true impact of their pur-
chases. Many label claims address only one environmental issue, 
which may or may not be relevant. A label of organic indicates 
that a product was probably made from an entirely natural pro-
cess (although the organic claim can be misleading5), but ignores 
other important information contributing to the environmental 
impact of a food product such as the amount of energy, water, 
and land used in production and the resulting carbon emissions. 
This kind of single attribute labeling is not an ideal method for 
green consumers who are concerned with the broader state of 
the environment, not solitary issues, and would like to utilize 
more comprehensive information. A uniform, comprehensive 
system of environmental labeling for food production is needed 
to inform green consumers
Developing and implementing a comprehensive and com-
prehensible information labeling system will achieve the dual 
purpose of increasing consumer satisfaction and meaningful 
environmental progress. While this appears to be a daunting task 
considering all the criteria that would need to be evaluated, it 
could be accomplished in a manner that is easy for consumers to 
use to make informed, environmentally conscious decisions. A 
useful example that eco-labels could emulate is already in place: 
nutrition labels on food have been a regular aspect of food pack-
aging for over a decade.6 Nutrition labels have been successful 
primarily because they take information about the ingredients 
and nutritional value of a food and disseminate it in a consistent, 
user-friendly manner that enable consumers to decide which 
foods offer the best dietary choice.7 Experience with food labels 
should provide the foundation for the development of environ-
mental information labels. 
Another method to pursue could be integrating eco-informa-
tion into the current nutrition labeling system instead of devel-
oping an entirely separate enterprise. This path would, perhaps, 
be the most comprehensive because nutrition labels and poten-
tial environmental labels share a common purpose—to improve 
human health. Information relevant to the environmental foot-
print of a food product—disclosure of pesticides and other 
chemicals used on the product, the amount of energy used for 
the entire production process, the effects of the manufacturing 
process on natural resources such as air and water quality—are 
equally relevant to maintenance of human health. Given their 
common purpose and audience, combining the two information 
systems may be the more efficient, successful system to achieve 
both goals of improving the environment and human health.
This article will discuss why food labels should be expanded 
to include important environmental information about products 
to allow consumers to make educated decisions regarding their 
impact on both human and environmental health. The first sec-
tion of this article examines the history and demand for green 
product information. A discussion of the development and les-
sons from nutrition labels follows, and includes an overview 
of potential legal questions that may arise from eco-labeling. 
Lastly, the article proposes recommendations for a path forward 
on eco-labeling. 
Green consumerIsm
There is a well-documented demand for green products.8 A 
surge in green products produced for a growing demographic of 
environmentally conscious consumers began in the 1990s and 
continues to this day with a wide variety of green promotions.9 
Consumers seek green products for many reasons, motivating 
marketers to create vigorous product campaigns promoting eco-
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friendliness.10 In response to these diverse motivations and broad 
spectrum of products, an enormous range of labels exists cur-
rently in stores, from prominent displays of government certified 
organic to third-party certification to a company’s own stamp 
of environmental approval. This confluence of often competing 
claims does little to actually achieve the goals of eco-consumers.11 
inDepenDent labelS
Two types of labels have emerged that do not require gov-
ernment regulation. One is awarded by an independent third-
party certifier that grants products permission to use their logo 
indicating their approval of environmental credibility.12 An 
example of this is the well-known “Fair Trade” line of prod-
ucts. The appearance of a Fair Trade logo on coffee, tea, or other 
product indicates that it was made by a farmer who will not 
only receive a fair wage for their work, but also did not use any 
genetically modified organisms (“GMO”) or agrochemicals in 
the process.13 A second type of green labeling not regulated by 
the government is done by companies themselves. A company 
may choose to label a food as “natural” with no indication of the 
company’s definition of the word.14 
There are numerous problems with allowing these practices. 
The lack of transparency and sheer volume of claims do not 
soundly educate the consumer.15 There is no easy manner for a 
consumer to differentiate between credible and less than credible 
claims.16 Terms such as “natural,” “environmentally friendly,” 
and “green” are vague and non-definitional and do not indicate 
what environmental benefit the product offers.17 Without more 
specific terminology and explanations, there’s no way for the 
consumer to determine what specifically about the product will 
help them be eco-friendly,18 be it reducing their carbon footprint 
or protecting a certain animal species. These labels frequently 
address only one issue and ignore other critical eco-attributes. 
For example, a “bird friendly” label does not give any insight 
into the carbon footprint of producing the product, and a stamp 
of “carbon neutral” does not indicate what, if any, pesticides 
were used on the product. Likewise, a “natural” label with no 
indication of the word’s definition, gives the consumer essen-
tially no valuable information. This convoluted system does 
little to assist consumers seeking to have the greatest impact on 
overall environmental health. 
State, FeDeral, anD international StatuteS  
anD GuiDelineS
Governments at all levels have engaged in sorting through 
the environmental claims of products, particularly for the food 
industry. The federal government has a variety of programs and 
labeling schemes to benefit the environmentally conscious con-
sumer. The most well known is the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (“USDA”) organic certified labels program, effective since 
1990.19 This program came to fruition as a result of the growing 
demand for chemical-free foods and the stunting of that market’s 
expansion due to a hodgepodge of state regulations.20 Originally 
a primarily small-farm technique, large industrial farms came to 
dominate the organic market and demanded federal regulation 
to enhance their growth.21 Therein lies one of several problems 
with this certification program. Large scale farmers drove the 
stakeholder process of creating the food labels, tilting the def-
initions in their favor.22 For the consumer purchasing organic 
products because of their desire to support small, natural farm 
practices, the USDA organic label can be misleading.23 Addi-
tionally, a lax and underfunded inspection process cannot com-
pletely guarantee that all organically labeled products are free 
of synthetic fertilizers or agricultural chemicals.24 More recent 
federal labeling schemes include labels issued to differentiate 
between livestock that had been raised on a purely grass-fed 
diet25 and requirements for labels regarding the country of origin 
of certain food products.26 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is also engaged in 
disseminating production information and issued guidelines in 
1992 for proper green advertising of products.27 While not labels 
per se, these guidelines do represent “a framework for volun-
tary compliance with standards for environmental marketing.”28 
However, these are merely guidelines and do not have the force 
of law behind them, and thus are somewhat meaningless.29 
What’s more, the FTC does not have the scientific expertise of 
the issues that are present at other agencies such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”), making the well-intentioned 
guidelines considerably less effective than they could be.30 
The states got an early lead in regulating environmen-
tal marketing of products. After a mid-1990s “Green Report” 
by ten state Attorneys General about rampant abuses in the 
green marketing industry regarding claims of the environmen-
tal credentials,31 several states passed statutes with stipulations 
defining what standards products must meet in order to adver-
tise their environmentally friendly status. The most publicized 
of these was a statute in California that regulated the use of 
the terms “ozone friendly,” “biodegradable,” “photodegrad-
able,” “recycled,” and “recyclable.”32 In addition, Indiana and 
Rhode Island passed similar definitional statutes regulating 
environmental marketing.33 New York, Connecticut, and New 
Hampshire have enacted statutes promoting logos to advertise 
environmental attributes, and Maine has codified the FTC guide-
lines.34 What is problematic about this patchwork approach is 
that it can be confusing and stifling to manufacturers, who may 
decide not to sell their products as expansively to avoid having 
to meet such a variety of criteria.35 This denies opportunities to 
consumers to choose from a wider array of products.36 
Eco-food labels are gaining prominence on the interna-
tional regulatory scene.37 Perhaps due to the high-profile issue 
of reducing carbon emissions, the most publicized labeling 
scheme in recent years has been UK-based supermarket Tesco’s 
decision to begin listing the carbon footprint on approximately 
seventy thousand of its products in-store.38 This will allow con-
sumers the opportunity to reduce these harmful emissions.39 
Japan recently announced plans to begin its own carbon label-
ing scheme in the next few years, and several EU countries are 
exploring carbon labeling options as well.40 This trend further 
supports the proposition that comprehensive action is needed to 
label products at the U.S. federal level, not only for domestic 
consumers but also for trade reasons.41 
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The experIence wITh nuTrITIon labels
Assessing the development and execution of nutrition labels 
is a useful prototype for implementing a green foods labeling 
system because it has, by and large, been successful. An exami-
nation is also inevitable if only for the fact that both would have 
to co-exist on food packaging. 
Although food regulation existed much earlier, the first food 
labels were established in 1907 to distinguish between “suit-
able” food colors.42 Nutrition labeling began gaining notoriety 
in the late 1980s out of concern over the American diet and 
the idea was codified in the Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act (“NLEA”) of 1990.43 Administered by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) and the USDA Food Safety Inspection 
Service, the Act was intended to provide the American consumer 
with reliable and informative data regarding the content of their 
food purchases and hopefully encourage healthful nutrition deci-
sions.44 Mandatory labeling became effective in 1992,45 with a 
re-examination of the guidelines every five years to ensure that 
they reflect the current knowledge and values in the American 
diet.46 For example, following an increased awareness of trans-
fats’ detriment to cardiovascular health, the labels were updated 
in 2006 to indicate whether a product includes the ingredient.47 
Today, nutrition labels are designed to carry the most essential 
nutritional value of a food product, listed in order to reflect the 
level of importance to a daily diet in an easy-to-read format.48 
Studies indicate that consumers view the labels favorably and 
often use them to base their decisions over purchases to improve 
their diets.49 
The flexibility component in updating the labels every five 
years to reflect nutritional values would be a useful aspect to 
integrate into a potential eco-food label. New research indicat-
ing which environmental threats are more precarious than others 
is continuously published and changes would be made to reflect 
new realities in any potential scheme. Another positive attri-
bute is the comprehensive, consistent dissemination of nutrition 
information. As demonstrated above, a severe handicap behind 
the current eco-labeling system is that there are no clear stan-
dards as to what certain terms mean, which can lead to consumer 
confusion over the veracity of the environmental claims. 
poTenTIal leGal obsTacles
The major legal challenges to date against either nutrition 
or potential environmental labels regard the First Amendment 
implications of requiring food producers to display this informa-
tion on their products. The two most prominent cases concerned 
allegations of violations of commercial free speech. In each case, 
the courts found that such a violation was not in play.
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala addressed the ques-
tion of the authority of the FDA to limit the health claims that 
may be made on dietary supplements under the NLEA.50 The 
plaintiff contended that: (1) the NLEA imposed an impermis-
sible ban on truthful, non-misleading constitutional speech, 
and (2) that the preauthorization scheme to label the products 
was an unconstitutional prior restraint on commercial speech.51 
Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren involved the 
California statute discussed above that required compliance with 
state standards when advertising a product in environmentally 
friendly ways52 such as declaring the product as ‘biodegradable’ 
or made of ‘recycled’ material. The plaintiff also alleged viola-
tions of commercial speech and non-speech.53 In both cases the 
courts relied on a four-step test from Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission to determine if the 
speech qualified as commercial, and could therefore be subject 
to regulation. 54 The test for determination considers the follow-
ing factors:
1)  Whether the speech is misleading or does not “concern 
lawful activity,” in which case no further inquiry is 
needed and the speech may be restricted;
2)  Whether the government’s asserted interest in regulating 
the speech is substantial;
3)  Whether the restraint directly advances the government’s 
interest; and
4)  Whether the legislation is no more extensive than neces-
sary to serve the government’s interest.55
In both cases, the courts found that the speech in question 
qualified as commercial and was subject to regulation under this 
test.56 If Shalala and Lungren serve as indicators, it is likely 
that eco-food labels will be subject to the Central Hudson test 
described above. Given the similar First Amendment violations 
alleged in both cases, it is plausible that free speech implications 
may arise in the implementation of environmental food labeling. 
Food producers may argue that restricting their current unbri-
dled use of environmental terms denies them free speech, and, 
simultaneously, that requiring them to provide certain informa-
tion is unjustified regulation. Therefore, those tasked with draft-
ing potential regulations must take care to remain within the 
confines of the Hudson test. While eco-labeling is clearly a vital 
government interest in line with Hudson’s second and third cri-
teria, the parties involved will have to find a balance to ensure 
that the policies are carried out in a reasonable manner to be 
consistent with the last criterion. 
First Amendment implications are not the only legal issues 
that will arise in the drafting process. Another potential legal 
concern could be over the roles of different agencies in imple-
menting this system. Since green labels involve issues falling 
under at least two different agencies jurisdictions—for instance, 
the EPA monitors environmental issues while FDA regulates 
food—green food labeling would probably necessitate a jointly 
regulated process where the specific roles and jurisdiction of 
each agency may be called into question. Other legal issues that 
will probably arise and could face legal challenge include the 
metrics used for reporting, thresholds for agricultural chemical 
content, and even reporting formats. 
recommenDaTIons
The following recommendations may serve as a foundation 
for implementing a labeling system that would indicate the envi-
ronmental content of a food product and its production process.
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new or expanDeD label?
It must be decided whether to simply expand nutrition labels 
to include environmental information or to have a separate label. 
Several factors favor expanding the existing nutrition label. 
Because nutrition labels are easy to read and valuable,57 includ-
ing the environmental information of a food would instantly 
reach that same level of credibility and wide audience. The 
necessity of involving the FDA in this regulation invokes a need 
for efficacy in regulating both labels. It would be easier for the 
FDA to continue evaluating only one, comprehensive label. 
The overlap in aspirations behind green food labels and 
nutrition labels make integration of the two a natural fit. Both 
sets of data strive to inform consumers about the best food avail-
able for their health. In fact, it could be argued that in neglect-
ing to list environmental considerations on the current nutrition 
labels, the information provided is severely lacking a vital com-
ponent to the consumer’s health and well-being. Knowing how 
one’s food is produced and its potential contents resulting from 
production allow consumers to make important health-related 
purchasing decisions. Therefore, including the environmental 
impact and make-up of a food on nutrition labels would simul-
taneously assist the consumer in improving their health, well-
being, and the environment. 
However, adding another label would increase the FDA’s 
workload and perhaps compromise the integrity of both sets of 
information as a result. Furthermore, a second label may be over-
whelming for packaging, particularly for compact food packets, 
and potentially either confuse consumers or risk neglecting vital 
information. 
public-private partnerShip
An efficient way to carry out this potentially complex data-
processing is to engage in a public-private partnership, with the 
government setting up a private entity to administer the environ-
mental information necessary to be placed on the labels. Such 
models have been implemented in other countries to great suc-
cess. The Carbon Trust is a private corporation created by the Brit-
ish government to assist UK businesses in lowering their carbon 
footprint.58 The organization worked with the Tesco supermarket 
chain to develop its food carbon labeling system.59 The Canadian 
government has licensed a company called Terrachoice to award 
eco-labels.60 While the government has primary responsibility 
for the overall program, Terrachoice is tasked with its day-to-
day operation.61 A similar relationship would be very useful in 
the United States as a good counterbalancing mechanism. With-
out a private partner to assume daily responsibilities, the govern-
ment runs the risk of including too many competing interests in 
the program’s development and not executing it as effectively 
as necessary. A private company, however, needs some degree 
of government oversight to ensure that the needs of the public 
health and environmental conservation remain its primary goals. 
aGency coorDination
The EPA, FDA, and possibly USDA should be the agencies 
charged with the primary responsibilities in any eco-labeling 
program. There ought to be a proper balance struck between 
EPA’s expertise over the environmental impacts of various foods 
with FDA’s jurisdiction of food regulation. Consideration must 
also be given to USDA’s oversight of agriculture. The FCC may 
also have a stake in the process and may be able to offer valuable 
insight from the guidelines protecting against erroneous environ-
mental marketing. While it is important to ensure that the labels 
aren’t bogged down in administrative quagmire, the program’s 
credibility depends on having all appropriate experts involved.
eco-DimenSionS
Specific criteria would need to be laid out concerning the 
terms used in measuring a food product’s environmental impact. 
A major drawback of any environmental labeling currently on 
the market is a lack of definitional meaning behind its terminol-
ogy. The public does not have a concrete idea as to what a term 
really means in regards to a product’s environmental impact. 
Therefore, there would need to be explicit definitions laid out, 
followed by a vigorous public education campaign to ensure that 
the public is using the information properly. To illustrate what 
such a scheme may look like, an example set of ten eco-dimen-
sions are shown in Table 1.




Water footprint Water use for production ▼
Earth footprint Cropland used for cultivation ◆
Ecological  
footprint 
Risk of erosion & fertilizer, pesticide, and 
herbicide run-off
▲
Carbon footnote Carbon emitted during production ▲
Imported energy Imported energy used during production ▼
Biodiversity Impact on biodiversity ▼
Sustainable Consumption of non-renewable inputs ◆
Air pollution Greenhouse gases emitted during  production ◆
Chemical input Chemicals, toxins, of heavy metals used for 
production
▼
Waste Landfill waste created by packaging ▼
Key: ▼ = low; ◆ = medium; ▲ = high (low being smallest ecological footprint).
A new labeling system such as this would provide consum-
ers with valuable information on the sustainability of each food 
product. Reporting the water footprint alone would be astonish-
ing to many consumers who have no idea that it takes approxi-
mately 147 liters (thirty-seven gallons) of water to produce just 
one cup of coffee.62
To build on the example above, the Green Tag 10 Ecologi-
cal Footprint label could be scored with a simple low, medium 
and high in relation to its impact on that particular category. A 
more sophisticated version might score on a ten point scale for 
each factor and provide a grand total out of 100. For example, 
under such a system, red meat might score 100, poultry 70, bread 
40, vegetables 20, and algae 10. Consumers could then use these 
scores to make decisions based on credible information regard-
ing the product’s true environmental impact. 
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conclusIon
Expanding food labeling to include eco-consumption dimen-
sions will provide consumers with critical information enabling 
them to make better choices for their personal health and vital-
ity, their families, and our collective environment. Moving for-
ward on eco-labeling is important to consumers and supports the 
national interests of reducing consumer addiction to oil, carbon 
emissions, and pollution by highlighting product footprints on 
the label. Eco-labeling supports sustainable eating and lifestyles 
that green consumers want and need. Most importantly, eco-
labeling will serve to educate consumers about personal and 
family well-being issues to enhance health, avoid obesity and 
diabetes, and reduce health care costs. How a food is produced 
and what resources were required to put it on the store shelf is 
directly related to these issues, and having easy, comprehensible 
access to this information through labels will allow the consumer 
to make sound decisions. All of these are vital interests that the 
federal government should seek to address by implementing a 
comprehensive, national eco-label system without delay. 
Endnotes:  The Case for Green 
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Beneath multi-hued trees lie expanses of arable land, where various crops are grown in order to feed our  hungry society. In the United States many farms are so 
large that they resemble an industrial operation, with concentra-
tions of crops and animals that increase the risk of large scale 
infection or disease. These characteristics make our agricultural 
landscape a unique target for bioterrorism.1 
In October 2008, the Agroterrorism Assault on Chester 
County (“ATAC 08”) coordinated efforts between federal and 
local officials in Pennsylvania to test “the region’s response to 
an intentional dissemination of a foreign animal disease into the 
region’s livestock population.”2 The exercise put agro-terrorism 
on the forefront of the security agenda and brought to light the 
problem of tracing and combating diseases which could be intro-
duced into the food system.
A well-planned attack against agriculture would be detri-
mental to the United States because of its potential to disrupt a 
fundamental portion of the nation’s economic system.3 Farming 
and related economic sectors account for sixteen percent of the 
United States’ workforce.4 The farm sector, while contributing 
less than one percent of total Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”), 
indirectly has a much greater impact on the national economy as 
it contributes, via related economic sectors, to eleven percent of 
GDP.5 And although only one percent of GDP comes directly 
from farming, 100% of the U.S. population is nourished and 
clothed by farming-related industries originating in the United 
States and abroad.
Some scholars cite General Sherman’s attack on the Ameri-
can south’s agricultural system during the Civil War as an 
example of how greatly an attack on foodstuffs may impact a 
population.6 There are countless examples of attacks on agri-
culture throughout history, from Rome’s salting of Carthage, to 
Japan’s World War II Unit 731 in Manchuria, which conducted 
numerous biological tests, including many on human subjects.7 
The United States’ use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam 
War, while not directed at farmland, did damage “some crops.”8 
The Soviet Union is also alleged to have used glanders, a disease 
which causes death in horses and mules, during their 1980s war 
in Afghanistan.9 Furthermore, multiple nations have programs 
that could be used to disrupt agriculture.10
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The likelihood of a full-scale attack by another nation 
against the United States is small. The possibility of a terrorist 
attack on the United States, using asymmetric tactics targeting 
agriculture, is greater and could have a substantial and detrimen-
tal psychological impact on the country.11 Recent food scares, 
which were not terrorist-related, were caused by jalapeños and 
tomatoes (infected with salmonella) in summer 2008. The FDA 
was forced into an expensive investigation to determine the ori-
gin of the infected tomatoes and jalapeños. The scare caused 
many restaurants and grocers to stop selling the produce, and 
affected both suspect and non-suspect farms alike, while sicken-
ing and frightening consumers.12
Several contemporary examples of agroterrorism have been 
documented overseas. The Arab Revolutionary Council used 
mercury to poison oranges in Israel in 1978, causing orange 
exports to decline significantly.13 In 1997 Israeli settlers used 
pesticides to spray Palestinian grapevines, causing the loss of 
seventeen thousand metric tons of produce.14 In 1952, a Kenyan 
insurgent group, the Mau Mau, used the African milk bush to 
poison and kill thirty-three head of cattle. 15 
Terrorist attacks are not limited to foreign and non-state 
actors. For example, the Rajneeshee Cult poisoned Oregon salad 
bars in 1984 with salmonella.16 In addition, the largest terrorist 
attacks conducted in the United States prior to 9/11 were per-
petrated by fringe right-wing domestic groups.17 In fact, the Ku 
Klux Klan has reportedly resorted to agroterror in the past, in 
an effort to intimidate minority farmers.18 An area of concern 
today is the possibility of increased right-wing violence through 
agroterror. The Southern Poverty Law Center has reported 
increased rhetoric from right-wing racist groups who believe 
that an Obama presidency would be good for them because it 
could “drive millions to their cause.”19 
Amplified racist sentiments, coupled with violence, may 
present a daunting challenge for law enforcement authorities 
because of the potential for a non-organized amateur terrorist 
attack. Mere “curiosity and fascination” may lead resurgent 
members of right wing groups to acquire nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons for multiple uses including agroterror-
ism.20 Furthermore, extremists of all varieties—whether or not 
they are affiliated with an organized group—pose a significant 
problem, and according to the FBI, have represented “the most 
difficult international terrorist challenge to the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities.”21 An amateur terrorist could use 
simple technologies to spread fear among the masses, attacking 
relatively unprotected areas like agricultural products.22
If farm products are to be protected, both federal and local 
governments will have to continue exercises such as ATAC 08. 
There is no way to ensure that food will be completely protected. 
However, preparing localities and strengthening pertinent leg-
islation will help authorities deal with such an exigency, and 
could help prevent a panic among the populace.23 Agriculture 
Secretary Ed Schafer, realizing the problem, has stated that the 
“USDA has to think of how we are vulnerable to terrorists and 
strengthen protective measures against terrorism.”24 In addition, 
diversifying the food supply, by strengthening local farms, can 
help offset the vulnerability and impact of an attack on a large 
farm. Acknowledgement of the vulnerability is a good step, and 
measures such as the ATAC 08 exercise is a sound second step, 
but it will take vigilant action at all levels to ensure that the food 
supply remains safe.
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InTroDucTIon
Over recent months, sharply rising global food prices have increased chronic hunger, exacerbated poverty, and sparked political unrest around the world.1 In the 
midst of this crisis a controversial agricultural technology has 
been receiving renewed attention: the genetic modification of 
food crops.2 This renewed attention comes after a period of 
muted consolidation by the food biotechnology industry. The 
spread of genetically modified (“GM”) foods has advanced 
steadily in recent years, but in the face of widespread public pro-
test and other forms of political contestation in many countries, 
this has been taking place with 
little fanfare.3 
Now, GM foods are once 
again in the headlines. Proponents 
of the technology have seized on 
the global food price crisis as evi-
dence that we need wider accep-
tance of food biotechnology. In 
the process, we are seeing the 
recycling of arguments that were 
first rolled out with the commer-
cial debut of GM foods in the mid 
1990s.4 We are being told now, 
as we were told then, that unless 
we wholeheartedly embrace the 
biotechnological manipulation of the global supply, there is no 
way that we will be able to feed an expanding human population 
without overstressing an increasingly fragile environment.5 The 
argument, in other words, is that GM foods must be at the heart 
of the sustainable food systems of the future.6
What are we to make of this renewed call for the more wide-
spread development and deployment of GM foods? In this article, 
I will make the case that GM foods in their current guise actu-
ally offer very little to help us overcome the current food crisis, 
and even less to help us with long-term hunger and poverty. In 
fact, by affording greater and greater power to fewer and fewer 
seed and chemical conglomerates, GM foods threaten to worsen 
our long-term food prospects. This is because GM foods further 
entrench the very political dynamics that are currently producing 
global hunger and a range of other food-related challenges. Our 
food systems must undergo revolutionary change if we are to 
eradicate hunger and ensure sustainability. Unfortunately, GM 
foods fail to offer this revolutionary change, but instead lead us 
further down our present, deeply problematic path.
makInG sense  
oF The Gm FooDs DebaTe
There is no question that since the introduction of commer-
cial GM food products in 1994, the food biotechnology indus-
try has seen extraordinary growth.7 The reach of GM crops has 
expanded rapidly to the extent that they now blanket more than 
57 million hectares (140 million acres) of farmland in the United 
States alone,8 with the result that between seventy and seventy-
five percent of all processed foods now in U.S. supermarkets 
contain genetically engineered ingredients.9 In 2007, world-
wide plantings of GM foods covered as much as 114 million 
 hectares (280 million acres), 
and GM crops were grown by 
an estimated 12 million farmers 
across twenty-three countries.10 
Regarding the area planted 
with GM crops and the num-
ber of farmers who are now 
using them, many claim that 
GM foods have been the most 
rapidly spread and adopted 
agricultural technology in all of 
human history.11
Nevertheless, the technol-
ogy’s spread has not been a 
smooth one. The concerns and 
actions of a diverse and committed worldwide network of oppo-
nents have greatly impacted the biotechnology industry’s expan-
sion plans.12 Certainly, there is little question that GM foods are 
one of the most contentious and contested technologies to have 
been developed in recent times.13 They have sparked protest in 
every place they have been introduced, and have proved a light-
ning rod for those with wider concerns about corporate control 
of the food supply and the harms associated with the practices of 
industrial agriculture.14
The debate over GM foods has been wide-ranging, built 
around several recurring themes and arguments. On one side of 
the debate, supporters claim that genetically modified plants pro-
duce, or have the potential to produce, higher crop yields while 
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reducing the use of agricultural chemicals, making for more effi-
cient and more environmentally-friendly farming.15 In addition, 
proponents claim the technology will both provide more food 
for the world’s hungry and increase on-farm profits by reducing 
the work that farmers need to perform.16 With future genera-
tions of transgenic technologies, we are told we can expect foods 
with higher concentrations of micronutrients, crops that thrive 
in drought-stricken or saline-sat-
urated soils, resistance to a wider 
range of damaging pests and 
diseases, plants that act as incu-
bators and delivery systems for 
vaccines and other pharmaceuti-
cal products, and much more.17
Yet such claims and prom-
ises have done little to convince 
the anti-GM crowd. Some are 
opposed to this new technology 
on the grounds that its likely ben-
efits have been inflated by the biotechnology industry and that 
its risks have been inadequately considered. These opponents 
are worried, in other words, that GM foods have already caused 
harm, or might prove to be harmful, to people or to the envi-
ronment.18 Others are concerned about the principles at stake 
in the production of these novel organisms, arguing that they 
are “unnatural” or “against God.”19 A third line of opposition 
focuses on the beneficiaries of GM technologies. These oppo-
nents suggest that expanded use of GM foods relies on deeply 
problematic assumptions about the causes of hunger and the 
plight of the environment, and claim that we should be wary of 
the further consolidation of power in industrial agriculture, and 
of the interests of the biotech companies that are pushing and 
patenting their creations.20
The DebaTe’s TechnoloGIcal rooTs
At the root of this debate lie some vastly different under-
standings of technology. A simplistic reading of the debate 
pigeonholes it as a disagreement between “technophiles” and 
“technophobes.”21 Proponents of GM foods often cast them-
selves in the technophile role, as pro-technological problem 
solvers, striving to find real, practical solutions to the world’s 
pressing agricultural challenges.22 By contrast, those who raise 
questions about GM foods are pegged as anti-technological 
Luddites—“skeptics” who are intent on halting even the most 
beneficial uses of all new technologies.23 
There is a grain of truth to this reading. Those who are 
strongly for the use of GM foods tend to be optimistic about 
the ability of new technologies to resolve complex problems, 
while those who argue against GM foods tend to be pessimis-
tic about such claims.24 However, this caricature of the debate, 
though widespread, actually obscures more than it reveals. This 
is because it would have us believe that there are only two tech-
nological paths open to us: either we wholeheartedly embrace 
our present technological trajectory, or we turn our backs on 
all technology and wander back into the Stone Age. In this 
sense, both the technophilic and technophobic positions are 
“deterministic”—they imagine technology in the driver’s seat, 
and assume that we are simply mute passengers along for the 
ride.25
These two extreme options, though, are not our real alter-
natives at all. There are a wide range of possible technological 
futures available to us, beyond moving ever forward on our pres-
ent track or turning our backs on 
all forms of technological prog-
ress. Those who argue against 
GM foods are not really railing 
against all technology; they are 
simply pointing out problems 
with this technology (or, more 
broadly, with the technological 
system of which GM foods are 
a part). And they are suggesting 
that rather than blindly accept-
ing all technological innova-
tions as right and good, we must develop more sophisticated 
forms of technological analysis.
Too often our technological trajectory and the impacts of par-
ticular technological developments go largely unquestioned. The 
most common way to think about technology is, after all, to give 
it very little thought at all. Most of us are guilty of what Langdon 
Winner once termed “technological somnambulism”26—we are 
content to sleepwalk our way through technological decision-
making. Of course there is always some general stir when a truly 
remarkable new technology finds its way into the global market-
place or imagination, as we have seen with GM foods. Once we 
become accustomed to any new technology, however, it is apt 
to become naturalized and reified through its use, such that it 
becomes largely immune to interrogation. The remarkable soon 
becomes mundane in our fast-paced world. 
In part, this is because the technologies in our lives are so 
ubiquitous, and by now we are so used to even sweeping tech-
nological change and upheaval, that only rarely is our collec-
tive attention held for any length of time. This also reflects the 
immense hold of the idea of “progress” and the technophilic ori-
entation on contemporary social thought. By this view, technol-
ogy is at the forefront of the quest for steady improvement of the 
human condition.27 As such, we largely take it on faith that tech-
nology has a positive or, at least, benign influence on our lives 
(often despite mounting environmental and other evidence to the 
contrary). All of this leaves little scope for raising real questions 
about our technologies and for the creation of alternative techno-
logical directions, since, as Andrew Feenberg characterizes this 
position, we tend to believe that “technology’s advance is the 
advance of the human species.”28 
Those arguing against GM foods are asking us to question 
these assumptions. They are pointing out, first of all, that the 
idea that all technologies must be essentially good or essentially 
bad is a myth without foundation. Rather than adopt the techno-
philic assumption that every new technology is a positive thing, 
we should instead understand that different technologies can 
GM foods ultimately  
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have different effects and implications. At the same time, the 
critics of GM foods are arguing that technological artifacts are 
not merely neutral tools. Moving away from food for a moment, 
take the old adage, a favorite of the National Rifle Association, 
that “guns don’t kill people; people kill people.” This entirely 
misses the fact that guns are designed with killing in mind, that 
the availability of guns gives power to some and takes it from 
others, and that their widespread availability makes purpose-
ful and accidental death more likely. Another way to say this is 
that guns, like every other technology, have political and social 
effects built into their very fabric. GM foods are no different.
To look at a technology like a GM seed through the limited 
technophilia vs. technophobia debate ultimately does not get us 
very far. We are much better off considering and judging each 
technology within its social and historic context, as both a prod-
uct and purveyor of politics. This means considering where a 
particular technology comes from, whom and what ends it bene-
fits, and what kinds of social and ecological relations it produces 
or holds in place.
Gm FooDs anD Global hunGer
For those who raise questions about GM foods, then, truly 
understanding this novel technology requires thinking about 
things like the context from which it has emerged, and the type 
of agricultural system that its use promotes. With this in mind, 
let us consider in more detail the arguments currently being 
made in favor of GM foods. Remember, we are being told that 
we need biotechnology to feed the world and slow the environ-
mental degradation caused by mainstream industrial farming.29 
The implication is that the few multinational companies that 
largely control the development of GM seeds and the chemicals 
that they require are best situated to lead us out of our current 
predicament, and that hunger is at base a technical problem to be 
resolved by the deployment of technological fixes.30 
In the wake of the recent food price increases, there are now 
more than 920 million people around the world who are chroni-
cally hungry.31 The proximate causes of this recent spike in hun-
ger are now well known, and can be recited briefly. In our highly 
industrialized global food system, crop prices are closely tied to 
oil prices, and with the price of a barrel of oil recently topping 
out at close to $150 per barrel, the fossil-fuel energy price surge 
has placed significant upward pressure on food costs.32 Another 
factor contributing to high food prices has been the near-drought 
conditions seen in Australia and much of Europe over recent 
growing seasons.33 These abnormal weather patterns have dra-
matically suppressed crop yields, particularly for wheat and 
rice.34 Since commodity crops like these are now sold on global 
markets, a significant food production shortfall in one region has 
worldwide implications.35
At the same time, increased demand for meat in China and 
a handful of other rapidly expanding economies have driven up 
demand for grains, while the collapse of home equity markets in 
the United States and elsewhere has driven speculative capital 
into food commodities markets, inflating the value of food in 
futures exchanges.36 Biofuels policies in Europe and the United 
States have also played a significant part in recent food price 
hikes by siphoning off increasing amounts of corn and other 
food crops for use in gas tanks.37 
GM foods are supposed to help alleviate all of these pres-
sures, principally by raising grain yields. If GM crops could 
consistently produce increased grain yields (itself a question-
able assumption) then this would presumably help us overcome 
the relative food shortages produced by the drought, demand for 
meat, corn-hungry biofuels mandates, and other factors outlined 
above.38 
However, there is a serious flaw in this argument. To imagine 
that hunger is a short-term problem, and to focus solely on tech-
nological responses to the proximate drivers of the recent food 
price crisis, is to miss a big part of the story. Hunger is hardly 
a new thing. Even in the few years before the 2008 price hikes, 
when food was cheap and the global food system was widely 
thought to be working effectively, there were an estimated 850 
million chronically hungry people around the world.39 This is 
something that tends to be lost and forgotten in current coverage 
of the food crisis. Yet try as we might to attribute conditions of 
hunger to short-term factors, this is clearly a long-term, struc-
tural problem. 
People have been going hungry in recent years despite 
the fact that we have a food system that produces roughly two 
pounds of grain per person each day.40 This is 3,000 kilocalories 
of food for each individual on the planet—more than enough to 
meet every person’s energy requirements, even before we take 
into account all of the nuts, fruits, and vegetables that our food 
system also provides.41 We live in a world of abundant food, yet 
millions go without adequate nutrition. How can this be?42
Here’s the punch-line, and it’s one that, thanks principally 
to the work of Amartya Sen, we have known for some time: in 
our age of abundance, hunger is ultimately not a function of a 
lack of food, but rather a function of a lack of access to food.43 
To push this argument further, framing hunger as something 
technical—to be resolved by the application of a simple techno-
logical fix—obscures the hidden workings of the global indus-
trial food system, drawing our attention away from the means 
by which our food system operates to produce hunger. Through 
the dominant technophilic lens, we tend to view hunger as some-
thing short-term and inadvertent. This is a mistake. It makes 
more analytic sense to see hunger as something that is a natural 
product of our organization of food production.44 When the food 
system produces hunger it is not failing, it is operating precisely 
as it has been developed to operate.
This is not to say that the people and organizations that 
have the most power in our contemporary food system go out 
of their way to create hunger and suffering. Yet in the push for 
profit and control that the industrial food system demands, some 
people win big and some people lose. The technologies we have 
developed to grow, process, package, and distribute food are a 
big part of why the food system now looks the way it does, and 
why its benefits accrue disproportionately to a shrinking number 
of large corporate actors. Certain Green Revolution technolo-
gies—combine harvesters, hybrid seeds, and chemical fertilizers 
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and pesticides, for instance—in combination with rich-country 
government policies and a range of other factors have helped 
to create our modern system of food production, and function 
now to hold it in place.45 With these technologies and in this 
environment a few farmers in rich countries are now able to 
produce truly extraordinary 
quantities of food. And yet the 
style of farming it encourages 
has had tragic environmental, 
economic, and social conse-
quences.46 Intractable chronic 
hunger is but one product of 
this system—a product that 
GM foods can never hope to 
magically abolish. 
Viewing the food crisis 
through this lens raises big 
questions about the claim 
that spreading biotechnology 
will feed the hungry and spur 
development in the world’s 
poorest regions. Instead, this 
analysis suggests that the 
more widespread use of GM foods may actually make things 
worse. Even should GM foods raise levels of food production, 
the structures and dynamics of food production and consump-
tion that are currently producing hunger go unchecked, and will 
in fact receive a boost from biotechnology. How will GM foods 
tackle the political roots of hunger and underdevelopment if 
through their development and deployment they serve to further 
entrench the very industrial food system that is giving rise to 
these problems? 
Some officials and commentators have described the recent 
food price hikes as a “silent tsunami.”47 There is some truth 
in this description. For one thing, the manner in which rising 
food costs have decimated lives and livelihoods calls to mind 
a marauding natural disaster.48 And, like the Indian Ocean tsu-
nami of 2004, the tragedy of global food riots has temporarily 
refocused attention on some of the world’s poorest regions.49 
After that, though, the metaphor breaks down. The global 
hunger and economic inequality that the food price crisis has 
exacerbated are not new things, brought on by a sudden catas-
trophe. Rather, they are old things made worse by new circum-
stances. Further, these recent food price increases are not acts 
of God. Instead, they represent a human-made tragedy. What I 
mean is that blame for the food price crisis lies not with nature 
or with other forces beyond our control, but ultimately with the 
constitution of our political and economic systems. Through 
political choices, institutional development, and technological 
design, we have developed a global food system that provides 
bountiful food to some while condemning others to lives of suf-
fering and deprivation. In this sense hunger is not natural; hunger 
is always political. GM foods ultimately do nothing to address 
these political roots of our food crisis. 
unDersTanDInG TechnoloGy
Let me try to be clear that this is not meant to be an anti-
technology commentary. I think it’s abundantly obvious that for 
humanity to thrive in ways that respect the rest of the natural 
world, we need a widespread technological revolution. In indus-
trialized countries and around the 
globe, we must find or recover 
more effective ways to produce 
and use energy, land, water, and 
the earth’s other scarce resources 
and sinks, in agriculture and in 
all other areas of life. The myriad 
challenges we face demand tech-
nological transformation on scales 
never before seen and experts and 
innovators to develop and dis-
tribute these new systems. Tech-
nology will always be front and 
center in any action to create a bet-
ter world.
However, our current forms 
of technological engagement are 
insufficient to achieve global sus-
tainability. The notion that there are just two extreme options 
open to us—unhindered technological development along our 
present path or a retreat into our ancestral caves—is a danger-
ous misinterpretation of what technology is, how technological 
change works, and what our options really look like. Instead of 
perpetuating this notion, we need to craft forms of technological 
engagement that are at once receptive to the promises of tech-
nological development and cognizant of challenges. This starts 
with understanding technology as an object not just of technical 
but of political study. It then means asking tough questions about 
contemporary technological life, and developing institutions that 
support such questioning. At the broadest level this means ask-
ing, what kind of world are we trying to create? What kinds of 
technologies will best help us create that world? 
There is no such thing as a one-shot, sacrifice-free solution 
to the food crisis, environmental crisis, or to any of the myriad 
other crises that contemporary life throws at us. And if the tech-
nological horrors of the twentieth century, from nuclear accidents 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to geno-
cide and environmental devastation, have taught us anything, it 
is that with technological promise often comes great peril. Self-
professed technophiles promise that through the application of 
technological fixes we can consistently overcome ecological 
limits.50 A far more promising tack, though, may be to appreci-
ate ecological limits and strive for rich lives within them. This 
is not an argument against technology and “progress,” as much 
as technophiles may wish to paint it in those terms. Rather, it’s 
a reiteration of an old environmental argument for technology in 
the service of a progress differently defined.51 
This means that instead of employing technologies to work 
against natural processes and bring them under a human yoke, we 
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can and must strive to develop technologies that help us engage 
with natural processes in ways that are productive and restoring. 
Consider that the fastest-growing segment of the food economy 
in the United States is farmers’ markets, and particularly those 
markets that support local and regional organic produce.52 The 
farmers who grow food for these local organic markets are not 
scratching in the ground with sticks. Many of these operations 
are incredibly high-tech.53 However, rather than depending on 
industrial technologies like GM crops, successful farms in this 
ilk depend on a mastery of the local, and on the development of 
technologies that accommodate cooperation with the land.54 
Some of this growing movement relies on the rediscovery 
of technologies and techniques from long ago. Intercropping dif-
ferent plant species and their successful rotation, managing the 
interplay between different aspects of the farm, drawing on local 
resources to develop and sustain the fertility of land through 
time—all are basic to the organic farmer’s tool kit.55 These are 
things that were known by the successful societies that came 
before our own, but have been largely lost in an age of industrial 
farming. These are lessons that are slowly being relearned, as a 
new wave of eager farmers taps into knowledge from a disap-
pearing breed, and the repositories of knowledge that exist in 
other places.56 
Much of the success of this emerging food system, though, 
depends not on the recovery of older farming forms, but on 
entirely new research. Finding alternatives to rampant industri-
alism is not just about turning backwards, but looking forwards 
along a new path. For instance, Wes Jackson and his team at 
the Land Institute in Kansas have developed highly productive 
perennial crop growing systems that provide a host of ecological 
benefits, without fostering a dependence on irreplaceable fossil 
fuels.57 Urban farmers across the United States are discovering 
new ways to grow food on roof-tops, on fire escapes, and on 
abandoned lots, and in the process are revitalizing neighbor-
hoods and transforming communities.58 More and more con-
sumers are discovering new connections to other people and to 
the environment through the simple act of eating delicious foods 
light on processing. This is a set of technologies—indeed, an 
expanding technological system—turned to a very different set 
of ends than that suggested by GM foods. This is technology in 
the service of human well-being, rather than a dangerous, short-
sighted industrial ideology.
conclusIon
We are, as Harriett Friedman has reminded us, eating ani-
mals.59 The search for sustainability is rooted in our food sys-
tem. With that in mind, our goal should not just be short-term 
fixes via an entrenchment of industrial farming methods. Rather, 
we should be striving to build an agricultural economy that gives 
us abundant healthful food while creating meaningful jobs, 
respects the land and the human and non-human organisms that 
depend on it, and views food as sustenance rather than simply as 
a collection of nutrients. To achieve this goal requires a technol-
ogy-based revolution that, at the same time, considers the deep 
contradictions in our social and economic condition. GM foods, 
in their present guise, as products of expanding corporate power, 
offer nothing of this sort. Rather, GM foods promise to further 
the present industrial food system, by affording more and more 
control to fewer and fewer players, by increasing the dependen-
cies of farmers and consumers, and by further clouding the rela-
tionships we have with our food and those who grow it. 
The GM foods debate reminds us that all technologies are 
ultimately products of political contestation, operating to the 
benefit of some and the exclusion and detriment of others. The 
more particular lesson is that hunger and the other problems that 
characterize the industrial food system are not the products of 
a shortage of food production, but rather a shortage of prudent, 
democratic engagement with the technological systems that 
comprise modern life. To build a sustainable food system, we 
need to find wiser ways to engage with our technological sys-
tems. Wisdom demands that we appreciate and work within the 
conflict between the contradictions of modernity and the com-
forts that it affords.60 There is no benefit in turning away from 
all of technology and all of the wonders that technological life 
provides us with. Nor is there real benefit in uncritically accept-
ing all technological developments. Either option is to deny our 
ability to shape our technological future. 
Transformation of our food system is basic to the revital-
ization of our material economy, and of our moral sensibilities. 
Technology must be at the heart of this transformation, but the 
form that this technology will take is not set in stone. The choice 
is not between bioengineering or mass starvation. Instead, there 
is a rich array of options open to us, ours for the making. 
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Since 1949, the Farm Bill has been updated every four to six years to reflect the evolving needs of the nation, addressing various topics from food stamps to agricul-
tural subsidies to natural disaster insurance. Section 11002 of 
the 2008 Farm Bill mandates country-of-origin labels for certain 
food products. This section amends the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1946, which gave prerequisites for producers of certain 
products only if they chose to put a USA label on their prod-
uct.1 The 2008 amendments to § 11002 now require country-
of-origin labels on goat meat, chicken, ginseng, pecans, and 
macadamia nuts. These are additions to the products which were 
already required to have country-of-origin labels. This prior list 
contained beef, lamb, pork, fish, peanuts, and perishable agricul-
tural commodities such as fruits and vegetables.2 Although these 
labels provide useful information to consumers, they come at a 
heavy price and still have loopholes allowing many food prod-
ucts to remain unlabeled. 
Country-of-origin labels will help consumers make informed 
decisions about the products they buy. Many consumers prefer 
American over foreign products. Also, in the event that foreign 
food products become somehow tainted, country-of-origin labels 
could reassure worried consumers. A good illustration of the 
utility of country-of-origin labeling comes from past outbreaks 
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly called “mad 
cow disease,” which may be present in cattle from England and 
Ireland.3 Outbreaks 1992 and 1993, where almost one thousand 
cases of mad cow disease were diagnosed in Great Britain each 
week,4 caused great fear among consumers of beef in the United 
States.
Some producers will enjoy decreased competition as a result 
of the 2008 amendment to § 11002. For example, the amendment 
adds macadamia nuts which are domestically grown in Hawaii.5 
They have also been imported from Australia—where they are 
more cheaply produced—and then packaged in Hawaii and sold 
as Hawaiian macadamia nuts for a lower price than those actu-
ally grown in Hawaii.6 Under the new law, these producers will 
have to market their nuts as products of Australia because nuts 
can only be labeled as American if they were produced exclu-
sively in the United States.7 
While the amendment will give consumers new knowl-
edge, the substantial costs of the labeling program will likely be 
passed on to consumers. The Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs estimates that labeling will cost producers, retailers, 
and packers anywhere from $500 million to $4 billion during 
the first year of implementation, and cost between $100 million 
and $600 million per year after the practice has been in place 
for ten years, making this “one of the most burdensome rules to 
be reviewed by the Administration.”8 The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, which underestimated costs when country-of-origin 
labels for fish were implemented in 2005, estimated a cost of 
$2.52 billion for producers, packers, and retailers during the first 
year.9 These costs come from producing new labels for all the 
products, segregating American from Canadian cattle in slaugh-
terhouses where they would otherwise be grouped together, 
and costs for some producers to find new domestic sources.10 
Furthermore, food retailers will face an estimated $952 million 
expense during the first year of implementation.11 When this 
price is handed down to consumers, this equates to an increase 
of seven cents a pound for beef and four cents a pound for pork, 
lamb, and goat.12 
Although it is more comprehensive, the amendment does 
contain holes. For instance, labels do not apply to all food prod-
ucts. Processed foods are exempted,13 removing a huge por-
tion of the overall food consumed in the United States. The 
exemption uses a broad interpretation of what is “processed,” 
and includes foods that have been cooked, cured, smoked, or 
restructured.14 The processed food exemption is also nonsensi-
cal as applied to certain products, like vegetables, which need 
labels when sold in separate packages but not if sold in a mixed 
bag.15 It only seems logical that if a consumer is entitled to know 
the origin of a bag of peas or carrots, the consumer should also 
be entitled to know the origin of a bag of peas and carrots. Other 
exemptions undermine the intended purpose of the rule. Roasted 
products, for example, are exempt from labeling, and as many 
nuts are sold roasted, this exemption will remove foods that the 
* Anastasia Lewandoski is a JD candidate, May 2010, at American University 
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Endnotes: Legislative Updatebill otherwise purports to regulate. Finally, restaurants and caf-eterias are not required to inform their customers where their 
food originated.16 
With these large exceptions, the country-of-origin require-
ment cannot be completely effective in informing Ameri-
can consumers of the origin of their food. Consumers are left 
guessing the origin of many products. Additionally, the costs to 
 consumers may be larger than the value of the information. In 
short, although the amendment is a step in the right direction 
for consumer information and food safety, it remains severely 
flawed. 
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Earth: The Sequel is an optimistic attempt at invigorating the debate over a cap-and-trade system for green house gas emissions. The book could not have come at a better time. 
Surging oil prices brought energy consumption and produc-
tion to the forefront of the presidential election campaign this 
summer, resulting in proposals for gas tax holidays and increased 
domestic production. Deregulation and the once-venerable free 
market are now slandered daily after the big business bailouts 
on Wall Street. A prevailing consensus of sorts has emerged 
about the need to invest in alternative energy, thereby creating 
millions of high-wage “green collar” jobs.1 It’s not surprising, 
however, that doubts remain about exactly where those millions 
of jobs will come from, and whether alternative fuels can rival 
their conventional fossil-based counterparts, or even whether it 
is advisable to place the future of the environment in the invis-
ible hands of the free market. 
This book seeks to alleviate those types of doubts. For 
authors Fred Krupp and Miriam Horn, the goal is stopping 
global warming. They see innovation and capitalism as the 
means to that end. They contend that the free market, along with 
a “technology neutral” price on carbon, is the fastest and most 
efficient tool for weaning ourselves off an unhealthy reliance 
on petroleum and diversifying our energy portfolio with clean, 
renewable resources. Krupp and Horn do not rely on graphs and 
spreadsheets to support their thesis. Instead, they provide anec-
dotal evidence drawn from the whole of the United States, from 
the sun-drenched west, to coal-rich Appalachia, to the dauntless 
Silicon Valley. To demonstrate that the country lacks appropri-
ate policy, not capable technology, the authors survey state-of-
the-art energy production in the fields of solar, tidal, geothermal, 
biofuels, and, yes, even coal. They argue that policy and not 
technology is holding back meaningful progress in the fight 
against global warming. 
The protagonists in Krupp and Horn’s stories are the engi-
neers, venture capitalists, and oilmen-turned-environmentalists 
that are on the verge of kick-starting a “new industrial revolu-
tion.” One colorful example is the story of Bernie Karl, of Chena 
Hot Springs, Alaska, whose ice hotel was dubbed “the dumbest 
business idea of the year” by Forbes Magazine when it melted 
book review
earth: the Sequel
the race to reinvent enerGy anD Stop Global warminG
by Fred Krupp and Miriam Horn Reviewed by John R. Shackelford*
*John Shackelford is a JD candidate, May 2009, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law and MA candidate, December 2009, at American Univer-
sity, School of International Service.
in 2004. Just two years later, Karl and the United Technologies 
Corporation opened a successful geothermal plant powered by 
water at temperatures so low that experts had previously written 
the source off for geothermal use. This renewable energy source 
now keeps Karl’s ice museum frozen during the summer, and it 
powers the rest of his resort all year long.
Importantly, Krupp and Horn do not get lost in their descrip-
tions of science fiction-like technology or ignore the potential 
contribution in the fight against global warming from developing 
countries. Perhaps the most inspirational story comes from the 
edge of the Brazilian Amazon, where an illiterate farmer named 
Herculano Porto rallied his neighbors to stand up to the loggers, 
ranchers, and armed gangs that raze the rainforest. His defiance 
led to the creation of “extractive reserves,” which eliminate the 
economic incentives behind rampant deforestation while allow-
ing those who rely on the forest to continue to use it sustainably. 
Earth: The Sequel only dabbles in the macroeconomic con-
cerns that pose a challenge to a national cap and trade system 
and does not devote much attention to the short-term effects 
such a policy might have on the deficit, the employment rate, or 
the prices of goods and services. It does, however, answer the 
fundamental underlying question driving the debate—whether 
we have the capacity and scientific know-how to combat global 
climate change—with an emphatic “yes!” This answer is both 
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